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Dedication
This book is dedicated to our late colleague and coauthor, R. Oliver
Clarke, 1923–2001.   Upon his death in August, 2001, Professor Greg Bamber
of Griffith University in Australia circulated the following biography of
Oliver:
Oliver Clarke was a Visiting Professor at Michigan State Uni-
versity’s School of Labor and Industrial Relations.  He also had
visiting assignments at the universities of: British Columbia, Wis-
consin-Madison, Western Australia, New South Wales, South
Australia, Leuven, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, and
also the American Graduate School of International Management,
Arizona.  After working in industry, where he trained in engineer-
ing, he became Secretary of the EEF, a major British employers’
association.  Then, after a period as Research Fellow at the Lon-
don School of Economics and as a management consultant, he
served for eighteen years in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development in Paris, where he coordinated its
work on industrial relations. He published widely on various
aspects of IR.  
Few people in the field were as expert as Oliver in matters involving
international industrial relations, as the many students who took his courses
will attest.   Indeed, his knowledge was truly encyclopedic, as was evidenced
by his annual article on labor matters for the Encyclopedia Britannica.  Thus,
Oliver touched academics, students, and the general public.
On a sabbatical in London in the winter of 2001, I had the pleasure of
spending many Thursday mornings with Oliver when illness confined him to
his house in London’s Golders Green.  We discussed industrial relations in
Britain, the United States, and the European Union.   Oliver pushed my think-
ing on U.S. industrial relations and labor matters, always encouraging me to
remember that the U.S. system of employment is only one of many in the
world.  Perhaps we in the United States, he always pointed out, could learn
something from others.  Oliver’s colleagues and his students are wiser and
more insightful for having known and been taught by him. He is  missed.
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Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establish-
ment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only
if it is based upon social justice;
And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injus-
tice, hardship, and privation to large numbers of people as to pro-
duce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are
imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently
required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work,
including the establishment of a maximum working day and
week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unem-
ployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection
of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of
his employment, the protection of children, young persons and
women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the inter-
ests of workers when employed in countries other than their own,
recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organi-
sation of vocational and technical education and other measures;
Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane condi-
tions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which
desire to improve the conditions in their own countries; . . .
Treaty of Versailles, 1919
The above quotation, from the provision of the Treaty of Versailles
establishing the International Labor Office in 1919, illustrates that the
issue of international labor standards has long been on the world stage.
During the last two decades, however, rising levels of international
trade and a proliferation of large-scale trade agreements have increased
the level of attention on cross-country differences in labor standards
and on issues associated with setting and enforcing international labor
standards.  Much of the discussion is on the interrelationship between
international trade and labor standards.  Despite considerable public
attention, relatively little empirical research has studied this relation-
ship.  One reason for this empirical void is the difficulty associated
with developing reliable measures of labor standards. 
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This volume has two purposes.  The primary purpose is to begin to
fill the gap in the research by developing a measure of labor standards
that can be applied across countries.  A second purpose is to apply that
measure to the United States and Canada to test a popular hypothesis
that Canada has higher labor standards than those in the United States.1
OVERVIEW OF THE RECENT DISCUSSION OF LABOR 
STANDARDS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
As international trade continues to rise, so does the awareness of
labor standards at global, regional, and national levels.  The debate
over the legitimacy of international labor standards and of linking stan-
dards to trade agreements has been long and contentious.  This debate
represents a deeper concern than simply identifying the “winners and
losers” in free trade.  Rather, it focuses on the role of government pol-
icy in protecting citizen welfare.  Government policy on employment
issues, like most government domestic policy, has traditionally been
determined by the domestic values as expressed in the political pro-
cess.  In an insular world with no outside contacts, societies could
adopt economic and employment relations policies solely in accor-
dance with their national interests and value systems, with little con-
cern about the consequences of interaction with societies having
different economic structures, employment relations, or value systems.
In a world of free trade, however, the insularity assumption does not
hold.  As competition increases, firms are more likely to be under pres-
sure to view human resources as a factor of production affecting their
ability to compete in the product market.  In their attempts to become
more competitive, firms may be tempted to use free trade to escape
costly regulatory obligations by moving production to a location with
less burdensome and, therefore, less costly labor standards.  Labor con-
ditions in different countries are thereby placed into competition.
Labor and employment policy, once exclusively a domestic issue, is
now affected by outside forces.
Differences in labor standards and labor employment policy
among competitors received little attention when the primary competi-
tors were firms in developed countries—the United States, Canada,
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Western Europe, and Japan—because all were perceived to be high-
wage countries, with high labor standards.  When less developed coun-
tries began to compete, however, with their lower labor standards and
lower wage rates, labor standards in competing countries began to be
seen as sources of competitive disadvantage for the developed coun-
tries.
Despite the intense public debate and interest that labor standards
issues have aroused over the last decade, there has been almost no
research on the relationship between trade and labor standards.  A pri-
mary reason for this empirical gap is the absence of measures of labor
standards that can be applied internationally.
The first objective of this book is to begin to close this empirical
gap by presenting a new method for comparing labor standards across
political jurisdictions; the second is to apply that method to the United
States and Canada.  In the absence of reliable comparative measures,
there is no way of evaluating differences in labor standards among
countries.  Therefore, there is no way of knowing how such differences
affect trade flows or other economic outcomes, such as income distri-
bution and employment levels.
THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS: WHY CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES MAY DIVERGE
When the issue of a free trade arrangement with the United States
and Canada was initially raised, one commonly articulated concern
was that Canadian labor standards would be forced downward as Cana-
dian and U.S. producers began to compete openly (Langille 1991).
Several years before the Free Trade Agreement was signed, the Cana-
dian Minister for International Trade, Gerald Regan, articulated the
basis for proceeding with the negotiations by saying, “I am convinced
above all that we cannot stand still and must explore new alternatives
to preserve and expand market access . . .  The status quo is simply not
a viable option for Canada’s future.”2  One basis for the opposition to a
free trade agreement was the belief that Canada had higher labor stan-
dards than the United States, and that the low labor standards of new
U.S. firms would give those firms a competitive advantage vis-à-vis
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their Canadian counterparts.  It was feared that free trade would result
in job losses or a deterioration of standards in Canada.
The second objective of this volume is to compare labor standards
in the United States and Canada and to examine the question of
whether labor standards are higher in Canada than in the United States.
Canada and the United States form a particularly interesting compari-
son because the two countries are quite similar in both economic and
demographic structure, yet differ in employment outcomes in several
important ways.
The United States and Canada are neighbors and one another’s
largest trading partners.  Among their similarities, both are developed
Western countries that trace their origins to British rule in the 18th cen-
tury.  Neither nation suffered economic infrastructure damage or civil-
ian casualties during World War II.  Thus, the industrial structures and
labor forces of the two countries are similar.
In terms of industrial structure, the plant, and equipment in the two
countries have followed comparable development cycles since World
War II.  In fact, many firms operate on both sides of the border (Lipset
1989; Rugman 1991).  The employment distribution across industries
differs in several ways, however.  While both economies employ
approximately 15 percent of the workforce in manufacturing and 17 to
18 percent in trade, the service sector in Canada constitutes 38 percent
of employment, compared with about 24 percent in the United States.
Another difference is that Canadian employment is somewhat more
concentrated in primary industries, including logging and forestry, fish-
ing and trapping, and mining.  Primary industries employ 2.1 percent
of the Canadian workforce, compared with 0.5 percent in the United
States (CANSIM 1998; U.S. Department of Commerce 1998e).
In general, the compositions of both the populations and the labor
forces of the two countries are fairly similar.  First, the populations
have similar age distributions.  In Canada, 33.2 percent of the popula-
tion are under 25 and 12.3 percent are age 65 or older (CANSIM
1998).  In the United States, 35.5 percent of the population is under 25,
and 12.8 percent are 65 or over (U.S. Department of Commerce
1998c).  Labor force participation is slightly higher in the United
States: 79.3 percent compared with 75.9 percent in Canada, in 1996
(CANSIM 1998). Although these rates are nearly identical for prime-
aged males and females (ages 25 to 54) in the two countries (about 91
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percent for males and 76 percent for females), labor force attachment
for U.S. workers is distinctly higher for those over 55.  In Canada, the
labor force participation rates of males ages of 55 to 64 and those 65 or
over are 59.3 percent and 10.3 percent, respectively.  The comparable
rates in the United States are 67.0 percent and 16.6 percent.  There are
similar patterns for females: the rates for Canadian women 55 to 64
and 65 or over are 39.6 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively, compared
with 49.6 percent and 8.6 percent in the United States.3 
Both countries are experiencing an ethnic diversification of their
populations, as both have been the destinations of European and more
recently Asian immigrants (Borjas 1993).  Canada’s share of immi-
grants from Asia is, however, effectively twice that of the United
States: over 1995–1996, 65.9 percent of all Canadian immigrants were
from Asia, compared with 37.2 percent for the United States in 1995
(CANSIM 1998; U.S. Department of Commerce 1998b).  In contrast, a
much larger share of U.S. immigrants comes from Mexico and Central
America: 30.3 percent of U.S. immigrants compared with 1.5 percent
of Canadian immigrants. 
The education levels of the two countries’ populations are roughly
comparable, although tight comparisons are difficult because of differ-
ences in the degree structure and because government data are reported
for different age categories.  In Canada, 17 percent of those aged 20 or
over have a university degree, compared with 15.8 percent of those
aged 25 and over in the United States, suggesting that the Canadian
labor force is better educated.  However, only 18 percent of Canadians
aged 15 and over have just high school diplomas, compared with 33.6
percent of the U.S. population aged 25 years or older, suggesting that
the U.S. labor force may be better educated (Statistics Canada 1998;
U.S. Department of Commerce 1998d). 
Despite these broad similarities, researchers have noted differences
in several labor market outcomes.  One difference is in unemployment.
Until the recession of the early 1980s, the two countries experienced
almost identical unemployment rates (Card and Freeman 1993; Riddell
and Sharpe 1998).4  Since then, Canada has experienced chronically
higher unemployment rates relative to the United States.  On average,
over the 1983–1996 period, the unemployment rate in the United States
was 6.5 percent, compared with 9.8 percent in Canada (Nickell 1997).
This difference has increased during the 1990s, with short-term unem-
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ployment falling in the United States from 6.4 percent between 1983
and 1988 to 5.6 percent between 1989 and 1994, while the comparable
Canadian rate remained effectively constant—9 percent in the early
period,  8.9 percent in the later period (Nickell 1997).  Subgroup unem-
ployment rates in 1996 indicate that unemployment for those just
entering the labor market, ages 15 to 24, and those on the verge of leav-
ing, age 65 or over, is nearly identical in the two countries.  However,
Canada’s unemployment rate for prime age workers, 25 to 54, is
approximately twice that in the United States.
Economists speculate about reasons for this difference in unem-
ployment rates.  One ready explanation is that wages are more flexible
in the United States than in most developed countries, implying that the
U.S. labor market equilibrates through adjustments in wages rather
than employment levels.  Time series data do not support this explana-
tion, however; they suggest, in fact, that wages are less flexible in  both
the U.S. and Canadian labor markets than in other developed econo-
mies, and that, comparing the two countries, U.S. wages are slightly
less flexible than those in Canada (Nickell 1997).  In addition, research
comparing Canada, the United States, and France suggests that wage
rigidity does not explain employment growth differences, implying
that it also will not explain unemployment differences (Card, Kramarz,
and Lemieux 1996).
There seems to be some agreement that the reasons for the unem-
ployment rate gap in the 1980s are different from those for the 1990s
(Keil and Pantuosco 1998; Riddell and Sharpe 1998).  For example,
one explanation that has been explored is that the gap is the result of
different rates of economic growth, attributable to differing monetary
policies in the two countries.  Evidence shows that the two countries
had comparable rates of growth through the 1980s, but that over the
period from 1989 through 1996, the annual growth rate in gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in the United States was 1.9 percent compared with
1.2 percent in Canada.  This suggests that, while a macroeconomic
explanation is plausible for the 1990s, it is probably not so for the ini-
tial gap in the 1980s. 
Card and Freeman (1993) empirically decomposed the unemploy-
ment rate difference during the 1980s and conclude that it can be attrib-
uted to structural features in the two labor markets.  They note that the
labor force participation for females increased faster in Canada than in
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the United States in the early 1980s, and that this increase took the
form of longer unemployment durations.  They link this behavior
change to two aspects of unemployment insurance in Canada: the
availability of maternity leave benefits associated with unemployment
or employment insurance and the substantially higher take-up rates—
approximately 60 percent in Canada compared with 25 percent in the
United States (Card and Freeman 1993).  Increases in female  partici-
pation rates in Canada have also been interpreted as having caused
increasing unemployment rates in Canada by allowing other household
members to extend their job searches (Keil and Pantuosco 1998).  This
is consistent with other findings showing that the 1981–1993 gap can
be explained in part by longer unemployment durations on the part of
Canadian males (Tille 1998). 
A second difference is in the union density rates in the two coun-
tries.  Compiling data from the U.S. Current Population Survey and the
Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey, Dinardo and Lemieux
(1997) found overall union density rates of 21.4 percent and 40.2 per-
cent in 1988 for the United States and Canada, respectively.  In the
labor force aged 25 and over, there is a consistent difference in the rates
of 20 percentage points between the two countries for all age groups,
indicating that this difference is not a cohort effect.  Although within
all educational categories Canadians are more likely than Americans to
be union members, the largest difference is for the most educated,
those with 16 years of school or more: in 1988, 13.9 percent of such
U.S. workers were union members, compared with 35.7 percent of
similarly educated Canadians.  While there are some differences in
industry mix, they do not explain the differences in union density rates.
Rather, Canadian workers in every industry are more likely to be union
members than are their counterparts in the United States.  Current data
suggest that the differences in union density rates persist.
A third labor market outcome in which the United States and Can-
ada have diverged is that of  income inequality.  The increasing ine-
quality of income in the United States has been well documented
(Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Johnson 1998; Topel 1997), but whereas
the Canadian evidence suggests that income inequality increased dur-
ing the late 1960s and again in the early 1980s, the evidence of rising
inequality is ambiguous in Canada since the early 1980s (Blackburn
and Bloom 1993).  Beach and Slotsve (1996) argued that, contrary to
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popular opinion, there is no evidence of income polarization in Can-
ada.  They maintained that increases in income inequality in Canada
can be accounted for almost entirely by cyclical factors, and that there
is a tight correlation between the unemployment rate and income ine-
quality.  Further, they found that income inequality for women, while
higher than for men, actually declined over the 1971–1992 period.
When the focus shifts to earnings, however, polarization is more
evident.  Again, there is evidence of gender differences: earnings ine-
quality did increase for males but decreased for females.  Beach and
Slotsve find different underlying patterns for men and women.  There
appears to be a long-term trend toward decreased inequality for
women; however, male inequality seems to be more a function of eco-
nomic growth and unemployment rates.  These differences combined
with Canadian income transfer policies have meant that there have
been no real long-term changes in family income inequality, unlike the
situation in the United States.
These observations are supported by another study, which finds
that increased hours of work by families mitigated against factors that
increased inequality in Canada (Morissette, Myles, and Picot 1995).
That study did find evidence of increased income inequality in Canada
but attributes it to differences in the hours worked, with more people
working part time, and those working full time working more than 40
hours.  This contrasts with the explanation commonly given for ine-
quality in the United States—that is, that widening gaps in the number
of years of education and in the quality of education lead to differences
in earnings. 
Unlike Beach and Slotsve, however, Morissette et al. argued that
there are underlying trends in the rise of income inequality that cannot
be entirely explained by the business cycle.  Their interpretation of the
shift in hours of work distribution is that firms are adopting a core-con-
tingent workforce strategy, increasing the number of hours worked by
core workers and decreasing the number worked by contingent work-
ers.
In a comparative study of how technological change has affected
the wage distribution in the United States and Canada, Murphy et al.
(1998) also attributed the differences between the two countries to
income transfer policies.  Their study differs from most in that they
examine this relationship in two ways.  First, they maintain that differ-
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ences in labor supply at relative wage rates can affect inequality and
that these are omitted from most studies.  Second, they note that usu-
ally a technological explanation of wage inequality explains abrupt
shifts in the wage distribution and not smooth trends.  They argued that
the differences in shifts in the income distribution in the two countries
can be explained by an “education-race” model, and that differences in
social policy between Canada and the United States explain the out-
come differences.
The education-race model argues that there are two simultaneous
trends, one driven by rates of technological change and the other by
changes in the education distribution of the workforce.  During the
period under study, 1963–1994, Murphy et al. assumed a constant rate
of technological change (that is, change due to the introduction of the
digital computer) and then examined how the relative supply of high
school versus college educated workers has affected the income distri-
bution.  They provided evidence that, cumulatively, technological
change has increased the demand for more educated workers relative to
their supply and has thus increased the earnings inequality.  However,
the  income transfer policies in Canada have mitigated that effect such
that income inequality there has not increased as it has in the United
States.
One explanation for some of these differences in the various eco-
nomic outcomes may lie in the fact that the United States and Canada
differ in their views of the relationship between the individual and the
government and of the role of the state in regulating economic matters.
The United States is generally considered antistatist and individualistic
(Lipset 1989; Blank 1994; Block 1992).  Its entire constitutional and
governmental structure is built around limiting the power and role of
government.  Canada is more statist than the United States, and has tra-
ditionally been more willing to accept some governmental control over
the lives of its citizens in order to obtain security and order (White
1988; Lipset 1989).  Therefore, as a society, Canadians are likely to be
more willing than citizens of the United States to use the government
as an instrument of wealth redistribution.
This difference in values between the United States and Canada
toward the role of the state was manifested most clearly in the debate
around the 1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.5  The FTA gener-
ated far more public debate in Canada than in the United States (Mah-
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ant 1993).  Canadian opponents of the FTA made their arguments in
terms of sovereignty, holding that Canada’s commitment to a high level
of social welfare for all its citizens would be compromised if free trade
resulted in pressure to harmonize its policies downward with  U.S. pol-
icies (Lyon 1987; Doern and Tomlin 1991; Martin 1991; Mahant 1993;
Smith 1988). 
A key theme in that debate was the perceived Canadian commit-
ment to social welfare in the form of high labor standards.6  The con-
cern on the part of Canadian FTA opponents seemed to be that, to
assure competitiveness in the product market, Canadian firms could
use the pressure of free trade as a basis for a political attempt to unbur-
den themselves of labor standards obligations, could reduce compensa-
tion to offset the costs of the higher Canadian labor standards, or could
move production to a location that was believed to have less burden-
some and therefore, less costly labor standards.  In all cases, the wel-
fare of workers and citizens would be reduced through a reduction in
standards, in compensation, or in employment. 
That view is based on the assumption that Canada’s labor standards
are superior to those of the United States, an assumption that is one
component of a more general attitude that Canada is more generous
than the United States in all forms of social assistance, in terms of both
eligibility and level of benefits (Blank and Hanratty 1993).  Empirical
comparisons of social assistance programs in the two countries, how-
ever, present a mixed picture.  Part of this arises from the differing
degrees to which these programs are federally controlled in the two
countries, with Canadian policies generally emanating from the prov-
inces, and U.S. policies reflecting more of a federal-state mix (Boy-
chuk 1997).  As the United States experienced growth during the 1960s
and 1970s in federal antipoverty programs, Canadian federal policy
took a cost-sharing form of matching provincial benefits that allowed
for considerable interprovincial variation (Blank and Hanratty 1993).
More recently, both countries have experienced a backlash against
spending on social assistance.  In the United States, this has taken the
form of some federal retrenchment, leading to more interstate varia-
tion.  Empirical comparisons of social assistance in the two countries
suggest that, on average, both coverage and benefit levels are more
generous in Canada than in the United States, but that there is sufficient
variation that, depending on the program feature, the least (most) gen-
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erous Canadian province is less generous than the least (most) gener-
ous U.S. state (Blank and Hanratty 1993; Boychuk 1997).
A second objective of this monograph is to investigate whether the
conventional wisdom, that Canadian labor standards are higher than in
the United States and that the difference is substantive, is correct.  The
chief justification for asking such questions is that a finding of substan-
tive and significant differences would allow the investigation of the
economic effect of the level of labor standards on various economic
outcomes.  It is often held that higher labor standards would put
domestic firms at a disadvantage relative to their foreign counterparts,
other things (such as exchange rates) being equal.  It is also plausible
that higher governmentally mandated labor standards might induce
firms to invest in their workforces (that is, engage in an efficiency
wage strategy) and thus raise the productivity of labor relative to for-
eign competitors.  The extent to which Canadian labor standards are
actually higher than U.S. standards has never been demonstrated.  Our
empirical examination of this issue will allow us to test the validity of
the assumption—often political—that labor standards are a cost, put-
ting domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage.
ORGANIZATION
This publication is associated with a website that makes available
the data used to measure the labor standards in the two countries.  This
availability will permit researchers throughout the world to use the data
to replicate our results, to change the assumptions underlying our
results, or to apply specific standards that may interest them and ana-
lyze their impact on trade and trade-related phenomena.  This website
will also permit researchers to easily use or adapt this method to com-
pare labor standards across jurisdictions other than the United States
and Canada.
Turning to the organization of this volume, Chapter 2 reviews the
literature on the relationship between labor standards and trade, both
generally and with specific attention to the United States and Canada.
Chapter 3 provides definitions of the labor standards discussed.  Chap-
ter 4 discusses the data and methodology used to compare the labor
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standards in the two countries.  Chapter 5 presents the results of the
comparison of labor standards in the two countries, through text and
tables.  Chapter 6 summarizes the results and presents conclusions.
Notes
1. Not all work finds that U.S. labor costs are lower than those in Canada.   One
study (Roberts and Smith 1992) found that U.S. and Canadian labor costs were
quite comparable.  Expressed in U.S. dollars, in 1993 the average hourly compen-
sation for production workers in manufacturing stood at $16.79 in the United
States and $16.36 in Canada, further suggesting comparability between the two
countries (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a).  To the extent that labor standards
are reflected in hourly compensation, this research should cause one to question
the proposition that Canadian firms are at a disadvantage relative to their counter-
parts in the United States.
2. Regan 1984, p. 16.
3. It could be argued that higher social welfare benefits in Canada explain some of
the differences in labor force participation.  However, research on the labor force
participation decision in Canada shows that it depends more on personal charac-
teristics than on the level of welfare benefits (Christofides, Stengos, and Swidin-
sky 1997).
4. Although the gap between Canadian and U.S. unemployment rates has triggered
considerable interest among economists, there is some evidence that the relation-
ship between the two rates, including the almost identical patterns up until the
early 1980s, is a statistical artifact, and that looking for structural shifts or exoge-
nous shocks to explain the gap is misguided (Lang and Zagorsky 1998).
5. The discussion in this paper focuses on the debate around the 1988 FTA.
Although many of the same issues were raised in the debate around the 1993
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) involving Canada, Mexico, and
the United States, the fact that NAFTA involved a third, less-developed country
made it more difficult to focus on that debate in discussing Canadian-U.S. differ-
ences.
6. There has been some work on specific issues that might be considered labor stan-
dards.  For comparative studies in collective bargaining, see Weiler (1983),
Adams (1993), and Block (1994 and 1996).  For comparative studies in workers’
compensation, see Burton (1989), Roberts and Madden (1992), and Hyatt and
Kralj (1992).  For a comparative study in unjust discharge, see Jain (1992).  For
an overview of social contracts, see Card and Freeman (1994).
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Labor Standards and Trade
Background and Literature Review
Two distinct, but related, bodies of literature discuss the interrela-
tionship between trade and labor standards.  The economics literature
treats labor standards as a form of factor price and examines, in that
light, how labor standards affect trade and vice versa.  The institutional
literature debates, first, whether labor standards should be explicitly
linked to trade agreements and, second, the propriety of setting univer-
sal standards.  This chapter provides an overview of these two discus-
sions.
The following section of this chapter reviews the economics per-
spective on labor standards, discussing three branches of the literature:
first, the studies on how factor prices affect trade, then those on how
trade affects factor outcomes, and finally, the few studies on the rela-
tionship between labor standards and trade.  The next section, a discus-
sion of the institutional perspective, expands the concept of labor
standards to examine the literature on universal labor standards, both
the studies that support explicit linkages between trade arrangements
and those that oppose such linkages.  The chapter concludes with an
overview of two preeminent institutions that establish and attempt to
enforce international labor standards: the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) and the European Union (EU).  The EU analysis centers
on the experience of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.
THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
The relationship between trade and factor prices is complicated
and not especially well understood.  One source of complexity is that
causality can be argued either way: trade flows can depend on factor
prices (which affect product prices); but also factor prices can shift
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when reducing trade restrictions  increases competition.  Considerable
research has been done on the determinants of trade.  Similarly, the
effect of trade on factor prices, particularly wages, has been investi-
gated.  However, an important gap remains in this research: the rela-
tionship between trade and labor standards, as a form of factor price,
has not been thoroughly investigated. 
The Effect of Factor Price on Trade
The simplest understanding of trade is based on the theory of com-
parative advantage, in which parties trade those goods for which they
have the relative production cost advantage (Karier 1991; Krugman
1994).  In the comparative advantage model, countries differ in produc-
tivity and factor price but not in factor endowments.  If trade barriers
are dropped, trade occurs because each country can specialize accord-
ing to its relative productivity.  The resulting more efficient use of
resources lowers prices for traded goods, and producers from both
countries face the improved demand schedule resulting from aggregat-
ing across the trading units as well as the reduced product price result-
ing from more efficient production.
The welfare implications of the comparative advantage model are
unambiguous: both trading parties enter the exchange voluntarily and
do so only because each is better off than it would be in the absence of
trade (Marshall 1994).  The comparative advantage model views any
sort of tariff or nontariff barriers to free trade as reducing the efficiency
of market allocation of resources, and thus, as suboptimal.1  According
to this view, although protectionist tactics may provide short-term ben-
efits to selective groups, both trading partners are better off under con-
ditions of unrestricted trade (Gaston and Trefler 1994).  Free trade
permits welfare to be maximized in both the importing and the export-
ing country, because each country will be better off than otherwise
(Srinivasan 1995; Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 1997; Golub 1997). 
In a solely domestic context (referred to as an autarky), govern-
ment-mandated labor standards can be seen from the employer per-
spective as a universally imposed cost of production, and from the
employee perspective as a set of protections of income or quality of
work life.  Once trade is introduced and the economy becomes more
competitive, the cost aspect of labor standards loses its universality.
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Producers located in jurisdictions where labor standards are high often
perceive themselves as facing higher production costs than those faced
by their low-labor-standard competitors.  In fact, in the debate over
linking labor standards to trade agreements such as the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), developing countries often accuse
developed countries of advocating labor standards obligations in order
to diminish the production advantage that the developing country has
because of its lower labor costs (Swinnerton and Schoepfle 1994). 
From this perspective, statutory protection of the workforce can be
viewed by producers as a nontariff trade barrier.  Advocates of the
comparative advantage framework may acknowledge that certain dis-
locations will occur in the short run, with less-efficient producers and
their employees suffering as a result of competition from more efficient
producers.  Proponents of this view further argue that unimpeded
growth could result in better working conditions and higher wages than
if labor standards were legislated (Hufbauer and Schot 1992).
Proponents of labor standards raise several counterarguments, all
designed to show that the imposition of labor standards does not neces-
sarily harm the competitive position of international traders.  One is
that cost minimization is not necessarily the most efficient production
strategy, at least with regard to labor costs.  This argument is based on
the efficiency wage theory (Carmichael 1989).  Efficiency wage theory
argues that employees and employers strike a wage-effort bargain, in
which employees will put forth greater effort in exchange for long-term
higher wages.  Efficiency wage theory has important implications for
many aspects of the employment relationship, but the one relevant to
trade is that this theory provides an economic justification for employ-
ers paying what appears to be above-market wages while remaining
competitive in the product market.  According to this model, firms are
seen as making a strategic choice as to how to operate.  The choice to
pay above-market wages and invest in workers is an attribute of a
“high-performance” workplace (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Marshall
1994).  Thus, one economic justification for labor standards is that they
are part of a high-compensation strategy that induces high levels of
work effort or low levels of employee monitoring, and so does not
harm the competitiveness of producers in the product market (Sharma
and Giles 1994; Groshen and Krueger 1990).
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A second justification for labor standards comes out of the con-
sumer theory (Freeman 1994).  According to that view, labor standards
can be seen as a consumer good and a normal good in that demand
increases with wealth.  In the autarky framework, the level of labor
standards could easily be seen as an indication of that society’s willing-
ness to pay for a workplace that is safer, more just, more secure, or
having some other welfare-enhancing quality.  There are three likely
payers for these standards: employees who pay in the form of lower
wages,2 consumers who pay in the form of higher product prices, and
taxpayers who pay in the form of higher taxes.  In the world of imper-
fect competition, it is also possible that firms (or their shareholders)
would pay in the form of lower monopoly profits (Karier 1992).  With
the introduction of trade, labor standards become components of the
product price; thus, consumers, employees, and taxpayers express their
willingness to pay for the higher labor standards by their acceptance of
the higher-priced goods, the lower wages, or the higher taxes.3
Empirical analyses of the effects of various factors thought to
affect the cost of labor on trade flows or other measures of economic
growth give a mixed picture.  Karier (1991, 1992, 1995) examined the
effect of union density on the U.S. trade deficit and found no union
effect.  Cooke  (1997) examined the effects of various measures of the
industrial relations climate on direct foreign investment in countries
within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and found that investment was negatively affected by union
density rates, centralized collective bargaining structures, and govern-
ment regulations on layoff procedures, but positively affected by
human capital levels of the workforce and mechanisms for joint labor-
management cooperation.  Several studies have examined the effects of
union density rates on capital investment and found a negative (usually
nonlinear) relationship (Hirsch 1992; Odgers and Betts 1997).  Sharma
and Giles (1994) examined whether income policies, collectively bar-
gained wage rates, and statutory reduction in working time affected a
country’s export levels and its share of the world’s export markets.
Using data from 10 countries over a 20-year period, they found limited
support for a negative effect of bargained wage rates on trade, no effect
for working time regulation, and negative and significant effects of
income policies on trade.
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The Effect of Trade on Factors of Production
The concern about the effects of free trade on factors of production
(in the labor context—employment, wages, and labor standards) is that
the competition in the product market will force producers to engage in
a cost-minimization strategy that will result in lower wages, less
employment, or both.  The specific concerns are that global competi-
tion will result in higher unemployment and falling relative wages for
lower-skilled workers, and thus rising wage inequality, deterioration of
labor standards, and a decline in national autonomy in setting standards
that are consistent with each country’s values (Adams 1997; Lee 1997).
In a version of the comparative advantage model, trade occurs as a
result of different factor endowments that result in different factor
prices.  These differences in factor prices form the basis for a compara-
tive advantage.  In this model, free trade in goods will equalize factor
prices across countries as international flows of factors or technology
lead to the convergence of endowments and thus of factor price
(Slaughter 1997).  In the case of labor standards, while trade may not
lead directly to convergence of labor standards, this model predicts
political pressures in that direction (Compa 1993).
Few empirical studies directly examine the relationship between
trade liberalization and labor standards.  Most of the empirical work
examines the effect of trade on other aspects of work, such as wages,
employment, or income distribution.  Again, empirical studies provide
mixed results.  For example, some research supports the assertion that
growing earnings inequality within developed countries can be partly
attributed to increased international trade (Borjas and Ramey 1994;
Richardson 1995).  Wood (1995) examined income distribution in
developed countries and found that relative wages for unskilled work-
ers in those countries had deteriorated as a result of trade with develop-
ing countries.  Additional evidence suggests that both import and
export activity increase earnings inequality, but that import activity has
the greater effect (Borjas and Ramey 1994). 
In contrast to those studies, Edwards (1997) examined changes in
income distribution for developing countries as a proxy for this out-
come and found no increase in income inequality as a result of trade
liberalization.  Ben-David (1993) found evidence for a positive rela-
tionship between trade liberalization and income convergence, but
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Slaughter (1997) noted that, although theory predicts that trade liberal-
ization should lead to the convergence of income across trading part-
ners, income convergence can be predicted as easily by a convergence
in worker’s access to capital stock as by trade liberalization.
In an examination of Canadian income distribution, Richardson
(1997) compared wage distributions in the United States and Canada
from 1981 through 1992.  His comparison showed that male wage ine-
quality grew at a faster rate in the United States for the 1981–1989
period.  But, inequality increased much more in Canada between 1989
and 1992.  Richardson does not discuss this in terms of the implemen-
tation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA); however, the timing of the
change in relative inequality does coincide with the implementation of
the agreement. 
Several studies on the effects of trade liberalization on unemploy-
ment show results that parallel those studies cited above that find an
increasing inequality of income distribution.  Three studies of the dis-
placement effects of trade suggest that employees who lose their jobs
in trade-sensitive industries experience unemployment spells of longer
duration than those losing jobs from trade-insensitive industries (Addi-
son, Fox, and Ruhm 1995; Bednarzik 1993; Kruse 1988).  This is con-
sistent with the results of another study that showed that trade-related
employment gains in the service sector were most likely to be found in
skill-intensive services (Armah 1994).  Lee (1997) concluded, how-
ever, in his discussion of the labor issues associated with economic
integration, that the balance of the empirical evidence cannot support
the hypothesis that trade is a primary explanation for rising unemploy-
ment.
Empirical Research on Trade and Labor Standards
Some empirical work has been done on the relationship between
labor standards and trade.  Rodrick (1994) used a measure of a coun-
try’s labor standards that was composed of  the following indicators:
the number of total ILO conventions and the number of basic rights
ILO conventions ratified, indicators of  political and civil rights, indi-
cators of the extent of the annual enforcement of child labor legislation,
the number of statutory hours of work in manufacturing or construc-
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tion, the number of days of annual leave in manufacturing, and the per-
centage of the labor force that was unionized. 
Rodrick found that the convention ratification measures and the
rights measure were positively and significantly related to labor costs,
whereas the child labor measure generated a negative and significant
coefficient.  Gross national product (GNP) per worker was used as a
control measure of productivity.  With the exception of the number of
hours of work, however, Rodrick did not find that the labor standards
were positively related to a comparative advantage in labor-intensive
goods  as measured by the ratio of textile and clothing exports to all
non-fuel exports. 
Aggarwal (1995a) examined export and investment data for coun-
tries and sectors considered to have varying levels of labor standards.
She found that for Singapore, Mexico, South Korea, and Malaysia—
countries she considered “developing”—more than half the export
share was accounted for by machines and transport equipment, indus-
tries that were considered to have higher labor standards than textiles,
garments, and toys.  The latter industries, however, were within the top
five export sectors for those countries.  Examining U.S. direct foreign
investment in nine developing countries, she found no indication that
such investment went disproportionately to labor-intensive industries.
She also concluded that developing countries with low labor standards
have a small aggregate impact on U.S. imports.  In 1994, ten develop-
ing countries accounted for 26.5 percent of U.S. total imports, whereas
Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan accounted
for 51.1 percent of imports.  She did point out, however, that at the cur-
rent growth rates the import share from developing countries would
have risen to approximately 41.5 percent by the year 2000.  She also
found no evidence of employment or wage declines in U.S. sectors
producing goods commonly associated with low labor standards in
response to the imports from developing countries.
The OECD (1996) examined the relationship between freedom of
association and trade.  Countries were divided into four groups on the
basis of each country’s ratification of ILO conventions, with group 1
manifesting the broadest rights of freedom of association, and group 4
the narrowest.  Using a one-way visual analysis, the study found no
indication that freedom of association was related to the change in the
country’s share of world exports between 1980 and 1990, but some
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indication that countries that had greater restrictions on freedom of
association experienced an increase in the country’s share of world
manufacturing imports.  Improvement in labor standards seemed to
have no effect on export performance.  Although there was evidence
that countries with narrow rights of freedom of association had lower
export prices for textiles, the group 1 countries had the highest market
share, suggesting the possibility of product differentiation.  There was
no evidence that high labor standards affected foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI); in 1993, 73 percent of FDI went to the high-standards
OECD countries. 
There are limitations to these three studies.  The OECD study
focused only on one indicator of labor standards: freedom of associa-
tion.  Although Rodrick’s work used multiple indicators, these were
measured only in the broadest way, by ratification of ILO conventions.
Aggarwal’s work relied principally on judgments of countries consid-
ered to have high or low labor standards.
THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In the political arena, the coupling of labor standards with free
trade issues has been the subject of long-standing discussion over the
past 100 years (Charnovitz 1987; French 1994).  Before the 1980s,
much of the discussion was raised in the context of competition among
countries at roughly similar levels of economic development (Servais
1989).   The issue took on renewed urgency in the 1980s, however,
with the increased involvement in worldwide trade of less-developed,
third world countries (Servais 1989).  Since the Uruguay Round in
1986, where the coupling was formally raised in a trade context (Char-
novitz 1987; OECD 1996), a theoretical and conceptual literature has
emerged on linking labor standards to free trade agreements.
The theoretical and conceptual literature consists of two competing
viewpoints.  One, associated primarily although not totally with the
ILO, is generally sympathetic to a legal linkage of trade and labor stan-
dards.  The second, associated primarily with advocates for less-devel-
oped countries, takes the position that it is inappropriate to link the
trade privileges of a country with the labor standards of that country.
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Linking Trade and Labor Standards
Although concern about the relationship between labor standards
and international trade has a long history, was referenced in the GATT,
and has been an integral aspect of the European Union (Hansson 1983),
that concern increased in the 1970s, when a long recession in the indus-
trialized market economies coincided with increased worldwide pro-
ductive capacity in such labor-intensive industries as apparel, textiles,
shoes, and electronics (Edgren 1979). 
Those sympathetic to the position that there should be a social
clause in trade agreements or a procedure in the worldwide trading sys-
tem that would link trade privileges to internal labor standards base
their position on human rights and social values.  If a country wishes to
reap the benefits of participating in the world trading system, then that
country should be obliged to guarantee its workers at least a minimal
acceptable level of labor standards (Maier 1994; ICFTU 1996; Caire
1994; Emmerij 1994). 
These arguments have sparked discussion of the propriety of incor-
porating a social clause or labor standards requirements in the interna-
tional trading system.  It has been pointed out that a series of
declarations sanctioned by the United Nations are consistent with the
principle that there should be a balance among markets, open informa-
tion, and government action; therefore, government action may be
essential to protecting worker rights in social development, thus creat-
ing a role for labor standards enforcement in the trading system (de
Waart 1996).   It is argued that requiring some minimal level of labor
standards would promote fair competition; firms would not be able to
use the lower labor standards and living conditions in some countries
to cause lower wages or less employment in the importing country or
in the country from which employment is shifted.  This, in turn, would
prevent any downward harmonizing of labor standards from causing a
“race to the bottom” and “social dumping” (Charnovitz 1987; van
Liemt 1989; Langille 1994; Gunderson 1998).
It is also argued that a social clause diffuses the benefits from
trade, increasing the possibility that workers worldwide will benefit
from trade, rather than some workers benefiting, and other workers
being victimized (van Liemt 1989; Golub 1997).4  Such a result would
raise the living standards of workers in developing countries, thereby
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supporting markets for consumer goods and reducing social tensions
caused by inequality (Servais 1989; ICFTU 1996).  A social clause
would also avoid the possibility of collaboration of Western countries
in the exploitation of workers in underdeveloped countries (van Liemt
1989).  Finally, a social clause would actually defuse pressures within
the Western countries for protectionism by removing one of the main
arguments that is used in support of protectionism (van Liemt 1989;
ICFTU 1996).
At the global level, the debate over including a social clause in
trade agreements notably sharpened at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) meeting in Singapore in 1996 and again at the Seattle meeting
in 1999 (Charnovitz 1987; van Liemt 1989; Rodrick 1994; Fields
1995; Lee 1997; WTO 1996, 1998; Kahn and Sanger 1999; Srinivasan,
2001).  Although the WTO has tried to take the position that matters of
international labor standards are the purview of the ILO (WTO 1998),
and therefore not a trade issue, the Seattle WTO negotiations were
effectively ended because of the intransigence of participants over sev-
eral issues, one of which was labor standards.
Regionally, the United States, Canada, and Mexico were able to
negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) only
by separating labor standards from the main body of the treatment and
negotiating those separately.  The basic concern in the United States
and Canada during the negotiations was that the lower Mexican wages
and labor standards and the geographical proximity of the U.S. and
Canadian markets to Mexico would encourage domestic firms to shift
existing production to Mexico or to invest in new facilities in Mexico
rather than in the United States or Canada.  The result in the United
States and Canada would be both employment losses and lower wages
and benefits, the latter occurring because firms would use the threat of
a production shift to obtain wage and benefit concessions from work-
ers.  There was also a concern that the U.S. and Canadian governments
would be pressured to lower their labor standards to permit firms to
compete more easily with Mexican firms or with U.S. and Canadian
firms producing in Mexico.
The resulting side agreement, completed after the signing of
NAFTA—the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC)—demonstrated the tension between national sovereignty
and international harmonization.  Under NAALC, shared perceptions
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of the rights of workers were articulated, while at the same time
national sovereignty with respect to labor and employment policy was
protected.  Each of the signatories agreed to enforce its own labor stan-
dards; however, NAALC does not commit any of the three NAFTA
signatories to enact any labor or employment laws.  Indeed, the agree-
ment provides “full respect for each Party’s constitution . . . recogniz-
ing the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor
standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and regu-
lations” (Bradsher 1993; Farnsworth 1993; NAALC 19935).  Rather,
NAALC states that “[e]ach Party shall promote compliance with and
effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate government
action.”6  This is to be accomplished primarily through publicity and
official consultations.   NAALC does not dictate standards, and there is
no explicit prohibition against statutorily changing labor standards.
In addition, NAALC does not include trade sanctions.  Noncompli-
ance with the recommendations of the process will result in an order to
comply and a monetary remedy,7 which must be no greater than 0.7
percent of the volume of trade between the two countries (the com-
plaining country and the country against which the complaint was
lodged).  The money, paid by the offending government, goes into a
fund to enhance the enforcement of labor laws in the offending coun-
try.8
Despite the  failure to achieve an international consensus, several
trade agreements that include labor standards have been implemented.
In these cases, treaties have allowed for sanctions against labor viola-
tions.  Worldwide agreements made for tin in 1975 and 1981, cocoa in
1986, sugar in 1987, and natural rubber in 1979 and 1987 all contain
provisions that address the observance or enactment of fair labor stan-
dards among the signatories (Servais 1989; van Liemt 1989).  The par-
ties to the agreements have “endeavored to maintain labour standards”
or promised to “seek to insure” fair labor standards in their countries
(Servais 1989).  The United States has been extremely active in incor-
porating links between labor standards in trade in agreements to which
it is a signatory.  Such agreements include the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive in 1983, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1984, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation in 1985, and the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Servais 1989; van Liemt
1989).  As a result of the sanctions incorporated in the GSP legislation,
24 Block, Roberts, and Clarke
two countries, Nicaragua and Romania, lost GSP status in 1987 (Ser-
vais 1989).
The Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1983 and the related Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1990 (CBERA) permitted the presi-
dent of the United States to give preferential trade status to countries in
the Caribbean basin, but also permitted the president to deny such pref-
erences to any Caribbean basin country that failed to provide its work-
ers with internationally recognized worker rights (van Liemt 1989;
Stamps, Kornis, and Tsao 1996).  Although no country has been denied
CBERA-related trade benefits as a result of worker rights violations,
Guatemala was the subject of a review in 1995 based on a petition filed
with the International Trade Commission by the AFL-CIO (Stamps,
Kornis, and Tsao 1996; Jennings et al. 1997).  That review was termi-
nated on May 2, 1997 (Jennings et al. 1997).
At the national level, in the 1980s, the United States included inter-
national worker rights provisions in legislation creating the Overseas
Private Investment Council, the GSP, and the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act (van Liemt 1989).  Recently, however, issues of
worker rights have been raised in two contexts: concerns about interna-
tional labor conditions in the apparel industry, and presidential “fast
track” authorization for trade agreements.  Public concerns about labor
practices in the apparel industry resulted in the establishment of the
Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement in April, 1997 (Branigan
1997; Greenhouse 1997).  Under the agreement, which was announced
by the U.S. president, several large apparel manufacturers and the
unions representing employees in the apparel industry agreed to estab-
lish workplace codes of conduct, provide for external monitoring of
working conditions, and recruit additional firms. 
Despite U.S. participation in treaties that do incorporate labor pro-
visions, however, fear that labor standards may be neglected in future
agreements has hampered U.S. participation in trade negotiations.
Twice in the last three years, the president has requested fast-track
authority from Congress and been turned down.  Fast-track authority
means that the Executive Branch is delegated the authority to negotiate
trade terms that may require changes in domestic law.  Congress may
include goals for the trade negotiations, but congressional objectives
are general and advisory only.  The Executive Branch is delegated the
authority to enter into international agreements, and writes whatever
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legislation is necessary to meet the terms of the agreement.  Congress
retains the right to vote yes or no on whatever agreement the Adminis-
tration negotiates (Mitchell 1997).  Congress declined to grant the pres-
ident fast-track authority in both 1997 and 1999, in part over concerns
that the president would give insufficient consideration to labor (and
environmental) issues (Mitchell 1997; Abramson and Greenhouse
1997).
Opposition to a Link Between Trade and Labor Standards
Opposition to direct links between labor standards and trade has
arisen on the basis of economic principles, political theory, and practi-
cal grounds.  The opposition to a social clause from an economic point
of view is based on the theory of comparative advantage.  The imposi-
tion of internationally set labor standards would have the effect of
negating the comparative advantage of less-developed countries.  If
developing countries have a comparative advantage in low-wage, low-
skilled labor, then they should produce goods that incorporate rela-
tively large amounts of such labor. 
Moreover, focusing solely on legislated standards does not take
into account the differences in factor productivity; when productivity is
taken into account, true labor cost differentials between countries with
“low” and “high” standards  decline (Srinivasan 1995; Golub 1997). To
create a universal set of labor standards in the presence of a diversity of
factor endowments would result in a suboptimal solution for at least
one country.  An optimal solution would require compensation from
the winners to the losers; however, such compensating transfers rarely
occur (Fields 1995; Srinivasan, 2001).  Although the creation of mini-
mum labor standards within a country should properly address internal
market failures, according to this perspective there is no justification
for internationally imposed standards (Srinivasan 1997).
Politically based arguments reject the “morality” notions  claimed
by those who advocate a social clause.  They argue that the attempt to
create international labor standards and link them to trade is primarily a
protectionist device on the part of developed countries to prevent
developing countries from exporting goods (Servais 1989; van Liemt
1989; Srinivasan 1997).  Given cross-country differences in income
levels, a country may decide it is in its best interest to select a low level
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of labor standards relative to other countries; that choice is a matter of
national sovereignty (Srinivasan 1995, 1997; Brown, Deardorff, and
Stern 1997; Basu and Van 1998; Lee 1997).  Those who make this
argument frequently accuse developed countries of being hypocritical,
noting that if attempts to force developing countries to raise labor stan-
dards are based on altruism, then those countries advocating such a rise
should be willing to make income transfers to the less-developed coun-
tries or to support the lifting of restrictions on migration (Srinivasan,
1997).  They also point out that the developed OECD countries do not
themselves adhere to many of the human rights that the higher labor
standards would impose on the less-developed countries (Srinivasan
1997).
Finally, there is a view that labor standards matters are not trade
matters (Rodrick 1994) and do not belong in a trade agreement.  This
perspective appears to be held implicitly rather than explicitly, but it is
evidenced by the traditional absence of labor-related provisions in
many of the major trade treaties, such as the GATT treaties and the
Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Canada.  The
WTO has taken the official position that labor standards matters should
be addressed by the ILO, implicitly endorsing the view that trade and
labor issues should be separate (WTO 1998).
More recently, however, there appears to be a willingness to recog-
nize a link between trade and labor standards.  One example, already
discussed, is the NAFTA side agreement, NAALC.  In addition, the
social charter is gradually becoming part of the treaties of the European
Union (EU).  Despite a contentious history, since 1992, the EU Com-
mission has enacted directives (legislation binding on all member
states) on works council, sex discrimination, and part-time workers;
this legislation was accomplished at the time only through a provision
in the Maastricht Treaty that permitted the United Kingdom to opt out
of the directive (Springer 1994; European Union 1994, 1998a,b).9
However, the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration renewed the
organization’s commitment to observing core labor standards and to
cooperation with the ILO (WTO 1996).
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INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR SETTING AND 
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS
In practice, it has been impossible to obtain an international con-
sensus on linking labor standards to trade agreements or on possible
mechanisms for enforcement.  It is acknowledged that the interests of
developed countries differ from those of less-developed countries; it
has been difficult, therefore, to create uniform substantive standards
that would apply across all countries (Servais 1989; van Liemt 1989).10 
The primary international organization charged with protecting
worker welfare is the ILO, created in 1919.  Part of its mission is to set
labor standards.  The two vehicles the ILO uses to set labor standards
are conventions and recommendations.  Conventions are intended to
lay down binding obligations, although their adoption is voluntary.
Recommendations are intended to serve as guidelines, setting out good
practice.
The procedure for establishing conventions and recommendations
is for the secretariat of the ILO to carry out the necessary research and
prepare reports on the subject concerned, and for the measure proposed
to be considered by three groups: the Governing Body, in whom execu-
tive authority is vested; a specially appointed independent expert
group; and the annual International Labour Conference, which has ulti-
mate decision-making authority.  The Governing Body and the Confer-
ence are both tripartite bodies.  When the Conference approves final
wording, usually after a second meeting, conventions and recommen-
dations are communicated to member states, who are asked to present
them to the appropriate law-making bodies within a fixed period of
time.  No country is obliged to adopt them, but once a convention is
ratified, it becomes binding until it is repudiated.  A country that rati-
fies a convention is required to report periodically on how it has ful-
filled its obligations.  Even countries that have not ratified are required
to report periodically on their practices related to the convention.  The
reports are reviewed by the Committee of Experts on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations.  When a complaint is made
against a country for failing to adhere to a ratified convention or rec-
ommendation, the ILO procedures provide for representations by
employers and workers’ organizations and complaints by other govern-
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ments.  This procedure is based on moral suasion and public informa-
tion (OECD 1996).
Both the number of conventions and the number of ratifications
have gradually risen.  As of 1997, the ILO had promulgated 180 con-
ventions and 187 recommendations.  Its 174 members had effected
6,431 ratifications.  The United States has ratified only 10 conventions,
arguing that its federal structure prevents ratification.  Other federalist
nations, however, have ratified many ILO conventions: 57 in Australia,
29 in Canada, and 96 in France.  The country that adheres to the most
conventions is Spain (103).
Several features of the procedure undermine the effectiveness of
the conventions.  To start with, by the time the necessary compromises
have been made to finalize the conventions, the ambit and force of the
conventions have already been restricted and weakened in the eyes of
those who wanted them to be forceful.  Further, whether any disregard
of the practical implementation of a convention comes to light (if the
country concerned fails to invigilate it) depends largely on whether it is
brought to the attention of the ILO.  Once a complaint is brought, the
investigation of the complaint is usually a slow business.  In addition,
from a practical point of view, the ILO lacks the ability to sanction
countries who do not comply, and so is likely to seek to conciliate the
parties rather than adopting a condemnatory attitude.
The standard-setting role of the ILO has taken on renewed impor-
tance in the debate about a “social clause” in international trade agree-
ments.  One of the key problems is that if a trade agreement is
conditional on the observance of particular labor standards, it is unclear
who is to judge whether a country is abiding by its commitments; bod-
ies dealing with trade have little experience of labor matters, and labor
experts are typically unfamiliar with trade.  The problems created by
this lack of cross-context expertise are compounded by the fact that
both trade negotiations and ILO procedures are necessarily slow.
Nevertheless, the existence of the ILO and its conventions, many
of which have been ratified by a large number of countries, suggests
some broad international consensus (if not unanimity) on basic princi-
ples of core worker rights (Lee 1997; ILO 1995).  Several proposals are
currently circulating to reform aspects of the ILO’s complaint investi-
gation and dispute resolution process.  The director of the ILO has pro-
posed a joint WTC-ILO body to examine charges of violations of ILO
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conventions 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 110, and 138—freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining, prohibitions on forced labor, antidis-
crimination, and restrictions on child labor (Maier 1994).  To take into
account the characteristics of individual countries, he recommended a
tripartite process to determine the measures or improvements that
could be made toward reaching the goal of compliance with these stan-
dards (Maier 1994).  Rodrick (1994) has proposed a system of formal
public complaints before domestic bodies, such as the United States
International Trade Commission.  This procedure would require testi-
mony from parties and groups that would be adversely affected by
trade restrictions against the respondent company so that the public
interest and self-interested motives of the complainant could be deter-
mined.  And the OECD has raised the possibility of using the WTO
trade policy review mechanism to address “social dumping” as a result
of low labor standards.  The notion is that governments that permit low
labor standards are providing an indirect subsidy to producers, permit-
ting them to sell their goods to importing countries at artificially low
prices.
THE EMERGENCE OF LABOR STANDARDS 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The ILO is no longer the only international body establishing inter-
national labor standards.  The European Union (EU), covering nearly
all Western and Southern European countries, has been strengthening
its involvement in labor matters, particularly since the mid 1980s.  It is
important to note some significant differences between European and
U.S. approaches to labor standards.  Europeans and Americans have
held somewhat different views on labor standards and the provision of
public welfare since before World War II (although there were differ-
ences among European countries too).  After the war these differences
widened.  With an unprecedented 25 years or more of economic
growth, labor standards were improved in both Europe and America,
but, although European workers expected—and obtained—improve-
ments in wages and working conditions, they also sought improve-
ments in public welfare provision, far more so than did U.S. workers.
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In several European countries, that trend can be attributed to the teach-
ing of the Roman Catholic Church on social matters.  Politicians on the
left and many on the right supported improving protection at work.  If
not able to build a welfare state that offered protection from the cradle
to the grave, they sought to offer at least unemployment benefits,
health care, sickness pay, and pensions, most of which were established
in advance of such programs in the United States, or at least were more
generally applicable among the population.  In addition to these social
guarantees, unions in many countries achieved greater recognition of
workers’ rights to workplace consultation, protection against unfair
dismissal, and severance pay, strengthened in some cases by represen-
tation on boards of directors.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the United Kingdom took
the lead, establishing a comprehensive welfare state, including, for a
time, completely free health care.  But the country’s relatively poor
economic performance meant that it was not many years before other
countries surpassed its level of  social benefits. 
Sweden was a particularly interesting innovator.  There, more of
the improvements stemmed from negotiation between central unions
and employers and less from government legislation, as befitted a
country with an exceptionally high level of unionization.  Since the rul-
ing party through most of the years from 1932 to the present was
socialist, there was a generally amicable division of responsibility
between government and labor in deciding the form of social advance.
A notable example was the creation of Sweden’s labour market board,
AMS (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen), a public body virtually managed by
employers and unions, which has operated what the Swedes have
called an active manpower policy, with more emphasis than in other
countries on training, retraining, job finding, and relocation, and less
on simply paying out unemployment benefits.  Between 1955 and
1992, Swedish unemployment stayed below 4 percent.  West Germany,
a  country defeated  and in ruins in 1945, rapidly achieved both eco-
nomic success and social advance, in what the Germans called a social
market economy.  The union-employer relationship was relatively
cooperative during that period, in part because of government and
employer responsiveness to the desire of workers to share in the overall
economic prosperity.
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It was in that environment that, in 1957, six countries—Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—made the
Rome Treaty, setting up what was then called the European Economic
Community (EEC), later becoming the European Union (EU).  The
Rome Treaty had little to say about labor.  To summarize, it called for
freedom for workers to work anywhere in the Community; it estab-
lished a “social fund” that could be used to help displaced workers; it
required equal pay for equal work for men and women; and it had gen-
eralized clauses looking toward harmonizing a range of legislation and
practices and gradually raising living standards.
Over its now more than 40 years of life, the EU has extended to
embrace most Western and Southern European countries (shortly to be
joined by others) and to cover more and more subjects, including a
greater range of social policy—a term that in continental Europe cov-
ers labor policy.  The executive arm of the EU, the Commission, has
extended its activity in the labor field, notably since the mid 1980s,
arguing that a common market would be effective only if ordinary
workers felt that they were an integral part of the enterprise and would
gain from it.  To accomplish that, the EU had to have a social dimen-
sion.  In 1989, to that end the Commission fostered a “social charter,”
which served to launch a series of measures during the 1990s.  While
many of those  dealt with relatively minor matters, others were more
significant.  Thus, the 1993 directive11 on working time established
rules concerning vacations, maximum working hours, and overtime;
and the 1994 directive on European works councils required that sub-
stantial multinational enterprises establish union-wide consultative
bodies through which workers’ representatives would be informed
about the management’s plans.
The mass of labor legislation that has been produced cannot be
attributed solely to the Commission, though, under the treaties, that
body has the responsibility for initiating legislation.  Legislation can be
effected only by the Council of Ministers—that is, the representatives
of national governments—either unanimously or through a weighted
majority, according to the subject. 
One question to be asked is why, at a time when the world trend is
toward fewer regulations, Europe is going in the other direction.  Part
of the answer is that, in fact, its zeal for labor legislation is now dimin-
ishing, and the Commission is being reminded of the provision of the
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Maastricht Treaty concerning “subsidiarity,” meaning that decisions
should be made as low down the regulatory ladder as possible while
still satisfying the treaty’s objectives.  In addition, one member coun-
try, the United Kingdom, has never favored more labor legislation and
has secured the opt-out from certain kinds of measures already referred
to.  But, despite some of these counterforces, the main answer lies in
the disposition of continental European countries toward such legisla-
tion, compared with the typical Anglo-Saxon disposition toward more
pragmatic approaches.
Still, the signs are that the flood of European legislation has less-
ened and is lessening.  The treaties rule out some subjects, such as “the
rights and interests of employed persons”; and others, such as social
security and social protection, require unanimity from the Council of
Ministers.  Some important proposals are still under consideration,
including one that would create a right for worker representation on
boards of directors and another aimed at requiring all member coun-
tries to have legislation binding firms to establish consultative machin-
ery.  But it is far from certain that the more ambitious parts of these
proposals will come to much.  With few exceptions, the existing legis-
lation deals with relatively minor matters rather than imposing intoler-
able burdens on managements.
CONCLUSIONS
The discussion in this chapter is intended to provide conceptual
and institutional frameworks for understanding the role of labor stan-
dards in an international economy.  What is evident in this overview is
the lack of theoretical and empirical consensus on the relationship
between labor standards and trade.  This ambiguity is mirrored in the
political difficulties faced by both the ILO and the EU in implementing
universal standards.  All of the sections in this chapter lead to the same
conclusion—that our knowledge of the relationship between labor
standards and economic outcomes is far from complete and that dura-
ble political solutions are unlikely until we know more.
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Notes
1. See Krugman (1994, Chapter 12) for a discussion of the conditions under which
protectionist strategies can be efficient.
2. For example, Dorsey and Walzer (1993) found that for blue-collar workers, a 1
percent increase in workers’ compensation costs led to a 1.4 percent decline in
wages.
3. Freeman’s argument rests heavily on consumer knowledge of the labor standards
embodied in the goods they purchase.  He provides clear, dramatic examples of
consumer willingness to pay for labor standards when goods are produced with,
for example, slave labor.  Compa (1993) provided additional examples such as
with the use of child labor.  Rodrick (1994) also cited examples in which informa-
tion about working conditions affects firm production decisions, suggesting that
there is a consumer demand for goods produced with some minimal level of labor
standards.  However, this model depends heavily on the accurate labeling of the
labor standards governing the workplace where the various goods are produced.
Questions have been raised, moreover, about incentives to label goods falsely, the
definition of “low” labor standards,  and methods of determining which countries
have sufficiently low labor standards to warrant a label.
4. Although most theories of trade point out that the winners from trade could com-
pensate the losers, such compensation rarely occurs (Fields 1995).  Rather, the
importing country must find ways to compensate the losers, through such vehicles
as trade adjustment assistance.
5. North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, Article 2, <http://
www.usite.gov:80/wais/reports/arc/W3058.htm and gopher://cyfer.esueda.gov.70/
00/ace/policy/nafta/nafta/labor-co.txt>.
6. NAALC, Article 3.
7. NAALC, Article 39.
8. NAALC, Annex 39. 
9. The United Kingdom abandoned its opt-out arrangement in 1997, coincident with
the election of Labor Party government (European Union 1998c; Hoge 1997; Bar-
ber 1997).
10. This difficulty in obtaining international consensus is reflected in differences
among trade unionists.  Despite the fact that the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions has come out in favor of linking trade and labor standards
(ICFTU 1996), union positions in different countries tend to reflect their separate
interests.  Thus, while Australian unions favor a linkage between trade privileges
and labor standards, Malaysian unions do not (Devadason and Ayadurai 1997;
Harcourt 1997).
11. Directives are laws approved by the Council of Ministers of the EU—the ruling
body; they are binding as to their objective but permit some flexibility in conse-
quent national legislation.  Regulations are binding on everyone in member coun-
tries and require no action by parliaments.  European laws have precedence over
national laws.  If a country fails to meet its obligations under European laws, it
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may be taken to the European Court of Justice, whose decision is binding.  Rec-





A necessary first step in comparing labor standards in the United
States and Canada is to develop a definition of “labor standards” in
terms that can be commonly applied in both countries.  We suggest that
the key characteristic of a labor standard is that it is applicable to all, or
almost all, employers and employees.
For the purpose of this study, labor standards have four common
components: 1) in both countries they are created and enforced by gov-
ernments; 2) they are designed to affect workplace transactions prima-
rily; 3) they are generally comparable between the two countries in
purpose and administration, such that a fair comparison can be made;
and 4) in both countries they have been or could reasonably be
adopted.
Governmentally Created and Enforced
The requirement that the standards included in our analysis be gov-
ernmentally created and enforced ensures that they apply to all
employers and employees, taking into account statutory exceptions.
Through legislation,  government can be seen as establishing a mini-
mum legally enforceable floor for labor standards.  We use the follow-
ing definition of labor standards: 
A labor standard is any governmentally established procedure,
term, condition of employment, or employer requirement that is
designed to protect employees from treatment at the workplace that
society considers unfair or unjust.  The common element across all
standards is that they are mandatory—that is, they are imposed and
enforced by government.  Employer failure to comply with the stan-
dards brings legal sanctions upon the employer.  This provides the uni-
versal coverage that is needed.  The only exclusions are statutory, and
can be accounted for and estimated.
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Such standards are generally value laden, because what one person
considers unfair, another may  consider reasonable.  For example, the
protection of employees who engage in union activity reflects a value
that employees should have the right to bargain collectively with their
employer without that right being impaired by employer actions vis-à-
vis the employees’ jobs.  Others may hold that property owners should
have the right to exclude persons from their property for any reason
whatsoever, and should not be constrained to retain employees who
organize against their wishes.  Because the standards we use are value
laden and governmentally imposed, they are linked to the political pro-
cess in each country. 
We acknowledge that there are other benchmarks for labor prac-
tices, such as custom and practice in the locality or industry, the mar-
ketplace, and collective bargaining.  All three of these sources have
inherent disadvantages, primarily the absence of a minimum require-
ment for all firms.  For example, custom and practice in an industry
may determine days off for holidays, but the holidays are not manda-
tory, and there is no way of knowing the percentage of firms that do not
abide by the custom or practice.  While the marketplace may actually
raise the level of compensation above the minimum in a region or
industry, markets vary over time and across regions, localities, and
industries.  Thus, while some labor markets may be in a labor surplus,
others may be in a labor deficit.  Markets in which there is excess
demand for labor may exhibit terms and conditions of employment
(often referred to as TCEs) that are above the regulated standard.  If
economic conditions change, however, then the observed conditions
may fall closer to the standard than they were under conditions of
excess demand.  
The TCEs within a collective bargaining agreement in the United
States or Canada do not extend beyond the employees contractually
covered by that agreement.  Whether or not other employers provide
TCEs comparable to those negotiated in the agreement depends on
whether those employers are unionized; if so, it all depends upon
whether the employer and the union negotiate a comparable agreement,
the percentage of nonunion employers that believe there is a union
threat if they do not match the unionized TCEs, and the extent to which
other employers must provide the union-negotiated TCEs to attract a
sufficiently high quality and quantity of labor.
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We show examples in which this criterion operates in practice in
our analyses of vacations and the exclusion of health care in the United
States, both discussed below.  We consider the United States as not pro-
viding vacations because there is no legal requirement on either the
federal or any state level that employees receive vacations, although
there is a custom and practice that employees receive vacation pay.
Similarly, we exclude health care because there is no legal requirement
that employers provide employees with health insurance, although
there are equal employment opportunity laws that impose such require-
ments on employers who choose to provide their employees with
health insurance or are required by collective bargaining agreements to
do so.
Primarily Affecting Workplace Transactions
The second criterion for inclusion in our study as a standard is that
the law or regulation is designed, in both countries, to apply primarily
at the workplace or to have its primary effect on workplace transac-
tions.  We exclude matters that may link somehow to the workplace or
a work relationship but do not have the workplace as their primary
focus.  The best example of such a matter is health care.  As the health
care financing system in the United States has evolved, it functions pri-
marily through employer contributions.  There is no requirement that
employers in the United States provide health care coverage to their
employees.  Under the “governmentally created and enforced” defini-
tion, the United States would appear to have a low standard, because
all Canadians are covered by government-provided health care.  But
the Canadian health care system is not funded or administered through
the employment relationship.  Rather, the Canadian health care system
is financed primarily through the general tax system of federal and pro-
vincial personal and corporate taxes (Health Canada 1998).  In other
words, health care is not a workplace issue in Canada as it is in the
United States, and therefore we exclude it from our analysis. 
For the same reason, we exclude the U.S. social security system
and the comparable programs in Canada  (see below).  Although they
are (at least partly) financed through the employment relationship, their
primary purpose is to act as an insurance program for persons who are
out of the labor force.
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Comparable in Purpose and Administration
The third criterion captures our principle that it is important to
limit the comparison to those standards that can be fairly compared.
This principle provides a second reason for our excluding from the
analysis the public pension systems in the two countries—social secu-
rity and the related programs in the United States, and old age security
and the Canada Pension Plan and related programs in Canada.  The
system in the United States is fully funded by workplace-based pay-
ments  (from employer and employee, or self-employed persons) and
interest, whereas the system in Canada is funded by a combination of
workplace-based payments, interest, and general tax revenues (HRDC
1998a,b).  Under our criteria, this difference makes it impossible to
compare these two programs.  
Adoptable in Both Countries
The fourth—and most important—criterion for including a law or
regulation as a labor standard in our analysis is that the law or standard
could reasonably be adopted in both countries.  Since the purpose of
this analysis is ultimately to develop a scoring for and ranking of labor
standards in the 63 jurisdictions within the United States and Canada, it
would be misleading to “score” a jurisdiction or a country lower than it
would otherwise be scored because it did not have a standard or a pro-
vision that one would think it could not reasonably adopt.  
Analyzing Labor Standards
Labor standards fall into one of two categories: 1) standards that
require employers to make monetary payments, either to workers or to
a government agency; and 2) standards that place constraints on
employer actions vis-à-vis workers.  The standards we analyze that
require employer payments are minimum wage, overtime, paid time
off, unemployment or employment insurance, and workers’ compensa-
tion.  The standards that place constraints on employer actions vis-à-vis
employees are collective bargaining, equal employment opportunity or
employment equity, unjust discharge, occupational safety and health,
and advance notice of plant closings or of large-scale layoffs.1  All
these meet our working definition.  All involve some government inter-
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vention or regulation of the workplace.  All ten are value laden.  On the
one hand, for example, health and safety regulations are said to impose
otherwise unnecessary costs on employers so that the work environ-
ment can be modified to ensure health and safety.  On the other hand,
the regulations are designed to protect the welfare of workers.
Sources of Labor Standards
There are four potential sources of labor standards: the Constitu-
tion, enabling legislation (statutes and laws), judicial and administra-
tive decisions (decisions issued by administrative bodies or courts),
and administrative regulations.  Of these four sources, the one we most
frequently cite is the enabling legislation.  For most standards, the
enabling legislation is the basic source, and it  allows for the clearest
cross-jurisdiction comparison of the level of protection of employees
within a jurisdiction.
Although statutorily generated standards have the force of law,
standards provided for in a nation’s constitution are more binding.  In
Canada, protections against employment discrimination (employment
equity)  have their basis in the human rights provisions of the Canadian
Constitution rather than in statutes or law (Kelly 1991).   This is impor-
tant because it means that employment equity rights in Canada cannot
be eroded through changes in legislation resulting from a shifting polit-
ical consensus or through adverse judicial decisions.  In the United
States, by contrast, where employment discrimination is statutorily
based, judicial decisions interpreting the legislation have the potential
to narrow employee rights.  For example, in 1989 the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned previously accepted judicial doctrine by ruling that,
for a respondent to make a prima facie case of discrimination, he or she
was required not only to show that protected classes were underrepre-
sented, but also to identify a specific employment practice that caused
the underrepresentation.  The Court also ruled that the employer could
overcome the prima facie case by demonstrating a business justifica-
tion for the employment practice (Ward’s Cove).  Although that case,
which substantially increased the burden on plaintiffs, was eventually
reversed by legislative action (Wolkinson and Block 1996), the case
does indicate that standards promulgated by legislation do not have the
status of standards based on the Constitution.
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Similarly, standards promulgated by legislation are subject to
being repealed if the political consensus changes.  For example, in
1995 the newly elected Conservative government in Ontario enacted
legislation repealing many of the provisions of Ontario labor legisla-
tion that were considered favorable to unions (Adams 1995).  Other
provinces show patterns of frequent changes associated with changes
in government (Bruce 1989; Block 1994).
Judicial and administrative decisions are a third source of labor
standards.  In the United States, with the exception of Montana the pro-
tections against unjust dismissal are solely based on judicial decisions.
Similarly, a key difference between U.S. and Canadian labor laws is
the scope of the bargaining—the range of subjects about which the par-
ties to a collective agreement must bargain.  In the United States, judi-
cial and administrative decisions have limited the scope of mandatory
bargaining to matters involving terms and conditions of employment
(Hardin 1992).  On the other hand, in Canada, because of judicial deci-
sions all issues are subject to the bargaining process (Adams 1997).
Finally, a standard could be set through regulations adopted by the
agency interpreting and administering a statute.  In the absence of pre-
cise statutory language governing an issue, or in the absence of a judi-
cial or administrative decision, regulations could in theory serve as the
de facto standard. 
Note
1. See Compa (1993), Charnovitz (1987), and Piore (1990) for examples of other
lists of labor standards.
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Methods for Comparing 
Labor Standards 
Under ideal circumstances, to compare labor standards between
the United States and Canada one would simply determine which labor
standards to analyze, and then examine those for the two countries.
There are, however, two difficulties with a simple comparison.
First, different levels of government promulgate labor standards in
the two countries. Whereas most labor standards in the United States
are generally promulgated at the federal level for all firms that affect
interstate commerce, labor standards in Canada are adopted at the pro-
vincial level for firms and employees within the province, except for
certain industries that are viewed as having a direct effect on interpro-
vincial commerce,1 which are covered by federal law.2  For example,
collective bargaining is federally regulated in the United States, but
both provincially and federally regulated in Canada.   The result is that
standards are more likely to be federally issued in the United States,
but province-based in Canada.  Any inventory must take account of the
varying levels of government. Accordingly, the  analysis depends on
the jurisdiction of the enabling legislation.
Second, a primary difference between the U.S. and Canadian gov-
ernmental structures is that in the United States, if a federal statute gov-
erns some aspect of the workplace, the federal rule prevails unless the
state standard is higher. In some cases, states will have statutes that
appear to allow lower standards, generally because either the state has
legislated a lower standard in anticipation of a possible repeal or revi-
sion of the federal standard, or the state statute was imposed long ago
and never repealed despite its lack of effect. Such state statutory stan-
dards apply to classes of workers excluded from federal legislation,
typically those that do not affect interstate commerce. In Canada, by
contrast, with a few exceptions the federal standard usually applies
only to federal government employees and those industries that can
reasonably be thought of as involved in interprovincial commerce
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(Canada Labour Code 1988). Except for employees in those indus-
tries, the provincial standards prevail. 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the ultimate goal in this
research is to develop a method of comparing labor standards among
different jurisdictions, in this case ranking the jurisdictions in the
United States and Canada with regard to the 10 labor standards chosen
for this study.  Such a ranking not only generates a usable summary of
the differences among jurisdictions in those labor standards, but also
allows researchers to use the rankings to test hypotheses regarding the
effect of a jurisdiction’s labor standards on various economic phenom-
ena, such as the level of imports and exports.  
OUTLINE OF THE METHODS
The ranking of a labor standard can be thought of as involving
three components: 1) the substance of the standard as it is specified by
its enabling legislation, 2) the rigor with which the statute is enforced,
and 3) the extent of the labor force that enjoys its protection.  Our
method of comparing the labor standards uses four steps: First, we ana-
lyze the substance—that is, the statutory provisions—of each of the
standards.  Second, we derive a method of measuring the nature of
enforcement.  Third, we develop an index—which we call the basic
index—of the strength of the labor standard in a jurisdiction by weight-
ing the various statutory provisions and enforcing efforts for each stan-
dard.  And finally, we deflate the weighted standards by an estimate of
the percentage of the labor force covered by each standard.
To rank the labor standards as they affect the typical employer or
worker in a jurisdiction, we calculate the basic index for each labor
standard for each subnational jurisdiction (U.S. states and Canadian
provinces and territories). To make cross-country comparisons, we
generate both an unweighted average for each labor standard for each
country as well as one weighted by each subnational jurisdiction’s
share of its country’s employment. In our results, we refer to these as
the unweighted and weighted indices.
The fourth step in our method involves deflating the weighted indi-
ces derived above by the percentage of the labor force covered by each
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standard (for standards for which coverage is relevant) to create a mea-
sure of the overall employee welfare associated with the labor stan-
dard.  As such, it provides more of an aggregate, societal-level measure
than does the basic index.  We call this the deflated index.  Because
both the basic index and the deflated index present useful and comple-
mentary information, we present both. 
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STANDARDS
The primary component of all the indices is the statutory substance
of the labor standards. To derive this, we code and array provision cat-
egories that are comparable across all jurisdictions.  We incorporate the
provisions into the analysis as discussed more fully in the later sections
in this chapter.3
ENFORCEMENT
The second component in our indices is that of enforcement.
Rights of Judicial Appeal: General Considerations
Our focus here is on litigants’ rights of judicial appeal outside of
the administrative agency that has the primary responsibility for
enforcing the statute.4  This analysis takes the position that the broader
the rights of appeal from the decision of the administrative agency, the
weaker the enforcement mechanism.  This proposition is based on two
factors: first, the principle of “justice delayed, justice denied” (Weiler
1983; Block and Wolkinson 1985; Novak and Somerlot 1990; Brudney
1996); and second, the likelihood that an agency charged with adminis-
tering a standard will be more expert in administering that standard
than will a court, and also that it may interpret that standard in a way
that is more sensitive to the employee beneficiaries of the statute than
the court (the court may see its role as one of interpreting a statute in
the context of other, nonstatutory, considerations that may be inconsis-
tent with the employee orientation standards, and it may also not be as
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expert as the administering agency) (Block and Wolkinson 1985;
Crowley 1987; Brudney 1996; Block 1997a).   Thus, given good-faith
differences regarding the proper interpretation of a statute in a specific
set of circumstances, it is more likely that the agency administering the
statute will interpret that statute in a manner favorable to the employ-
ees than will a court.
 If an employer appeals an agency decision finding a violation of a
standard, there will be delays in applying the standard.  Employers who
do not prevail at the administrative agency may maintain their action
pending the outcome of the appeal process, thus for a time denying
employees that to which they are most likely entitled.  An implicit
assumption in our enforcement measure is that employers are usually
better able than employees to bear the costs of a prolonged dispute over
a labor standards violation.
Rights of Judicial Appeal: Comparing the United States 
and Canada
Comparing the United States and Canada, the literature on appeals
of administrative decisions indicates that appeals rights are narrower in
Canada than in the United States.  Canadian legislation frequently
incorporates privative clauses that explicitly limit the power of courts
to overturn or review agency  decisions.5  For example, the Ontario
Workers’ Compensation Act incorporates the following privative
clause:
[t]he order or direction of the Appeals Tribunal or a panel thereof
is final and conclusive and not open to question or review in any
court upon any grounds and no proceeding by or before the
Appeals Tribunal or a panel thereof shall be restrained by injunc-
tion, prohibition or other process or procedure in any court or be
removable by application for judicial review, or otherwise, into
any court.6
The language severely limits the extent to which an agency decision in
a workers’ compensation case can be appealed to the courts.
Compare this language with the appeals language from Section
10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act in the United States:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review
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of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit
wherein the unfair labor practice in question was  alleged to have
been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts busi-
ness, or in the United States Court of  Appeals for the District of
Columbia  . . . [T]he court  . . .   shall have the . . . jurisdiction to
grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it
deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a
decree  enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or
setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board.7
It is clear that there is far broader scope of appeal of agency deci-
sions under the U.S. National Labor Relations Act than under the
Ontario Workers’ Compensation Act.8
Privative clauses do not completely prevent the courts from recon-
sidering agency decisions.  Adams (1997) notes that, although all
Canadian labor relations statutes contain privative clauses, the labor
relations tribunal remains subject to judicial review on one or more of
four grounds: 1) the agency lacked jurisdiction over the matter, 2) the
appellant was denied natural justice or due process, 3) the agency’s
decision was clearly in violation of the law or patently unreasonable, or
4) the agency engaged in fraud or collusion.  Still, these are narrow
grounds for review as compared with the bases of judicial review in the
United States. Indeed, there are no legislative standards in the United
States for judicial review of administrative agency decisions.9
Even in the absence of a privative clause, Canadian courts gener-
ally defer to tribunal decision making.  Mullan (1993) observed that
Canadian courts have generally adopted the established arguments for
deference to tribunal decision making.  First, there is the argument
based on parliamentary sovereignty: the existence of a tribunal reflects
the will of the legislature that decisions be made by the tribunal rather
than the courts.  The courts have an obligation to honor that legislative
choice.
A second argument is based on expertise: because the tribunal reg-
ularly, and exclusively, deals with matters within its jurisdiction, it can
be expected to be more expert in that area than the courts.   A third
argument is based on efficiency: if the courts become involved in inter-
preting a statute, the tribunal becomes redundant.  In the same vein, a
well-known willingness of the courts to defer to the tribunal discour-
ages appeals from parties who do not prevail.
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These differences suggest that appeals to the courts are far more
likely in the United States than in Canada.  Consistent with this propo-
sition, Block (1994) found that, for the period 1976–1990, on average
33 percent of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) unfair labor
cases were closed with a court rather than a board decision.  By con-
trast, only 7.1 percent of Ontario Labour Relations Board cases during
the period 1980–1981 to 1991–1992 were closed with a court decision.
The percentages were comparable for cases before the British Colum-
bia Industrial Relations Council (5.2 percent) for the period 1988–1991
and the Canada Labour Relations Board (6.4 percent) for the period
1980–1991.
As regards the matter of statutory interpretation, there is evidence
to suggest that agencies administering labor and employment laws in
the United States are less successful than agencies administering other
laws at having their decisions sustained by the courts.  Crowley (1987)
found that the success rate of “all social agencies” (including the
NLRB, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]) before
the U.S. Supreme Court during the period 1975 to 1983 was 68.3 per-
cent, while the success rate of “economic agencies” (such as the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission and the Interstate Commerce
Commission) was 79.1 percent. The combined success rate of the
NLRB, the EEOC, and the OSHA was only 63.8 percent (they were
successful 30 times out of 47).
These results showed that, during that period, the NLRB was suc-
cessful before the Supreme Court only 65.6 percent of the time.  These
numbers are somewhat consistent with other estimates of NLRB suc-
cess before the courts.  Block (1997b) found that, during the period
July 1995 through June 1996, the NLRB was successful (defined as
upheld “in whole or major part”) in 64.9 percent of the cases decided
by the courts of appeal.  Brudney (1996) found that for the period
November 1986 through October 1993, the NLRB success rate was
77.1 percent, where success was defined as an NLRB order “wholly
enforced or affirmed.”   For the period October 1989 through Septem-
ber 1996,  the NLRB reported that 71 percent of its unfair labor prac-
tice orders were fully enforced, and 83 percent were enforced in whole
or part (NLRB 1997).10
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For this research, we are concerned most with the effect of such
judicial behavior on labor standards legislation.  Our view, based on
the foregoing analysis, is that court involvement in the administration
of the labor laws generally works to the detriment of worker and labor
interests and to the advantage of employer interests.   In contrast, the
absence of judicial review and the ceding of substantial authority to
labor standards agencies works to the advantage of worker and labor
interests and to the disadvantage of employer interests. 
An analysis of labor standards statutes in the United States reveals
no explicit limitations in any statute on court review of agency deci-
sions, in situations where the statute is administered by an administra-
tive agency.  This observation along with the foregoing literature
review leads us to conclude that there are few constraints on the scope
of judicial review of agency decisions in the United States.
Conversely, we observe that there are substantial constraints on
judicial review throughout Canada and in all statutes.  The Canadian
literature reviewed above discusses in some detail the impact of priva-
tive clauses, and there is literature indicating that the narrow scope of
review extends to situations in which no privative clause exists.  We
have come across no literature that suggests that the scope of judicial
review in Canada is anything other than narrow.
All this suggests that a reasonable coding scheme for judicial
review in the two countries is to presume that, for those standards for
which judicial review is a relevant consideration, judicial review is
broad in the United States (unless the statutory language explicitly
indicates otherwise) and narrow in Canada, both in the federal jurisdic-
tion and throughout the provinces (unless the statute indicates other-
wise).11  This is the scheme used in our study.12 
DEVELOPING THE INDICES
To develop the indices, we first constructed a basic index for each
of the labor standards in our study.  The basic index for each standard
has two parts: a subindex value for each of the standard’s provisions,
which is larger the greater the level of protection given to employees;
and a weight given to each provision within each standard. For the pur-
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pose of constructing an index, we treat enforcement mechanisms as
additional provisions.
Using a technique developed for coding the provisions in collec-
tive bargaining agreements (Kochan and Block 1977; Block 1978a and
1978b),13 we constructed an ordinal scale for each provision.  We
assigned subindex values to each relevant statutory provision or
enforcement mechanism by giving a value 0 to the absence of a provi-
sion, and a value of 10 to the strongest provision.  Provisions of inter-
mediate strength received intermediate values in accordance with the
number of possible categories in the provision.
Generally,
spdj = the subindex value assigned to provision p in standard d in
jurisdiction j, 
where 0 ≤  spdj ≤ 10. 
Although the coding schemes for each of the provisions are dis-
cussed below, an example here will illustrate. For collective bargaining
laws, jurisdictions in which union recognition can be obtained without
an election are assigned a subindex value of 10, and jurisdictions in
which an election is required are assigned a value of 0.  Thus, for this
labor standard provision, there are no intermediate subindex values. In
contrast, advance notice requirements for plant closings or large-scale
layoffs is an example of a provision that requires an intermediate cod-
ing.  If the provision of the statute in the jurisdiction requires advance
notice of greater than or equal to 16 weeks, the jurisdiction is coded as
a 10.  Notice of 12 to 16 weeks is coded as 7.5; notice of 8 to 12 weeks
is coded as 5.0; notice of 4 to 8 weeks is coded as 2.5; and no provision
of notice is coded as 0. 
In addition to coding each provision, we established a weighting
scheme for provisions within a labor standard, such that the total
weights of all the provisions within a standard is equal to 1. Within
each standard, greater weights are given to the provisions deemed to be
most important.  For example, in the minimum wage standard, the level
of the minimum wage is weighted  at 0.92; the availability of a submin-
imum (or learner) wage is weighted at 0.04; the possibility of a fine or
imprisonment is weighted at 0.02; and the right of appeal is weighted at
0.02.  Later in this chapter, we present the different weights and subin-
dex values assigned to each provision within a standard.14 
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wpdj = the weight assigned to provision p in standard d in jurisdic-
tion j, 
where 0 ≤ wpdj ≤ 1
Then, the basic index score, Xdj, for standard d for jurisdiction j is:
              n
Xdj = Σ spdj wpdj
where the index consists of n provisions.
ESTIMATING COVERAGE
The final component in the full index is the extent to which the
labor force is covered by each labor standard. The justification for
including coverage is that the proportion of the workforce that is
intended to enjoy the protection afforded by any given labor standard is
one component of that standard’s effect. Coverage is measured as the
proportion of the workforce covered by each labor standard. If cover-
age is comprehensive—that is, if all workers within a jurisdiction are
covered by a particular labor standard—that proportion is equal to 1.
What we refer to as the “coverage-deflated” (or simply the “deflated”)
index is constructed by multiplying the basic index by the coverage
proportion. The employment-weighted deflated index is constructed by
multiplying the employment-weighted index by the coverage propor-
tion. The incorporation of coverage lowers the indices to the extent that
coverage is less than comprehensive.
Coverage criteria are specified in the enabling legislation for each
standard.  For the 10 standards, there are three bases for coverage crite-
ria: characteristics of the workforce, firm size, and occupation or
industry. 
Standards Assumed to Have Comprehensive Coverage
For 6 of the 10 standards—protection from unjust discharge, paid
time off, antidiscrimination or employment equity, unemployment or
employment insurance (UI/EI), health and safety, and advance
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notice—we assume coverage to be comprehensive (thus equal to 1 for
each).  Two standards have universal coverage in both the United
States15 and Canada (protection from unjust discharge and paid time
off16), and we thus set coverage equal to 1 for those two. Antidiscrimi-
nation or employment equity laws protect certain classes of individuals
from discrimination, for example against race or gender. Because of
the difficulty of observing several of the coverage classifications—spe-
cifically  disability, religion, national origin, and (in Canada) political
beliefs—we determined that we cannot generate useful coverage esti-
mates for such laws, and thus for the purpose of constructing the
deflated indices we assume coverage also to be equal to 1.  It should be
recognized, however, that this assumption biases the index upward,
although it does not change the rankings across jurisdictions. Finally,
coverage for three of the standards—UI/EI, health and safety, and
advance notice—is based primarily on firm size. In most cases, any
statutory exclusions are for very small firms, and the necessary firm
size data were not available. As a result, we again assume coverage to
be comprehensive. 
Standards Assumed to Have Less than Comprehensive Coverage
Coverage estimates for the four remaining standards—minimum
wage, workers’ compensation, overtime pay, and collective bargain-
ing—were generated using data from two sources, the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) for the United States and unpublished data from the
Survey of Employment, Payrolls, and Hours for Canada, both for 1993.
The CPS data used here are from the March 1993 survey. The CPS
sample, composed of households, includes data at the household and
individual levels. Individual records were read and aggregated to con-
struct the coverage estimates used in this study. Annual average
employment and union membership data from the monthly Canadian
employment survey were provided to us at the three-digit Canadian
1980 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level in tabular form for
all of Canada and by province from the Labour Division of Statistics
Canada.17 
We estimated coverage for the next three standards—minimum
wage, workers’ compensation, and overtime pay—in the following
three steps: 
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Step 1: Ratio of occupation to industry. For the most part, coverage
exclusions for these three labor standards are based on occupation and
occasionally industry. Therefore, to estimate the share of the excluded
occupations in each jurisdiction, we calculated the share of employ-
ment in excluded occupations by major industry sector. Because occu-
pational information is available only for the United States and not for
any individual jurisdictions, we assumed that the occupational mix for
any given industry, using an abridged version of the one-digit SIC, is
constant across jurisdictions and is equal to the occupation-industry
ratio for the total United States. For example, we assumed that taxi
drivers (excluded from workers’ compensation in some jurisdictions)
compose an equal share of employment in the manufacturing industry
regardless of jurisdiction, and that the share is equal to the U.S.
national share of taxi drivers in manufacturing. Summing these ratios
over exempted occupational categories and industry yields the total
share of exempted employment in the United States, EEMPUS:
EEMPUS = Σ (EXOCCij/INDj)
ij
where EXOCCij is the total employment in the exempted occupational
category i in industry j, and INDj is the total employment in industry j.
The assumption that ratios of occupation to industry are constant
across jurisdictions is equivalent to assuming that production func-
tions, at least with respect to their use of labor, do not vary spatially.
Clearly, the more homogeneous the industry category, the easier this
assumption is to defend. Making this assumption at the one-digit SIC
level is necessary in order to keep the estimation process tractable.
However, in most cases, the occupations that are excluded from labor
standard coverage tend to be clustered in nonmanufacturing, and often
in business and personal services. Therefore, we calculated the occupa-
tion to industry ratio at the more disaggregate level for the services
industry. The resulting abridged industry classification thus includes
the following 13 industries: agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; mining;
construction; manufacturing; transportation, communication and other
public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and
real estate; business and repair services; personal services; entertain-
ment and recreation services; professional and related services; and
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NEC (not elsewhere classified). This study is limited to the private sec-
tor; all government sectors are excluded.
Step 2: Jurisdictional industry weights. The next step was to calcu-
late the industry mix by industry for each state and Canadian province
or territory. The jurisdictional industry weights are simply the propor-
tion of employment in each industry for each jurisdiction. For the
United States, we did this by summing individual records from the CPS
by industry. For Canada, we aggregated the three-digit provincial
employment information into our industry classification scheme. These
weights sum to 1:
Σ (EMPjk/EMPk) = 1
j
where EMPjk is the total employment in sector j in jurisdiction k, and
EMPk is the total jurisdiction employment.
Step 3: Exempted share of employment by jurisdiction. The total
share of exempted employment in each jurisdiction, EXSHK is:
EXSHk = Σ (EXOCCi/INDj) × (EMPjk/EMPk) × Dik
ij
where the first two terms on the right are as previously defined and  Dik
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if occupation i is exempt in jurisdic-
tion k and 0 otherwise.
An example of the calculation will be instructive and is illustrated
in Figure 4.1.  Take the taxi driver example discussed previously and
apply it to a sample jurisdiction.  Assume that taxi drivers constitute 1
percent of manufacturing employment in the United States, that manu-
facturing accounts for 20 percent of total employment in that jurisdic-
tion, and that taxi drivers are not covered (are excluded from) the
relevant labor standard in the jurisdiction.  Under these assumptions,
the decline in coverage of the relevant labor standard in the jurisdiction
accounted for by the exclusion of taxi drivers in manufacturing would
be 0.002, which would be the exempted share.
The figure also makes the assumption that the hypothetical occupa-
tion servers and buspersons constitutes 2 percent of employment in
manufacturing in the United States.  This would result in an exempted
share of 0.004 resulting from buspersons and servers in manufacturing.
On the other hand, if truck drivers constituted 5 percent of manufactur-
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ing employment in the United States, the exempted share would be 0,
because truck drivers are covered by the legislation.  Thus, the total
exempt share from these three occupation-industry combinations is
0.006.
By summing across all excluded occupations in manufacturing in
jurisdiction k for any labor standard, we would obtain an exempt share
of employment in manufacturing in jurisdiction k for that standard.  By
making similar calculations for each occupation in each industry, we
would obtain an exempt share for each industry in jurisdiction k for
that standard.  Summing all the exemptions in all industries would pro-
vide an exempt share of employees in jurisdiction k for that standard.
Our procedure allows for two sources of coverage variation. The
first is difference across jurisdictional statute—that is, whether  Dik
equals 0 or 1. The other is industry mix, which will differentially
weight each occupation’s share of the total employment in each juris-
diction.
For the final standard, collective bargaining, we estimated cover-
age using the same logic with two slight variations. In some cases,
under a collective bargaining law, there might be variation within cer-
tain occupations in the right to organize and thus in coverage. For
example, some professionals may also be managers or supervisors and
are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act.18  To account for
this, we assigned a weight of 0.5 to those occupational categories for
the purpose of counting them in calculating the ratio of exempt occupa-
tion to industry. The second variation was to make the simplifying
assumption that all jurisdictional exclusions were the same as those





















(1) * (2) * (3)
Taxi drivers 1 20 Yes = 1 0.002
Servers and 
buspersons 2 20 Yes = 1 0.004
Truck drivers 5 20 No = 0 0
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specified in the U.S. National Labor Relations Act. We made this
assumption for computational reasons, and it will tend to overstate the
coverage in most Canadian jurisdictions. As a result of this assump-
tion, all variation in coverage across jurisdictions is a function of
industry mix.
MODEL FOR COMPARING LABOR STANDARDS
As discussed in Chapter 3, labor standards fall into two basic cate-
gories: standards requiring direct employer payments, either to em-
ployees or to government, and standards constraining the employer’s
behavior vis-à-vis its employees.  For the standards requiring employer
payments, the provisions considered are the level of required pay-
ments, the extent of exclusions, and the severity of penalties for statu-
tory violations. In general, the required payment level is given the
highest weight, and the higher the received payment, the higher the
standard.  For the standards constraining employer behavior, the provi-
sions considered depended on the purpose of the standard, but broadly
include the breadth of the constraints on employers, the amount of free-
dom given to employees, and the penalties on the employer.  The
greater the constraints on the employer or the greater the employee
freedom, the higher the standard.   
THE LABOR STANDARDS ANALYZED: PROVISIONS, 
WEIGHTS, AND SCORES19
This section of the chapter describes the statutory provisions, the
weighting scheme, and the scoring (subindex values) for each standard.
The section starts with the standards requiring employer payment, fol-
lowed by the discussion of standards constraining employer actions at
the workplace.
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Standards Requiring Employer Payment
Minimum Wage
The provisions, weights, and subindex values that constitute the
minimum wage index are shown in Table 4.1.  The basic principle
behind the minimum wage is the creation of a wage floor for all
employees. Through the enactment of a minimum wage, the govern-
ment says implicitly that private contracts for a wage below the mini-
mum are undesirable and will not be permitted.  On this basis, we give
the greatest weight, 0.92, to the level of the minimum wage.  We also,
however, take into account the fact that in some jurisdictions learners
and inexperienced employees are allowed to receive a subminimum
wage.  This is a modification of the “undesirable contract” notion, but
it would apply only to a limited number of employees and for a limited
time, therefore we assign it only a small weight of 0.04. We did not
wish to make the appeals and enforcement aspects of the standard
greater than the modification of the substantive standard.  Thus, each
of these is assigned a weight of 0.02.  
Overtime
The provisions, weights, and subindex values that constitute the
overtime index are shown in Table 4.2.  A jurisdiction creates a stan-
dard work week, in essence stating that the standard is the amount of
time employees are expected to work in a week.  The creation of a stan-
dard work week, in turn, is based on the notion that employees are enti-
tled to some time during a week for leisure and to attend to personal
business.  In most cases, hours worked over and above the standard
work week are associated with premium compensation for the employ-
ees over and above what they would ordinarily earn for those hours,
and additional cost for the employer, over and above what the
employer would ordinarily pay. 
The two key components of an overtime standard are the overtime
premium, or multiplier, and the number of weekly hours of work at
which the overtime premium requirement is triggered.   The greater the
overtime premium, and the fewer the number of weekly hours at which
the premium is triggered, the more favorable the standard to employ-
ees. Some Canadian jurisdictions require the overtime premium paid to
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Minimum wage level (12/20/98) 0.92
≥ US$5.75 or $C8.05 10
US$5.50–$5.74 or $C7.70–$8.04 9
US$5.25–$5.40 or $C7.35–$7.69 8
US$5.00–$5.24 or $C7.00–$7.34 7
US$4.75–$4.99 or $C6.65–$6.99 6
US$4.50–$4.74 or $C6.30–$6.64 5
US$4.25–$4.49 or $C5.95–$6.29 4
US$4.00–$4.24 or $C5.60–$5.94 3
US$3.75–$3.99 or $C5.25–$5.59 2
US$3.50–$3.74 or $C4.90–$5.24 1
Subminimum wage 0.04
If jurisdiction has no subminimum or if 
subminimum wage would reduce wage paid 
below  federal or jurisdictional minimum, 
whichever is higher 10
Otherwise 0
Fines, imprisonment 0.02
If fines or imprisonment a possible sanction 
on violator 10
Otherwise 0
Right of appeal of agency decision 0.02
Yes 10
No 0
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be a multiple of the jurisdiction’s minimum wage rather than the
employee’s wage. This is also taken into account in our coding.
It should be noticed that the highest subindex value is assigned to
provisions in which the employer is required to pay 1.5 times the
hourly rate after 40 hours.  This is assigned a higher score than a stan-
dard that requires 2 times the hourly rate after 48 hours.  Data on aver-
age hours worked justify this scoring.  Between 1988 and 1997, the
average weekly hours for U.S. production workers never exceeded
41.5 in any single month (U.S. Department of Labor 1998).  For Can-
ada in 1997, the average weekly hours worked for employees in min-
ing, quarrying, and oil wells—the industry group with the highest
average weekly hours—was 42.5 (Statistics Canada 1998).  Therefore,
it seems reasonable to presume that most overtime is assigned in hours
41 to 48, and that statutes that give employees overtime at lower hours,
albeit at a lower rate, are more favorable to employees than are statutes
that give employees overtime only after more hours even if at a higher
rate.





1.5 × reg rate after 40 hours per week 10
2 × reg rate after 48 hours per week 8.57
1.5 × reg rate after 44 hours per week 7.14
1.5 × reg rate after 48 hours per week 5.71
1.5 × min wage after 40 hours per week 4.18
1.5 × min wage after 44 hours per week 2.85
1.5 × min wage after 48 hours per week 1.42
Limits on rights of appeal of agency decisions 0.05
Yes 10
No 0
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Paid Time Off
The provisions, weights, and subindex values that constitute the
paid time off index are shown in Table 4.3.  The principle underlying
this index is that the greater the level of paid leisure time to which
employees are entitled, the higher the standard.
We focused on two types of paid time off that would be universally
available to all employees regardless of random occurrences, such as














Pay for overtime 0.335
Employees must be paid for holidays 
taken or granted overtime for holidays 
worked 10
Otherwise 0
Vacation length and pay 0.45
3  weeks vacation at 6% of pay or reg. 
pay 10
2  weeks vacation at 6% of pay 6.67
2  weeks vacation at 4% of pay or reg. pay 3.33
No vacation, no pay 0
Eligibility for vacation pay 0.05
After 10 months service 10
After 12 months service  6.67
After more than 12 months service  3.33
No provision 0
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illness or bereavement. These two types are holidays and paid vaca-
tions.  Half of the weight of the index—that is, 0.5—is associated with
holidays.  Within the holiday component, one-third (0.165) is assigned
to the number of holidays, and two-thirds (0.335) to provisions for pay
or overtime for holidays worked.  A required holiday standard is coded
as higher when it is paid or requires overtime pay than when it does
not.  
The vacation component (0.5) of the index also comprises two sub-
components. We give 90 percent of the vacation component (0.45) to
the amount of paid vacation to which the employee is entitled.  The
smaller subcomponent (0.05) is the length of service that determines
eligibility for vacation pay; this subcomponent is assigned a smaller
weight because these standards generally make employees eligible
after a year of tenure or less with the employer.  Therefore, most
employees under such statutes are eligible for vacation pay, and eligi-
bility is not a source of great variation among firms.
Unemployment or Employment Insurance
The provisions, weights, and scores that constitute the UI/EI index
are shown in Table 4.4.  In general, UI/EI systems are designed to pro-
vide financial support to employees during periods of unemployment
that are the result of factors beyond their control.  The systems consist
of a tax-based financing mechanism and a benefit structure. In general,
the higher the level of benefits and the greater the length of time
employees may receive benefits, the higher the standards.  In addition,
the standard is also considered to be higher the greater the percentage
of the financing borne by the employer, and lower to the extent that the
employee must bear a portion of the tax burden.20  
As Table 4.4 shows, the greatest weight goes to the level of the
average weekly benefit as a percentage of the average weekly wage.
This is based on the notion that the greater the replacement of the
employee’s regular wage, the higher the standards.  The subcomponent
assigned the second greatest weight is the employee’s UI/EI tax rate.
The higher the employee’s tax, the lower the subindex value assigned,
because any employee payment is seen as offsetting the benefits. The
principle is that if employees must pay part of their wages into the fund
each pay period, that payment can be viewed as offsetting what they
would receive if they were unemployed.  Further, employees who are
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Table 4.4 Unemployment or Employment Insurance: Provisions, 











Employee tax rate 0.3
No employee tax   10
> 0 but < 1% 8.3















a As a percent of average weekly wage.
b It is assumed that all employees are entitled to 13 weeks of federal extended UI/EI
benefits.
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not laid off do not receive benefits but do pay part of the premium.  The
subindex is coded higher the lower the tax rate; lower tax rates mean
lower payments for employees.
Weighted at 0.25 is the length of time that employees may receive
benefits.  The greater the length of time, the higher the standard.  This
subcomponent is assigned a slightly lower rate than the benefit level
and the tax rate because not all employees will be required to draw
benefits for the maximum period.  The smallest subcomponent,
weighted at 0.1, is the taxable wage base.  The higher the wage base,
the greater the financial resources of the fund from which benefits are
drawn.
Workers’ Compensation
The provisions, weights, and subindex values used to develop a
workers’ compensation index are shown in Table 4.5.  The criteria used
represent the essential program dimensions of the state and provincial
workers’ compensation systems based on the 19 essential recommen-
dations from the Report of the National Commission on State Work-
men’s Compensation Laws (1972). The recommendations are broken
into categories that reflect different aspects of the law. In particular,
eight refer to the extent of coverage, nine refer to the adequacy of
income benefits, and two refer to the scope and adequacy of medical
benefits. Data on compliance across the states are compiled annually
by the Employment Standards Administration within the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. The data used to construct the index in the Chapter 5
appendix come from the 1997 report (U.S. Department of Labor 1997)
and a reprint of its 1995 report in the 1996 Workers’ Compensation
Yearbook (Burton and Schmidle 1996). The Burton and Schmidle
source was one of two used to derive compliance among the Canadian
jurisdictions. The other source was the 1996 Analysis of Workers’
Compensation Laws (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1996).
With the exception of the right to file across jurisdictions—the one
recommendation for which we could not obtain reliable data for the
Canadian jurisdictions—the essential recommendations are weighted
equally. Two of the recommendations, compulsory coverage, and death
benefits for family members, are themselves subdivided into parts.
Those for compulsory coverage are weighted equally.  Among the four
parts to the family death benefits one (continuation of death benefits to
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private employment (2.1a) 0.024 10
No waivers permitted (2.1b) 0.024 10
No exemption based on firm size (2.2) 0.047 10
Farmworkers covered (2.4) 0.047 10
Casual and household workers covered (2.5) 0.047 10
Mandatory government worker 
coverage (2.6) 0.047 10
No exemptions based on employee class (2.7) 0.047 10
Employee choice over where to file (2.11) 0.000 10
Coverage for all work-related diseases (2.13) 0.047 10
Temporary, total disabilities (TTD) 
benefits ≥ 66 2/3% of wages (subject 
to maximum) (3.7) 0.047 10
Maximum TTD benefit at least 100% 
standard average weekly wage 
(SAWW) (3.8) 0.047 10
Retain prevailing part-time (PT)  
definition (3.11) 0.047 10
PT benefits ≥ 66 2/3% of wages (subject 
to maximum) (3.12) 0.047 10
Maximum PT benefit at least 100% 
SAWW (3.15) 0.047 10
Benefit duration = disability duration (3.17) 0.047 10
Death benefits ≥ 66 2/3% of wages (3.21) 0.047 10
Maximum death benefit at least 100% 
SAWW (3.23) 0.04 10
Family death benefits (3.25) 10
Benefits to widow(er) (3.25a) 0.024 10
Lump sum to widow(er) on 
remarriage (3.25b) 0.008 10
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Benefits to dependent child until 18 (3.25c) 0.008 10
Benefits to dependent child until 25 if 
student (3.25d) 0.008 10
No statutory $ limit on medical or rehab. 
services (4.2) 0.047 10
No time limit on right to medical or 
rehab. services (4.4) 0.047 10
Right of appeal
Agency 0.05 10
Internal process 0.05 10
Levels of appeal available 0.05
No appeal beyond internal process 10
Option to go to State Court or Supreme 
Court 7.5
May go to State Court and Supreme 
Court 5.0
No internal process but may go to State 
Court or Supreme Court 2.5
No internal process but option to go to 
State Court and Supreme Court 0
a Recommendations as presented in Report From National Commission (1972).
b For provisions that have no subindex values listed, jurisdiction is given a subindex






the spouse) is weighted three times as heavily (0.024) as the remaining
three (a lump sum to the spouse upon remarriage, benefits to children
until age 18, and benefits to children until age 25 if in school), each
weighted at 0.008. The logic behind this weighting scheme is that ben-
efits to the spouse compensate for the loss of a breadwinner, and are
thus the primary purpose of survivor benefits. Children will benefit
through these surviving spouse benefits or be financially cared for if
that spouse remarries.
The measures of enforcement for this standard are based on the
principle articulated earlier, that justice delayed is justice denied.  Dis-
putes are relatively common in workers’ compensation cases, and the
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jurisdictions vary considerably in the structure used to resolve disputes,
including the presence of pretrial hearings, mediation, and provisions
for alternative dispute resolution. The research on the value of the pre-
formal-hearing process is mixed, indicating that in some cases it
resolves disputes earlier but in others prolongs them (Ballantyne and
Mazingo 1999), thus making it difficult to characterize the enforce-
ment properties of this stage of dispute resolution. For that reason, we
consider only the features of the formal structure in developing the
enforcement component of the index. Three features are included: the
presence of an internal, administrative, first-level formal hearing; the
presence of an internal appeals process; and the number of levels of
appeal after the internal appeal process is exhausted. We base this on
the principle described earlier, that an internal agency will be more
likely to be knowledgeable about the purpose of the statute and to
make decisions that favor that purpose. Thus, the presence of an inter-
nal dispute resolution process is given a score of 10; the absence of
such a process is scored 0 (in that case, disputes are resolved by trial in
state court). Using the same logic, the presence of an internal appeals
agency is coded the same way: 10 if there is an internal appeals
agency; 0 if the decision must be appealed in the judicial system. The
third characteristic, the number of levels of appeal beyond the first, is
coded such that the fewer the number of possible appeals levels, the
higher the score. The possible levels and their attendant scores are: no
appeal beyond the internal appeal process (10); after an internal pro-
cess, can go either to state courts or to the state Supreme Court, but not
both (7.5); after internal process, can go to state courts and then to
Supreme Court (5); no internal process, but can appeal the administra-
tive decision at either the state court level or the state Supreme Court,
but not both (2.5); and, no internal process but can appeal the adminis-
trative decision at the state court level and then to the state Supreme
Court (0).21 
Standards Constraining Employer Allocation of Labor
Collective Bargaining
The provisions and weights that constitute the collective bargain-
ing index are shown in Table 4.6.  To distill the important components
of detailed and complex collective bargaining legislation in both coun-
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tries, we attempted to incorporate those aspects of the law that are at
the heart of rights to bargain collectively.  These incorporate a statute
providing the basic rights, the right to select representation, and the
right to negotiate an agreement, when and if a representative is
selected.  Because all of the provisions in the collective bargaining
index were such that a jurisdiction either had the provision, or the juris-
diction did not have the provision, there were no intermediate values
for the subindex; the value was 10 if the jurisdiction had a provision,
and 2 if it did not.
The two greatest weights, each 0.20, are assigned to the require-
ment of an election and the right to request conciliation or mediation
during negotiations.  An election requirement favors employers, result-
ing in a subindex value of zero, because it gives the employer the
opportunity to influence the outcome of the representation process
(Weiler 1983).  Card checks, on the other hand, the most common
method for determining representation in the absence of an election,
favor unions because the union has the opportunity to establish repre-
sentation with no employer involvement (Block 1994).22
A mediation or conciliation requirement is also assigned a weight
of 0.20 because of the notion that government involvement in the bar-
gaining process makes it more difficult than otherwise for the
Table 4.6 Collective Bargaining: Provisions, Weights, and Subindex 
Valuesa
Provision Weight
Statutory protection for collective bargaining 0.15
Election not requiredb 0.20
Unlimited subjects of bargaining 0.10
Conciliation rightsc 0.20
Striker permanent replacements prohibited 0.10
First-agreement arbitration available 0.10
Limits on rights of loser to appeal 0.15
a The jurisdiction’s subindex value is coded as 10 if the provision is in effect; 0 other-
wise.
b Election is not required if there is evidence that a majority support the union.
c Conciliation during negotiations is compulsory at the request of government or at the
request of either party.
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employer to use its bargaining power to weaken or eliminate the union
(Block 1994).  Thus, a subindex value of 10 is assigned to jurisdictions
where either side can trigger mandatory third-party involvement, and
zero is assigned to jurisdictions where there is no mandatory third-
party involvement.
Limits on appeal rights are assigned a weight of 0.15, far higher
than the weight such limits are  assigned in the other indices in which
an appeal is relevant.  This assignment is based on the literature, which
suggests that appeals can be used by employers to maintain a status
quo favorable to themselves, that such tactics can be an integral com-
ponent of employers’ legal strategies under the labor laws, and that
appeals can be successful for employers in influencing interpretations
of the law (Block and Wolkinson 1985; Report and Recommendations
1994; Block 1994, 1997a, 1997b; Brudney 1996).  Broad rights of
appeal are presumed to benefit employers: because most unfair labor
practice charges are filed against employers, thus they generally bene-
fit the most from maintaining the status quo.  Accordingly,  the greater
the scope of the appeal rights, the lower the standard. 
Weights of 0.1 are assigned to prohibition on striker replacement,
the presence of first agreement arbitration, and the absence of limits
on the subjects of bargaining.  If employer and union preferences are
indicated by the political debate, then the ability to replace strikers
enhances employer interests, and the absence of that ability enhances
union interests (Adams 1995, 1997; Schnell and Gramm 1996; Block,
Beck, and Kruger 1996; Block 1997a).  The presence of first agree-
ment arbitration also enhances the welfare of the union by establish-
ing a first contract for the union, the most difficult contract for a
union to secure (Cooke 1985).  Finally, limiting the subject matter of
bargaining reduces the scope of union activity and creates opportuni-
ties for litigation and delay, which tend to favor the employer (Sock-
ell 1986).  
Equal Employment Opportunity and Employment 
Equity (EEO/EE)
The provisions, weights, and subindex values that constitute the
index for EEO/EE are shown in Table 4.7.   The basic coding principle
was to focus on classes of covered employees as determined by statutes
or clearly enunciated judicial doctrine (such as regarding sexual
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harassment as sex discrimination).23  Provisions on judicial doctrine
covering such matters as burden of proof and liability are excluded
because they tend to be either ambiguous or fact-specific, making cod-
ing necessarily arbitrary and often inaccurate.24
The greatest weight is given to those characteristics of employees
that are the core of antidiscrimination, which include visible minorities
and women who would also likely be the largest protected groups.
Thus race and gender are each assigned a score of 0.15.  The next high-
est weights, 0.10, are assigned to national origin, age, religion, and dis-
ability.  Each of these categories is often specifically covered by
statute.  Sexual orientation and political beliefs were coded at 0.05
because they are likely less obvious than some of the other protected
Table 4.7 Equal Employment Opportunity and Employment




Race, visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples 0.15
Gender 0.15




Retirement plan exceptions 5
Age not covered 0
Sexual preference or orientation 0.05
Disability 0.10




Reasonable accommodation for disabled employees 0.04
Limits on rights of appeal 0.05
a For provisions that have no subindex values listed, jurisdiction is given a subindex
value of 10 if its law is in full compliance with the recommendation or 0 otherwise.
b For pregnancy, illness of a family member, or serious health problem—12–17 weeks,
unpaid.
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classes.  The breadth of coverage for family leave is assigned a weight
of 0.05 because other types of leave, such as sick leave, personal leave,
and vacation, are used more frequently than family leave, which is
used relatively infrequently.  Sexual harassment, equal pay, and rea-
sonable accommodation are coded separately because they represent
special situations that have received either statutory or special judicial
attention.  But we limited their weights to 0.03, 0.03, and 0.04, respec-





Discharge model prohibited if implicit contract 
exists 0.05
Definitive state ruling in favor of exception 10
No court decision 5
Definitive state ruling against exception 0
Handbook exception 0.05
Definitive state ruling in favor of exception 10
No court decision 5
Definitive state ruling against exception 0
Public policy exception 0.10
Definitive state ruling in favor of exception 10
No court decision 5
Definitive state ruling against exception 0
Covenant-of-good-faith exception 0.10
Definitive state ruling in favor of exception 10
No court decision 5
Definitive state ruling against exception 0
Legislative model
Limitedb 0.70 10a
a Coded as 10 if the provision is in effect; 0 otherwise.
b Except for misconduct, incompetence, or negligence; limited to “good cause.”
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tively, because they are also covered under gender discrimination and
disability discrimination.
Unjust Dismissal
The provisions, weights, and subindex values that constitute the
unjust dismissal index are shown in Table 4.8.   In general, there are
two models for protection against unjust dismissal.  The legislative
model provides broad-based coverage for all employees, but limits lia-
bility for any single incident (St. Antoine 1988; Krueger 1991; Stieber
and Block 1992; Wolkinson and Block 1996).  The litigation model
does not provide broad coverage, limiting coverage to individual
employees who are able to prove that their particular employment con-
tract or work situation is an exception to the employment-at-will stan-
dard. Under the litigation model, the existence of an exception for an
individual employee must be shown through litigation.  Once shown,
however, liability is determined by the judge or jury (Wolkinson and
Block 1996).  Given the high cost of initiating litigation, we presume
that the legislative model represents a higher standard than the litiga-
tion exception model.
Because in principle a jurisdiction could have both legislation and
litigation models, we created an index in which the presence of both
models would result in a jurisdiction being coded a 10.  Because of the
broader coverage of the statutory model, we assign jurisdictions with
that model a subindex value of 0.70.
In regards to the litigation model, each of the three judicially cre-
ated exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine—contractual, pub-
lic policy (employee may not be discharged if the discharge violates
public policy or if employee refuses to commit an illegal act), the cov-
enant of good faith (employer may not discharge an employee to avoid
paying monies owed)—was assigned a weight of 0.10 (Wolkinson and
Block 1996).  The contractual exception was further subdivided into
two parts.  States in which courts have ruled that the employee may
show a verbal or written contract that he or she would not be dis-
charged except for just cause was coded 0.05.  States in which courts
have ruled that an employee handbook that states that employees will
not be discharged except for just cause constitutes a contract were
coded 0.05.  Thus, states in which employees may rely on both sources
of contract would be coded 0.10.
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Within the three judicially created exceptions, a jurisdiction could
receive three subindex values: 10 if there is a judicially created excep-
tion in the jurisdiction, 0 if a court in the jurisdiction has explicitly
ruled that the exception does not exist in that jurisdiction, and 5 if
there has been no definitive ruling in the jurisdiction.  This middle
value is based on the view that the absence of a judicial decision cre-
ates legal uncertainty in the jurisdiction: it is unclear whether an
exception exists.
Therefore, a jurisdiction with all three judicially created exceptions
but with no statutory coverage would receive a subindex of 3.0.  A
jurisdiction with broad-based coverage but with limited liability would
receive a subindex of 7.0.  Given what we perceive as revealed
employer preferences for the litigation model, we believe this differ-
ence is reasonable.25
Occupational Safety and Health
The provisions, weights, and subindex values that constitute the
occupational safety and health index are shown in Table 4.9.  In gen-
eral, they are based on Wolkinson and Block (1996) and incorporate
penalties and required procedures. In the absence of substantial evi-
dence that any single provision is of greatest importance in improving
occupational safety and health, all provisions are weighted equally.
Although some evidence suggests that the presence of a plant-level
committee is important in assuring compliance (Weil 1995), the ulti-
mate responsibility for compliance and penalties still rests with gov-
ernment agencies.
An additional caveat is associated with occupational safety and
health standards.   The federal government and various state agencies
have developed industry- and product-specific occupational health and
safety standards that would be impossible to incorporate in an index
such as this.  To do so would require both an analysis of the industry
mix in each jurisdiction and an analysis of the rigorousness of the stan-
dards for each industry or product relative to some unknown bench-
mark.
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Subject to general duty clause 0.02
Inspection warrant requiredb 0.053
Maximum penalty for willful violation 0.053
≥$100,000c 10
$80,000–$99,999 8.3
$60,000–$79,000   6.7
$40,000 –$59,999   5.0
$20,000–$39,999   3.3
$1,000 –$19,999   1.7
No penalty 0
Maximum penalty for a serious violationd 0.053
Maximum penalty for a willful repeat violationd 0.053
Repeat violation penalties increasede 0.053
Willful violation causing deathd
Penalty for first offense 0.053
Penalty for second offense 0.053
Penalty for failing to abate a hazardf 0.053
≥ $10,000c 10
$8,000–$9,999   8.3
$6,000–$7,999   6.7
$4,000–$5,999   5.0
$2,000–$3,999   3.3
$1–$1,999   1.7
No fine 0
Reduction in penaltites for firms
With fewer than 250 employees 0.02
With written health and safety program 0.02
With no violations during a specified time 0.02
Record keeping exemptions for small firms or 
specified industries 0.02
(continued)





Jurisdiction with stricter standards than federal 
government 0.053
Occupational safety committee or represenative 
required 0.053
Maximum imprisonment possible 0.053
24 months  10
12 months  8
6 months  6
3 months  4
1 month  2
Maximum penalty for contravening direction of 
safety officer or inspector 0.053







Maximum penalty for any contravention by anyonef 0.053
Maximum penalty for minor offensesf 0.053
Additional fines possible 0.053
Penalty for failing to abate a second hazard 0.053
Limits on appeal of agency decisions 0.052
a For provisions that have no subindex values listed, jurisdiction is given a subindex
value of 10 if its law is in full compliance with the recommendation, or 0 otherwise.
b Warrant can be demanded before inspector may enter.
c All dollar amounts are domestic.
d For coding, see column entitled “Maximum penalty for a willful violation of statute”
in Wolkinson and Block (1996).
e Repeat violation penalties may be increased by a factor of 10.
f For coding, see column entitled “Daily penalty assessed for failing to abate a hazard
until corrected” in Wolkinson and Block (1996).
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Advance Notice of Plant Closings and Large-Scale Layoffs
The provisions, weights, and subindex values that constitute the
advance notice index are shown in Table 4.10.  The highest provision
weights, 0.20, are assigned to provisions on the minimum number of
employees necessary for coverage, the amount of advance notice
required, whether notice must be given to the affected employees, and
whether the employees are entitled to severance pay.  The smaller the
minimum unit size for coverage, the higher the standard.  The longer
Table 4.10 Advance Notice of Plant Closings and Large-Scale Layoffs: 




Number of employees for coverage 0.20
More than 10 10
More than 25   6.7
More than 50   3.3
No provision  0
Maximum time in which layoffs must occur 0.04
No maximum 10
4–5 weeks   6.7
8 weeks   3.3
No provision 0
Advance notice required 0.20
> 16 weeks 10
12 to 16 weeks 7.5
8 to 12 weeks 5
4 to  8 weeks 2.5
No notice required 0
Notice to minister of labor or government 0.01
Notice to affected employee 0.20
Notice to union 0.10
Severance pay 0.20
Limits on appeal of agency decisions 0.05
a For provisions that have no subindex values listed, jurisdiction is given a subindex
value of 10 if its law is in full compliance with the recommendation, or 0 otherwise.
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the notice required, the higher the standard.   The jurisdiction is given a
10 if the provision requires the employer to notify the employees
directly rather than merely notifying the union or the government.
Finally, a provision that requires at least some severance pay is
assigned a weight of 0.20, on the grounds that jurisdictions that grant
employees monetary compensation associated with the loss of a job
have a higher standard than jurisdictions that do not require the
employer to pay monetary compensation.
A requirement that the union be notified is weighted at 0.10.  The
standard is presumed to be higher if the employees can obtain aid from
a union.  Moreover, notification to the union would facilitate the filing
of any grievances under the collective agreement.  This provision is
assigned a weight that is half of those of the major provisions because
union coverage is far less than 100 percent.
The maximum time in which the layoffs must occur, once notifica-
tion has been given, is assigned a score of 0.04, since it involves a
question of when the employees know with certainty that their posi-
tions will end.  It is presumed that the shorter the time, the higher the
standard, as a shorter  period results in increased certainty.   Addition-
ally, a long delay in layoff can result in a dilution of the purpose of the
notice provision, because employees are unable to allocate full time to
a job search. 
 In addition to appeal rights, the other provision with a positive
weight is notice to the government.  If such notice is required, the gov-
ernment can more easily notify laid-off employees of government ser-
vices, and also investigate the employer if there have been any
violations of the law.
SUMMARY
This chapter explains the weights and subindex values created for
each of the 10 labor standards analyzed.  Although there may be legiti-
mate differences of opinion regarding individual weights and subindi-
ces, we believe that the ones we use are logical, defensible, and, where
appropriate, grounded in the academic literature.26  Moreover, because
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we will provide the composition of each of the indices, other research-
ers can easily recompute the indices to suit their own needs.
Notes
1. For a discussion of the Canadian constitutional basis of this system, see Car-
rothers 1986. 
2. The labor standards in the following sectors are federally regulated in Canada: air
transportation, banking, broadcasting, communications, Crown corporations
(such as Canada Post), flour, feed mills, grain elevators, longshoring, interprovin-
cial and international railways, interprovincial and international road transport,
shipping and navigation, and various miscellaneous industries.  See Canada
Labour Relations Board 1991; Block 1997b.
3. The full spreadsheets showing each statutory provision within each jurisdiction
are available upon request.
4. Our initial intention in this portion of the research was to focus on two aspects of
enforcement: 1) the aggressiveness of enforcement efforts by the jurisdiction,  and
2) the rights of appeal by litigants.  It seemed reasonable to measure the aggres-
siveness of an agency by calculating its budget deflated by a measure of employee
coverage, on the presumption that greater resources in an agency would indicate
greater enforcement powers. The assumption implicit in this view, however, was
that agencies enforcing comparable standards across jurisdictions performed com-
parable functions. If that is not the case, then budgets cannot be compared. Once
we began to analyze the differing systems of labor standards administration, not
only between the two countries but also between jurisdictions within the two
countries, it became clear that agencies are not comparable.  For example, the
enforcement of equal opportunity laws in the United States is housed, in the first
instance, in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  The
EEOC’s jurisdiction is limited to matters of employment discrimination.  More-
over, it may only investigate complaints, attempt to conciliate, and sue in court.  It
is not a decision-making body. (See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Sec.
705.)
In Canada, however, the enforcement of employment equity laws  is mainly
housed in provincial human rights commissions, which generally have jurisdic-
tion over all matters involving human rights, such as housing and public accom-
modations as well as employment. Moreover, the commissions also make
administrative decisions regarding violations of the provincial human rights stat-
utes.  (See, for example, Alberta Community Development, Alberta Human
Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act [<http://www.gov.ab.ca/~mcd/citi-
zen/hr/hrcmcact.htm>] and Alberta, “Quick Facts about the  Human Rights, Citi-
zenship and Multiculturalism Act” [<http://www.gov.ab.ca/~mcd/citizen/hr/pubs/
quickfct/quickfct.htm>]; and Ontario, Ontario Human Rights Code [<http://
www.ohrc.on.ca/english/codeeng.htm>].) 
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Similarly, the U.S. National Labor Relations Board has both adjudicative and
prosecutorial functions (the latter through the Office of the General Counsel), and
it must incorporate both in its budget.  Canadian boards have no such prosecuto-
rial function, and thus no need to budget for it. See, for example, Bruce 1990 and
Block 1994.  
5. The term “agency,” in this context, refers to a duly empowered, individual deci-
sion maker in the agency, or a tribunal, board, or commission operating within the
agency.  The key question is the extent to which the internal decision of the
agency, whatever the procedure by which it was reached, can be appealed exter-
nally to a court.  
6. Paragraph 86, Sec. 3, at <http://149.174.222.20/WCB/WCB.nsf/Public/
WCACTsect86>.
7. 29 U.S.C. 160(f).
8. For similar language on judicial review of decisions of the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, created under the United States Occupational
Safety and Health Act, see 29 U.S.C. 660(a), at <http://www.law.cornell.edu:80/
uscode/29/660.html>.
9. 340 U.S. 474, 1951.
10. Block and Wolkinson (1985) argued that the courts are unwilling to defer to the
NLRB because the NLRB is limited to interpreting the National Labor Relations
Act, while the courts have the authority to attempt to harmonize the act’s princi-
ples with other legal principles.  They also contended that, whereas U.S. law
views property rights as fundamental constitutional rights, worker rights are statu-
tory-based.  Thus, when employers exercise property rights, they are exercising a
higher order of rights.
Brudney (1996) pointed out that the courts of appeal give far more weight to
employee free choice than to employer deterrence and bargaining stability; the
latter two values are important to the NLRB.  This is part of what Brudney calls
“statutory aging”—a process by which the courts are attempting to harmonize a
mid 1930s statute (which was designed to encourage collectivization of the
employment relationship, to encourage industrial stability, and to increase mass
purchasing power) with contemporary values such as employee freedom of choice
and the protection of individual rights at the workplace.
 11. We do not include appeals rights or judicial review as a consideration in unem-
ployment insurance (United States) or employment insurance (Canada).
Although there may be a dispute over whether any individual employee qualifies
for insurance, such cases are highly individual and have no effect on the general
standards.  
12. We include an additional element  in the workers’ compensation enforcement
measures: the scope of appeal within the workers’ compensation adjudicative sys-
tem. Typically, jurisdictions allow either a narrow review based solely on a point
of law or a more complete one that permits a full review of the record, sometimes
to the point of a de novo appeal. The index used here gives a jurisdiction a score
of 0 if the appeal process permits a review beyond solely the basis of law, on the
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assumption that the fuller the review of the record (and possibly the evidence), the
longer the process is likely to be. Although the Canadian provinces typically do
not allow appeals outside the administrative system, an appeal within the system
can be brought on a basis wider than a mere point of law.
13. For a somewhat comparable process of coding legislation, albeit only for public
sector collective bargaining laws, see Currie and McConnell (1991) and Gunder-
son, Hebdon, and Hyatt (1996).
14. We are aware that, to some extent, the indices are a function of the weights given
to each relevant provision.  Although the weights are open to debate, we believe
that the weighting scheme we have developed is reasonable. Other weighting
schemes are likely equally reasonable.  See the Chapter 5 appendix for a test of
the robustness of the weights.
15. There are no occupational or industrial exclusions from judicially determined
exceptions to employment-at-will in the United States.  
16. The only departure from this assumption is for British Columbia, where managers
are exempt.
17. Total employment for  Yukon and the Northwest Territories was not included in
the data set. The employment totals for these two jurisdictions were taken from
the following Internet addresses: <http://www.yukonweb.com/government/
facts.htmld /#earnings> and <http://www.stats.gov.nt.ca/Bureau/StatInfo/Labour-
Force/_LfsData.html>.
18. See, for example, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Health Care and
Retirement Systems v. NLRB, 511 U.S. 571 (1994); and NLRB v. Kentucky River
Community Care Inc., U.S. Supreme Court, No. 99-1815 (2001) at <http://
www.findlaw.com/casecode/supreme.html>, party name search = “Kentucky
River.”
19. Among others listed, the following sources were used to obtain or compute the
provisions in the indices: Bureau of National Affairs (1994, 1995a,b,c); Govern-
ment of Canada (1988, 1993, 1995); Canada Labour Relations Board (1991);
Commerce Clearinghouse Inc. (various years); Hardin et al. (1990 and updates);
Human Resources Development Canada (1995a,b,c, 1997, 1998a,b); Kumar
(1991); and U.S. Department of Labor (1998). 
20. We do not consider the question of whether payroll taxes are truly borne by the
employer or are fully or partly shifted to employees in the form of reduced com-
pensation. We note that it is also possible that, when employees have market
power, they can conceivably shift part of their tax back to the employer by
demanding higher compensation.  Because there is no way of knowing which
effect operates, we simply assume that the total cost of the tax is borne by the
party that directly pays the tax.
21. See Ballantyne and Mazingo (1999) for data used to code levels of appeal.
22. We presume that union organizing rights and employee rights coincide, and that
standards that favor union organizing also favor employees. This is because, in
collective bargaining, unions are the institutional actor that represents employees.
Although it may be argued that enhancing the rights of unions does not necessar-
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ily enhance the rights of employees, especially the rights of those employees who
may oppose union representation, it would be methodologically impossible to
determine the percentage of employees who might feel a loss of welfare if union
rights were enhanced.   Moreover, if there were an overvaluation of the enhance-
ment of employee welfare based on the enhancement of union bargaining rights,
that overvaluation would be limited to this component because the other compo-
nents either address employee rights broadly or are generally operative when
union representation has been selected.
23. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
24. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that for “hostile environment”
sexual harassment to be shown, the actions in the workplace to which the
employee objects must be severe and pervasive (Harris v. Forklift Systems, 63
FEP Cases, 225, 1993).  It would be impossible to attempt to code the full range
of actions that would be classified as “severe and pervasive,” given the subjectiv-
ity of this standard.  See, for example, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 97-282
(1998), in which the District Court and Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the
Court of Appeals on the other, disagreed on whether the same set of facts consti-
tuted unlawful sexual harassment.  
25. For a contrary view, see Krueger (1991).





U.S. and Canadian 
Labor Standards Compared
OVERVIEW
The labor standards indices for the United States and Canada are
summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.1  The second-to-last
column in each shows the sums of the basic indices for each jurisdic-
tion.  The last column shows the sum of the coverage-deflated indices
(the actual coverage-deflated indices are not included).  The sums pre-
sented indicate the overall level of labor standards in each jurisdiction
as of December 31, 1998.
Table 5.3 compares the indices for the two countries.  The first two
rows of Table 5.3 show the averages of the unweighted basic indices
for the two countries as derived in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and then a sum
of the unweighted averages.  The last two rows of Table 5.3 present the
indices weighting the jurisdictions by the percentage of the country’s
employment2 in each jurisdiction.  Although the differences between
the unweighted and employment-weighted indices are not great, some
are noticeable.  Table 5.4 presents analogous information for the cover-
age-deflated indices. 
Comparing the range of U.S. indices (Table 5.1) with those in Can-
ada (Table 5.2) we see that, in general, Canadian labor standards are
higher than U.S. labor standards, as measured by the procedure out-
lined in Chapter 4. The U.S. basic indices range from 47.58 (Tennes-
see) to 61.77 (Montana), while the Canadian basic indices range from
54.79 (Alberta) to 76.10  (British Columbia).  The U.S. coverage-
deflated indices range from 43.83 (Tennessee) to 60.66 (Montana)
compared with a Canadian range of 51.56 (Alberta) to 72.38 (British
Columbia). 
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That Canadian labor standards are higher than U.S. labor standards
is corroborated in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, which present the results for
averages for the basic labor standards indices and the coverage deflated
labor standards indices, as measured by the procedure outlined in
Chapter 4.  As  Table 5.3 shows, the sums of the basic unweighted indi-
ces for the United States and Canada are 52.24 and 64.28, respectively.
The sums of the employment-weighted basic indices for the United
States and Canada (weighted by provincial or state employment) are
51.91 and 65.27, respectively.  Table 5.4, presenting coverage-deflated
indices, shows results comparable to those for the basic indices. The
sums of the unweighted indices are 49.92 and 63.10 for the United
States and Canada, respectively.  The sums of the employment-
weighted indices are 50.23 and 64.20, respectively, for the United
States and Canada.3
STATISTICAL RESULTS: NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS
The above discussion is based solely on a descriptive comparison
and does not provide a statistical test of the differences in the labor
standards.  The differences in these indices cannot be subject to testing
with standard parametric statistical techniques. Although it is helpful to
use averages to illustrate the points, we assume that the indices do not
have any distribution, normal or otherwise; thus they should be ana-
lyzed using nonparametric techniques. Therefore, we base our statisti-
cal comparison of the labor standards in the two countries on the
ranking of each of the jurisdictions for each of the standards.
In this procedure, we rank each of the 63 (51 in the United States
and 12 in Canada) political jurisdictions according to its subindex
value on the basic, unweighted indices on each of the standards.  For
each standard, the jurisdiction with the highest index on that standard is
ranked 1 for that standard, and the jurisdiction with the lowest index on
that standard is ranked 63.  An adjusted ranking is created by assigning
jurisdictions with equal scores a rank equal to the mean of the ranks
associated with that index value. For example, if two jurisdictions have
the highest possible score on a standard, each is assigned a rank of
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1.5—that is, (1 + 2)/2.  With this method, lower index values are asso-
ciated with better ranks and thus higher labor standards. 
The ranks for each of the 10 standards for each jurisdiction are then
summed.4  Therefore, the best possible score (the highest labor stan-
dard) for a jurisdiction is 10 (that is, 10 standards each ranked first; 10
× 1).  The worst possible score for a jurisdiction is 630 (10 standards,
each ranked 63rd; 10 × 63).
Table 5.5 presents the raw results of these rankings.  As can be
seen, 6 of the 10 jurisdictions with the best rankings are Canadian,
including two of the three largest provinces: Ontario and British
Columbia.  Nine of the 12 Canadian provinces or territories are in the
upper half of the distribution. 
Despite what appear to be consistently higher labor standards
there, the provincial autonomy in Canada, in contrast to U.S. federal
supremacy, results in a greater range of sums of adjusted rankings in
Canada than in the United States. Thus, in Canada, the range of the
sums of adjusted ranks is 268 (the sum in British Columbia is 108.5;
whereas it is 376.5 in Alberta), while the range of the sums of adjusted
ranks in the United States is 181.5 (Hawaii is 217.5; whereas Delaware
is 399.5).
To determine if the differences between the United States and Can-
ada are significant, we tested Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon rank differ-
ence tests for comparing populations.  We tested the rankings on each
of the standards and the sums of each of the standards to determine if
these differences could have occurred by chance (Mendenhall, Schaef-
fer, and Wackerly 1986). These tests  do not require that the samples be
of equal size, and they assume no underlying distribution. The null
hypothesis is that the jurisdiction rankings for the two countries are
drawn from populations with identical distributions—that is, there is
no significant difference in the ranks of the jurisdictions by country. 
The results, presented in Table 5.6, show that the Canadian ranks
are significantly better than the U.S. ranks on 6 of the 10 standards:
paid time off, unemployment or employment insurance (UI/EI), work-
ers’ compensation, collective bargaining, unjust discharge, and
advance notice of large-scale layoffs.  The U.S. ranks are significantly
better than the Canadian ranks on three standards: minimum wage,
overtime, and occupational safety and health. There is no significant
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difference between the two countries in the rankings on the equal
employment opportunity or employment  equity (EEO/EE) standard.
RESULTS ON INDIVIDUAL LABOR STANDARDS
This section discusses the results for each standard, focusing first
on standards that require employer payments, and then turning to stan-
dards that place constraints on employer actions vis-à-vis employees.
Minimum Wage
Table 5.7 presents the scoring of the components used to construct
the minimum wage index.  Although minimum wage levels, denomi-
nated in domestic dollars, were generally higher in Canada as of
December 31, 1998, than in the United States,5 in order to make com-
parisons between the two countries, the minimum wage rates were
evaluated in U.S.$.  To smooth fluctuations in the exchange rate, an
average over the 1994–1998 period was used, where Can$1 = U.S.$.71
(or U.S.$1 = Can$.40).6  Evaluated in a common currency, the U.S.
minimum wage rates were higher than those in Canada.  The Canadian
minimum wage, valued in U.S. dollars, ranged from $4.22 to $5.08.
The combined effects of recent increases in the U.S. statutory mini-
mum wage rate and an exchange rate in which the Canadian dollar has
been devalued relative to the U.S. dollar places the U.S. rates above all
of the Canadian jurisdictions for this standard.  This current difference
is reflected in country-level minimum wage indices that average 7.24
for the United States, 4.07 for Canada for the unweighted minimum
wage index, and 7.34 and 5.24 for the employment-weighted index, as
shown in Table 5.3.  The reason for the greater difference in the
employment-weighted and unweighted minimum wage indices in Can-
ada relative to the United States is because of the relatively high mini-
mum wage rates in the three largest provinces, Ontario, Quebec, and
British Columbia.  Recall that the unweighted index weights all prov-
inces and territories equally, while the employment-weighted index
gives greater weight in computing the index to the larger provinces.  
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Overtime and Hours of Work
Table 5.8 presents the jurisdiction indices for the overtime stan-
dard. Basic overtime standards are higher in the United States than in
Canada for several reasons. First, the federal standard in the United
States is a maximum of 40 hours accumulated in a single work week.
There is far more variation in this norm in Canada. Of the 13 Canadian
labor standards jurisdictions, only 7 have a 40-hour per week maxi-
mum.  New Brunswick and Ontario use 44 hours; Quebec has a 43-
hour standard; and Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have enacted
a 48-hour straight-time maximum. Second, in three Canadian prov-
inces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland), the overtime
rate is a multiple of the minimum wage rate rather than the individual’s
straight-time rate.
Both countries permit sectoral exemptions, generally for those
industries that either do not operate on a regular daily work schedule or
whose employees must perform their jobs without supervision and
monitoring. Quebec is the only jurisdiction in either country that per-
mits an exception either by collective agreement or with the permission
of the government.
The index averages (shown in Table 5.3) reflect this difference: for
the unweighted basic indices, the average is 10 for the United States
and 7.49 for Canada; for the employment-weighted indices, the aver-
ages are 10 for the United States and 7.06 for Canada. When coverage
is taken into account, the differences narrow: the unweighted for the
United States average is 8.68, and for Canada, 6.47; the comparable
employment-weighted figures are 8.83 and 6.41.7  
Paid Time Off
Table 5.9 presents the results for paid time off in the United States
and Canada.  Although most states have more official holidays than
Canadian jurisdictions do, there is no requirement in any law or statute
in the United States that employees be paid for those holidays. But
mandatory payment to employees for official holidays is almost uni-
versal throughout Canada.  Every Canadian jurisdiction requires that
employees either be paid time and a half, if they must work an official
holiday, or receive the day off with pay.  
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In addition to these differences, Canadian jurisdictions, unlike
those in the United States, have legislatively mandated paid vacations.
Mandated vacations range from two to three weeks, with employees
receiving 4 percent or 6 percent of their annual pay. A person is eligible
after being employed from 10 to 12 months, depending on the jurisdic-
tion.
It is clear that Canadian standards for paid time off are far higher
than comparable U.S. standards. The paid time off index reflects this
difference.  Because the greatest weight is assigned to the pay entitle-
ment provision (which gets twice the weight given to the number of
holidays in the jurisdiction), the Canadian indices are far higher than
those in the United States. As shown in Table 5.3, the undeflated,
unweighted indices are 1.29 and 6.37 for the United States and Canada,
respectively. The comparable employment-weighted numbers are 1.29
and 6.59. Deflating for coverage makes only a small difference, as is
evident in Table 5.4  The U.S. indices do not change, as there is no leg-
islated paid time off in the United States, and holidays apply to all
employees.  Deflating for coverage reduces the Canadian indices to
6.31 and 6.02 for the unweighted and employment-weighted indices,
respectively.
Unemployment or Employment Insurance
Table 5.10 presents the results for the unemployment insurance
(UI) system in the United States and the employment insurance (EI)
system in Canada. Our results and indices suggest that the Canadian EI
system is slightly better, from the workers’ point of view, than the U.S.
UI systems. Although, as shown in Table 5.3, the difference between
the two countries’ unweighted averages is relatively small (6.28 com-
pared with 7.51), 47 of the 51 U.S. jurisdictions (50 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia) have indices below the Canadian national index,
suggesting that few U.S. workers are governed by a statute as generous
as Canada’s.
This difference in favor of Canada is due to two factors. First, the
average weekly benefit as a percentage of previous earnings in Canada
is higher than in the United States. The Canadian is 55 percent, while
in the United States the average is 37 percent.  Second, Canadian work-
ers may draw their benefits for a longer time than U.S. workers—45
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weeks as compared with a maximum of approximately 39 weeks (with
extended benefits) in the United States.  The typical length of time in
the United States is 26 weeks.
While the benefit structure to employees is higher in Canada than
in the United States, Canadian workers must pay for these higher bene-
fits. In the United States (exception of Alaska), the total cost of UI is
borne by employers, while in Canada the cost of EI is shared: Canadian
employees pay $2.95 per $100 of insurable earnings up to earnings of
$39,000 per year; U.S. workers pay nothing.  This somewhat offsets
the advantage that unemployed Canadian workers have vis-à-vis their
counterparts in the United States.8
Workers’ Compensation
Tables 5.11a, b, and c present the results for the workers’ compen-
sation indices for the United States and Canada. The criteria used to
represent the program dimensions of workers’ compensation are based
on the 19 essential recommendations from the report of the National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (1972), with 8
related to coverage, 9 related to income benefit adequacy, and 2 to
medical benefit adequacy.
As shown in Table 5.3, the average unweighted base indices for the
two countries are 6.72 and 7.60 for the United States and Canada,
respectively. Weighting changes these scores to 6.58 and 7.77, respec-
tively. Fourteen jurisdictions (Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia) have indices greater
than the Canadian unweighted, undeflated standard.  Three Canadian
provinces (Alberta, Manitoba, and New Brunswick) have indices lower
than the U.S. unweighted, undeflated standard. The primary explana-
tion for the higher Canadian indices are the appeal processes, some-
what higher death benefits, and an absence of limitation on the duration
of temporary total benefits. Overall, these results indicate greater com-
pliance with the essential recommendations in Canada than in the
United States.  
Looking at the subcomponents of the essential recommendations
of the National Commission, the Canadian laws are more complete
with respect to coverage and slightly less complete with respect to ben-
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efit levels. Although actual benefit levels tend to be slightly higher in
Canada than in the United States, the Canadian provinces in general
provide slightly less extensive benefits to widows and survivors in the
event of death.
CONSTRAINING EMPLOYER ALLOCATION OF LABOR
Collective Bargaining
Table 5.12 presents the results for the collective bargaining indices
for the United States and Canada. As is generally acknowledged, Cana-
dian labor laws are far more favorable to unions and collective activity
than U.S. labor laws. Of the seven scoring components for collective
bargaining, the United States is scored zero for all but the statutory pro-
tection  of bargaining collectively. Eleven of the 13 Canadian jurisdic-
tions require no election for union certification, thus minimizing the
role of the employer in the unionization process. None of the Canadian
jurisdictions places limits on the scope of bargaining, thus permitting
union involvement in a wide range of employer decisions. All Cana-
dian jurisdictions have procedures under which either one party or the
government may require conciliation during negotiations, thus making
it more difficult than otherwise for the employer to use the bargaining
process to eliminate the union. Two jurisdictions have a broad-based
ban on striker replacements, and seven jurisdictions permit first-agree-
ment arbitration, thus institutionalizing the union. 
These differences result in a substantially higher index for the
Canadian jurisdictions than for the United States.  As shown in Table
5.3, the nondeflated, unweighted Canadian index is 7.92, as compared
to an index of 1.50 for the United States.  The weighted Canadian aver-
age is 7.10, while the U.S. average, because it is based on national leg-
islation, does not change.  The change in the Canadian index is due to
the greater weight associated with Ontario, which has relatively weak
collective bargaining legislation, relative to the other provinces.  An
examination of Table 5.4, showing coverage deflated indices, shows
lower levels, but the basic conclusion of substantially higher indices
for Canadian workers relative to U.S. workers does not change.
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Equal Employment Opportunity/Employment Equity
Table 5.13 presents the results for the equal employment opportu-
nity (United States) and employment equity (Canada) indices.  The
EEO/EI index, which is heavily weighted toward racial and gender dis-
crimination protection, indicates that this labor standard in the two
countries is roughly equal.  As shown in Table 5.3, the relevant
unweighted basic index averages are 8.64 in the United States and 8.68
in Canada.  The weighted index averages are 8.76 in the United States
and 8.53 in Canada.  The slight drop for Canada is due to the fact that
the largest province, Ontario, was associated with an index slightly
lower than the unweighted average.  The average of the coverage-
deflated indices, shown in Table 5.4, are comparable to the nondeflated
averages shown in Table 5.3.
The table indicates that Canadian law covers a slightly wider range
of activities and classes than U.S. law. Laws in both countries cover
race, Aboriginal peoples, and visible minorities; gender; national ori-
gin or ancestry; religion; and age. More Canadian provinces than U.S.
states cover sexual orientation. In addition, most Canadian jurisdic-
tions protect persons from discrimination based on political beliefs and
membership in organizations, protection that is not extended to
employees or applicants in the United States (with the exception of
union membership). U.S. law, on the other hand, goes further than most
Canadian jurisdictions in requiring reasonable accommodation for dis-
abled employees (Schneid 1992).
A key difference, albeit uncoded, between EEO law in the United
States, and EE law in Canada is that the latter is grounded in concepts
of human rights comparable to constitutional rights in the United
States, while the former is viewed as a regulation of interstate com-
merce.  In the United States, there has been a reluctance to permit
employees to make constitutional claims against private employers
(Kelly 1991; Wolkinson and Block 1996).
Unjust Dismissal
Table 5.14 presents the results for the unjust discharge indices for
the United States and Canada.  With the exception of Montana, no
jurisdiction in either country has broad-based protection against unjust
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dismissal. In the United States, roughly 40 states have developed judi-
cial doctrine based on contract law that prohibits an employer from dis-
charging an employee except for just cause if the employer has
contracted not to do so. Such contracts may be written, implied, or
based on a handbook. Other states have also created exceptions for
employees who are discharged for refusing to violate public policy or
who are discharged when an employer refuses to pay for benefits
already earned (for example, sales commissions). 
Canadian law has developed a broad-based notice requirement
(Human Resources Development Canada 1995b; Levitt 1985). Thus,
employers who terminate employees without giving proper notice will
generally be required to pay the employee what he or she would have
received during the notice period. The notice requirement increases
with the length of time on the job.
It thus appears that Canadian employees have a greater level of
protection against unjust discharge than U.S. employees. Protection in
the United States is generally limited to those employees who can dem-
onstrate an employer promise. Protection in Canada is based on
employment status, per se. This difference is reflected in the coding of
our index.  We give the greatest weight to the coverage breadth of the
Canadian statutes.  Conversely, the situation-specific nature of unjust
discharge protection in the United States caused us to give it a narrow
weight.  Thus, all the Canadian jurisdictions have an index value of 7,
while the states generally have indices between 2 and 3.
Occupational Safety and Health
Tables 5.15a and b present the components of the occupational
safety and health indices for the United States and Canada.  Although it
is impossible to analyze detailed regulations for each industry, a com-
parison of procedures and penalties suggests that U.S. federal safety
and health standards are somewhat higher than the standards in most of
the Canadian provinces.  The U.S. index score is 3.13, as shown in
Table 5.3, while the nondeflated, unweighted Canadian average is 2.78.
This advantage to the United States is primarily due to the higher pen-
alties the United States imposes. On the other hand, the data indicate
that two of the three largest provinces, Ontario and British Columbia,
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have fairly high health and safety standards.  The standards in Quebec,
however, are low relative to the other provinces.  
Advance Notice of Plant Closings and Large-Scale Layoffs
Table 5.16 presents the components of the advance notice indices
for the United States and Canada.  The components incorporated into
this index include the minimum number of employees necessary to
trigger a requirement, the amount of advance notice required, whether
notice is given to the affected employees, whether there is a severance
pay requirement, and whether notice must also be given to the union, if
the employees are so represented. It should be noted that the severance
pay requirements refer to individual as opposed to group termination.
There are no statutory requirements in the United States that employees
be paid severance pay. However, Canadian employees under federal
jurisdiction or in British Columbia or Ontario are entitled to severance
pay if they meet the qualifying tenure requirements. The United States
has enacted national legislation, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN).  Canadian provinces determine the extent of
advance notice for firms within their borders.
As shown in Table 5.3, the nondeflated, unweighted indices indi-
cate that the United States has slightly better advance notice provisions
than Canada.  The nondeflated, unweighted indices are 5.03 for the
United States and 4.87 for Canada, as shown in Table 5.4.  The cover-
age-deflated weighted indices are 5.03 and 4.82, respectively.
These indices are somewhat misleading, however, since the Cana-
dian scores are influenced by the provinces of Alberta and Prince
Edward Island, neither of which has advance notice provisions. If we
compute a Canadian index including only the provinces that have
advance notice provisions, the nondeflated and coverage-deflated,
unweighted averages for Canada increase to 5.76 and 5.78, respec-
tively,9 showing that the Canadian jurisdictions that have enacted
advance notice provisions have stricter provisions than WARN in the
United States. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results presented in this chapter indicate that, overall, labor
standards are higher in Canada than in the United States.   These con-
clusions are suggested by the total of the index scores for each of the
standards and for each of the jurisdictions.  The results are confirmed
by the analysis of the rankings of each of the 63 jurisdictions on the
labor standards.
Despite the significance of this generalization, the results on the
individual standards are also important, because not all labor standards
will be equally important in all industries.   The rankings analysis sug-
gests that labor standards are higher in Canada than in the United
States on three of the five standards requiring employer payments—
paid time off, UI/EI, and workers’ compensation.  Overtime require-
ments are actually more stringent in the United States than in Canada.
Moreover, to the extent that U.S. employers provide vacation and holi-
day pay to their employees, the gap between the two countries would
be narrowed further.  Overall, then, although direct payments associ-
ated with employment are greater for Canadian employers than for
their United States counterparts, the difference may be small.
Turning to the standards constraining employer allocation of labor,
it is clear that Canadian standards are substantially higher than U.S.
standards for collective bargaining and unjust discharge, and slightly
higher for advance notice, where such requirements exist in Canada.
Antidiscrimination laws are comparable in both countries, and the
United States may actually provide greater penalties for violation of
health and safety laws than does Canada.  Although Canada does have
slightly more stringent requirements than the United States for notifica-
tion regarding plant closing and large scale layoffs, there is a question
regarding the frequency with which the obligations under such a statute
would be triggered for any employers.  On the other hand, standards
for collective bargaining, unjust dismissal restrictions, and occupa-
tional safety and health operate daily at the workplace.
The foregoing discussion suggests the importance of decomposing
the standards.  We discuss this matter further in Chapter 6.
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Table 5.1 Basic and Coverage-Deflated Labor Standards Indices, United States, as of December 31, 1998





























AL 6.84 10.00 1.29 5.12 5.67 1.50 8.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 49.92 46.01
AK 9.08 10.00 1.11 5.01 6.64 1.50 8.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 52.83 51.28
AZ 6.84 10.00 1.11 5.58 6.02 1.50 8.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 50.55 46.52
AR 6.84 10.00 1.11 6.77 5.26 1.50 8.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 49.98 49.14
CA 9.60 10.00 1.11 5.02 6.92 1.50 9.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 54.64 53.22
CO 6.84 10.00 1.11 6.33 7.07 1.50 8.85 3.00 3.13 5.03 52.85 50.93
CT 9.08 10.00 1.11 5.74 7.94 1.50 9.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 55.87 54.18
DE 6.84 10.00 1.47 5.58 5.69 1.50 8.35 1.50 3.13 5.03 49.08 45.13
DC 10.00 10.00 1.29 5.74 8.65 1.50 8.85 2.50 3.13 5.03 56.68 54.92
FL 6.84 10.00 1.11 6.17 5.77 1.50 8.85 1.00 3.13 5.03 49.39 48.11
GA 6.84 10.00 1.65 5.58 5.34 1.50 8.35 1.00 3.13 5.03 48.41 46.58
HI 7.76 10.00 1.29 8.58 7.91 1.50 9.35 2.50 3.13 5.03 57.04 55.60
ID 6.84 10.00 1.29 7.27 5.13 1.50 8.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 51.52 48.85
IL 7.24 10.00 1.29 6.17 7.86 1.50 8.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 52.56 50.82
IN 6.84 10.00 1.65 5.58 6.13 1.50 8.35 1.50 3.13 5.03 49.70 45.81
IA 6.84 10.00 1.29 7.10 8.10 1.50 8.35 2.75 3.13 5.03 54.07 49.90
KS 6.84 10.00 1.29 6.77 6.52 1.50 8.85 2.00 3.13 5.03 51.92 50.14
KY 6.84 10.00 1.47 6.17 7.55 1.50 8.85 2.25 3.13 5.03 52.78 51.34
(continued)
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LA 6.84 10.00 1.65 5.02 5.38 1.50 8.85 1.25 3.13 5.03 48.64 44.75
ME 6.84 10.00 1.29 6.17 7.31 1.50 8.85 1.50 3.13 5.03 51.62 49.27
MD 7.24 10.00 1.47 5.58 7.27 1.50 9.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 52.56 50.38
MA 7.76 10.00 1.29 7.55 7.31 1.50 8.35 2.75 3.13 5.03 54.66 53.08
MI 6.84 10.00 1.47 6.17 5.81 1.50 8.85 2.50 3.13 5.03 51.30 50.65
MN 6.84 10.00 1.29 7.10 7.20 1.50 8.85 2.00 3.13 5.03 52.93 50.93
MS 6.84 10.00 1.29 5.58 4.76 1.50 8.35 2.25 3.13 5.03 48.72 45.34
MO 6.84 10.00 1.29 5.58 7.78 1.50 8.85 3.00 3.13 5.03 52.99 51.31
MT 7.24 10.00 1.11 7.10 7.83 1.50 8.85 10.00 3.13 5.03 61.77 60.66
NE 7.24 10.00 1.47 5.58 7.15 1.50 8.35 2.25 3.13 5.03 51.69 47.49
NV 7.04 10.00 1.29 6.50 6.37 1.50 8.35 2.75 3.13 5.03 51.95 50.14
NH 6.84 10.00 1.47 5.58 8.85 1.50 8.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 53.74 52.75
NJ 7.24 10.00 1.47 6.50 4.61 1.50 8.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 49.82 49.19
NM 6.84 10.00 1.29 5.74 4.70 1.50 8.85 2.50 3.13 5.03 49.57 47.91
NY 6.84 10.00 1.29 5.58 5.89 1.50 8.85 1.00 3.13 5.03 49.10 48.55
NC 6.84 10.00 1.47 6.33 7.47 1.50 8.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 52.11 50.13
ND 6.84 10.00 1.11 6.93 6.95 1.50 9.35 1.75 3.13 5.03 52.58 49.67
OH 6.84 10.00 1.11 6.17 8.33 1.50 8.85 2.50 3.13 5.03 53.45 51.03
OK 6.84 10.00 1.11 6.93 5.89 1.50 8.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 50.77 46.71
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OR 9.60 10.00 0.92 6.67 7.70 1.50 8.35 2.50 3.13 5.03 55.40 53.52
PA 6.84 10.00 1.29 6.76 7.31 1.50 8.85 1.75 3.13 5.03 52.45 51.01
RI 6.84 10.00 1.47 7.66 7.83 1.50 8.85 1.75 3.13 5.03 54.05 52.77
SC 6.84 10.00 1.11 6.17 6.13 1.50 8.35 2.50 3.13 5.03 50.75 46.90
SD 6.84 10.00 1.29 6.17 7.55 1.50 8.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 51.85 50.73
TN 6.84 10.00 1.65 5.58 3.51 1.50 8.35 2.00 3.13 5.03 47.58 43.83
TX 6.84 10.00 1.29 6.17 5.26 1.50 8.35 2.50 3.13 5.03 50.07 46.09
UT 6.84 10.00 1.29 7.10 7.86 1.50 8.35 2.50 3.13 5.03 53.59 49.70
VT 7.76 10.00 1.11 6.17 7.27 1.50 8.85 2.50 3.13 5.03 53.31 51.36
VA 6.84 10.00 1.29 6.17 6.26 1.50 8.85 2.25 3.13 5.03 51.31 47.12
WA 9.08 10.00 1.29 7.89 7.78 1.50 8.85 2.00 3.13 5.03 56.54 54.50
WV 6.84 10.00 1.47 6.17 8.38 1.50 8.35 2.50 3.13 5.03 53.36 52.22
WI 6.84 10.00 1.47 6.93 7.86 1.50 8.85 2.00 3.13 5.03 53.60 51.24
WY 6.84 10.00 0.92 6.93 4.83 1.50 8.35 3.00 3.13 5.03 50.52 46.31
a Sum may not equal total of subindices due to rounding.
b Coverage-deflated subindices themselves are not shown.
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Federal 4.28 10.00 6.27 7.51 6.77 6.00 9.00 7.00 4.33 5.53 66.69 c
AB 1.52 7.28 7.61 7.51 6.69 6.00 8.10 7.00 3.07 0.00 54.79 51.56
BC 7.04 10.00 6.27 7.51 8.58 10.00 8.60 7.00 3.20 7.89 76.10 72.38
MB 2.44 10.00 5.89 7.51 6.54 9.00 9.10 7.00 3.13 6.03 66.64 62.05
NB 2.44 3.21 5.38 7.51 5.99 8.00 8.10 7.00 2.11 5.71 55.44 53.11
NF 2.44 4.57 5.53 7.51 7.25 9.00 8.60 7.00 2.08 5.03 59.00 55.98
NT 6.12 10.00 6.27 7.51 8.82 6.00 9.00 7.00 2.18 3.21 66.11 63.18
NS 2.44 1.85 5.71 7.51 7.32 6.00 9.10 7.00 2.18 6.37 55.49 52.94
ON 6.12 7.28 6.07 7.51 7.64 9.00 8.50 7.00 3.24 7.03 69.39 65.48
PE 2.44 5.92 5.20 7.51 7.72 9.00 8.60 7.00 1.87 0.00 55.25 52.12
QC 6.12 7.28 7.23 7.51 8.35 10.00 9.00 7.00 2.63 4.50 69.62 66.38
SK 2.44 10.00 9.11 7.51 8.66 9.00 8.60 7.00 3.00 6.87 72.19 68.04
YT 7.04 10.00 6.27 7.51 8.43 6.00 8.50 7.00 3.17 5.21 69.13 66.18
a Sum may not equal total of subindices due to rounding.
b The coverage-deflated indices themselves are not shown.
c Not calculated because coverage is calculated by province.
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Table 5.3 Employment-Weighted  and Unweighted Average Basic Labor Standards Indices, United States and 
Canada, December 31, 1998 


























United States 7.24 10.00 1.29 6.28 6.72 1.50 8.64 2.41 3.13 5.03 52.24
Canada 4.07 7.49 6.37 7.51 7.60 7.92 8.68 7.00 2.78 4.87 64.30
Weighted average
United States 7.34 10.00 1.29 6.09 6.58 1.50 8.76 2.19 3.13 5.03 51.91
Canada 5.24 7.06 6.59 7.51 7.77 7.10 8.53 7.00 2.81 5.66 65.27
a Sum may not equal total of subindices due to rounding.
96Table 5.4 Employment-Weighted and Unweighted Average, Coverage-Deflated Labor Standards Indices, United 
States and Canada, December 31, 1998










































United States 6.73 8.71 1.29 6.28 6.57 1.13 8.64 2.41 3.13 5.03 49.92
Canada 4.05 6.46 6.31 7.51 7.56 5.77 8.65 7.00 2.66 4.82 60.78
Weighted average
United States 7.34 8.82 1.29 6.09 6.45 1.13 8.76 2.19 3.13 5.03 50.23
Canada 5.24 6.59 6.02 7.51 7.73 6.44 8.53 7.00 2.81 5.66 63.53
a Sum may not equal total of subindices due to rounding.
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and health  
Advance 
notice 
BC 16.0 28.5 5.0 10.5 5.0 1.5 31.5 7.5 2.0 1.0 108.5 1.0
YT 16.0 28.5 5.0 10.5 8.0 10.5 34.5 7.5 3.0 7.0 130.5 2.0
ON 55.0 58.0 7.5 10.5 22.0 5.0 34.5 7.5 1.0 2.0 203.0 3.0
MB 59.5 28.5 7.5 10.5 47.0 5.0 6.5 7.5 29.5 5.0 206.5 4.0
SK 59.5 28.5 1.0 10.5 4.0 5.0 31.5 7.5 57.0 3.0 207.5 5.0
HI 8.0 28.5 38.0 1.0 6.0 38.0 3.0 32.0 29.5 33.5 217.5 6.0
MA 8.0 28.5 38.0 4.0 14.5 38.0 19.5 25.0 29.5 33.5 238.5 7.0
NT 55.0 28.5 5.0 10.5 2.0 10.5 8.5 7.5 59.5 61.0 248.0 8.0
MT 12.0 28.5 55.0 19.5 29.5 38.0 19.5 1.0 29.5 33.5 266.0 9.0
WA 5.0 28.5 38.0 2.0 26.5 38.0 19.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 268.0 10.0
NS 59.5 63.0 9.0 10.5 42.0 10.5 6.5 7.5 59.5 4.0 272.0 11.0
DC 1.0 28.5 38.0 47.0 9.0 38.0 19.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 276.0 12.0
CT 5.0 28.5 55.0 47.0 20.0 38.0 3.0 18.5 29.5 33.5 278.0 13.0
QC 55.0 60.0 3.0 10.5 10.0 1.5 8.5 7.5 63.0 60.0 279.0 14.0
MD 12.0 28.5 22.0 54.0 18.5 38.0 3.0 47.5 29.5 33.5 286.5 15.0
CA 2.5 28.5 55.0 61.5 21.0 38.0 3.0 18.5 29.5 33.5 291.0 16.0
RI 35.5 28.5 22.0 3.0 29.5 38.0 19.5 55.0 29.5 33.5 294.0 17.0
KY 35.5 28.5 22.0 39.5 11.0 38.0 19.5 39.5 29.5 33.5 296.5 18.0
























and health  
Advance 
notice 
WI 35.5 28.5 22.0 23.5 24.0 38.0 19.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 301.5 20.0
VT 8.0 28.5 55.0 39.5 18.5 38.0 19.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 302.0 21.0
NH 35.5 28.5 22.0 54.0 7.0 38.0 48.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 315.0 22.0
NF 59.5 61.0 10.0 10.5 35.0 5.0 31.5 7.5 62.0 33.5 315.5 23.0
PA 35.5 28.5 38.0 28.0 14.5 38.0 19.5 55.0 29.5 33.5 320.0 24.0
NJ 12.0 28.5 22.0 30.5 61.0 38.0 19.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 322.0 25.0
NE 12.0 28.5 22.0 54.0 17.0 38.0 48.5 39.5 29.5 33.5 322.5 26.0
WV 35.5 28.5 22.0 39.5 16.0 38.0 48.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 323.0 27.0
MI 35.5 28.5 22.0 39.5 46.0 38.0 19.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 324.0 28.0
OH 35.5 28.5 55.0 39.5 13.0 38.0 19.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 324.0 29.0
UT 35.5 28.5 38.0 19.5 24.0 38.0 48.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 327.0 30.0
NC 35.5 28.5 22.0 32.5 12.0 38.0 48.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 327.5 31.0
KS 35.5 28.5 38.0 26.5 33.5 38.0 19.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 330.0 32.0
MN 35.5 28.5 38.0 19.5 42.0 38.0 19.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 331.5 33.0
CO 35.5 28.5 55.0 32.5 42.0 38.0 19.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 332.5 34.0
OR 2.5 28.5 62.5 29.0 29.5 38.0 48.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 333.5 35.0
NB 59.5 62.0 11.0 10.5 49.0 8.0 62.5 7.5 61.0 6.0 337.0 36.0
ID 35.5 28.5 38.0 17.0 51.0 38.0 48.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 338.0 37.0
IL 12.0 28.5 38.0 39.5 24.0 38.0 48.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 339.0 38.0
PE 59.5 58.0 12.0 10.5 36.0 5.0 31.5 7.5 58.0 62.5 340.5 39.0
NV 35.5 28.5 38.0 30.5 38.0 38.0 48.5 25.0 29.5 33.5 345.0 40.0
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VA 35.5 28.5 38.0 39.5 48.0 38.0 19.5 39.5 29.5 33.5 349.5 41.0
MO 35.5 28.5 38.0 54.0 26.5 38.0 48.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 350.5 42.0
ME 35.5 28.5 38.0 39.5 3.0 38.0 48.5 58.0 29.5 33.5 352.00 43.0
AK 5.0 28.5 55.0 63.0 37.0 38.0 48.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 356.5 44.0
NM 35.5 28.5 38.0 47.0 56.0 38.0 19.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 357.5 45.0
NY 16.0 28.5 38.0 54.0 57.5 38.0 3.0 62.0 29.5 33.5 360.0 46.0
SD 35.5 28.5 38.0 39.5 32.0 38.0 48.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 370.5 47.0
FL 35.5 28.5 55.0 39.5 33.5 38.0 19.5 62.0 29.5 33.5 374.5 48.0
AL 35.5 28.5 38.0 60.0 45.0 38.0 48.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 375.0 49.0
LA 35.5 28.5 14.5 61.5 55.0 38.0 19.5 60.0 29.5 33.5 375.5 50.0
AB 63.0 58.0 2.0 10.5 44.0 10.5 62.5 7.5 56.0 62.5 376.5 51.0
ND 35.5 28.5 55.0 23.5 29.5 38.0 48.5 55.0 29.5 33.5 376.5 52.0
WY 35.5 28.5 62.5 23.5 59.0 38.0 48.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 377.0 53.0
MS 35.5 28.5 38.0 54.0 62.5 38.0 19.5 39.5 29.5 33.5 378.5 54.0
IN 35.5 28.5 14.5 54.0 39.5 38.0 48.5 58.0 29.5 33.5 379.5 55.0
SC 35.5 28.5 55.0 39.5 39.5 38.0 48.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 379.5 56.0
TX 35.5 28.5 38.0 39.5 60.0 38.0 48.5 32.0 29.5 33.5 383.0 57.0
AZ 35.5 28.5 55.0 54.0 50.0 38.0 48.5 18.5 29.5 33.5 391.0 58.0
TN 35.5 28.5 14.5 54.0 62.5 38.0 48.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 392.0 59.0
AR 35.5 28.5 55.0 26.5 54.0 38.0 48.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 396.5 60.0
GA 35.5 28.5 14.5 54.0 53.0 38.0 48.5 62.0 29.5 33.5 397.0 61.0
OK 35.5 28.5 55.0 23.5 57.5 38.0 48.5 47.5 29.5 33.5 397.0 62.0
DE 35.5 28.5 22.0 54.0 52.0 38.0 48.5 58.0 29.5 33.5 399.5 63.0
NOTE: Canadian jurisdictions in italics.
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Mean rank   
United 
States
27.43 28.50 38.00 37.06 34.65 38.00 32.67 37.76 29.50 33.50 36.02
Canada 51.42 46.88 6.50 10.50 20.75 6.50 29.17 7.50 42.50 25.63 14.92
Signifi-
cancea
<0.00b <0.00b <0.00c <0.00c 0.018c <0.00c 0.530d <0.00c 0.001b 0.043c 0.001c
a Mann-Whitney U/ and Wilcoxon Z tests.
b U.S. rankings significantly higher than Canadian rankings at 0.05 level.
c Canadian rankings significantly higher than U.S. rankings at 0.05 level.
d No significant difference.
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Table 5.7 Component Scoring for Minimum Wage Index, United States 




















Federal 7 0 10 10 6.84 —e —e
AL 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.33
AK 9 10 10 10 9.08 0.95 8.63
AZ 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.29
ARf 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.38
CA 10 0 10 10 9.60 0.96 9.20
CO 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.94 6.44
CT 9 10 10 10 9.08 0.93 8.42
DE 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.29
DC 10 10 10 10 10.00 0.93 9.34
FL 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.91 6.23
GAf 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.28
HIg 8 0 10 10 7.76 0.91 7.04
ID 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.33
ILf 7 10 10 10 7.24 0.92 6.66
INf 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.37
IAh 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.91 6.21
KS 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.27
KY 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.32
LA 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.31
ME 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.32
MDi 7 10 10 10 7.24 0.92 6.69
MA 8 0 10 10 7.76 0.93 7.25
MI 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.97 6.67
MN 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.94 6.42
MS 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.32
MOi 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.31
MTi 7 10 10 10 7.24 0.96 6.94
NEf 7 10 10 10 7.24 0.93 6.73
NV 7 10 0 10 7.04 0.93 6.55
NH 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.36
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NJ 7 10 10 10 7.24 0.92 6.68
NM 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.33
NY 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.32
NC 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.36
ND 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.94 6.40
OHj 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.35
OKf 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.28
OR 10 0 10 10 9.60 0.94 8.99
PA 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.33
RI 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.94 6.40
SC 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.30
SD 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.39
TN 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.36
TX 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.30
UT 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.94 6.45
VTf 8 0 10 10 7.76 0.93 7.20
VAf 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.34
WA 9 10 10 10 9.08 0.95 8.64
WVf 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.39
WI 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.93 6.33
WY 7 0 10 10 6.84 0.92 6.27
CANADA
Federal 4 10 0 10 4.28 —e —e
AB 1 10 0 10 1.52 1 1.52
BC 7 10 0 10 7.04 1 7.04
MB 2 10 0 10 2.44 1 2.44
NB 2 10 0 10 2.44 1 2.44
NF 2 10 0 10 2.44 1 2.44
NT 6k 10 0 10 6.12 1 6.12
NS 2 10 0 10 2.44 1 2.44
ON 6 10 0 10l 6.12 1 6.12
PE 2 10 0 10 2.44 1 2.44
QC 6 10 0 10 6.12 1 6.12
SK 2 10 0 10 2.44 1 2.44
YT 7 10 0 10 7.04 1 7.04
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a Table entries are subindex values; index is calculated as a weighted sum of subindex val-
ues using 0.92 for wage level; 0.04 for inexperienced employees; and 0.02 for fines and
limits on appeal rights.
b Subindex values set as follows:
≥US$5.75/Can.$8.05 = 10
US$5.50 – $5.74/Can$7.70 – Can$8.04 = 9
US$5.25 – $5.49/Can$7.35 – Can$7.69 = 8
US$5.00 – $5.24/Can$7.00 – Can$7.34 = 7
US$4.75 – $4.99/Can$6.65 – Can$6.99 = 6
US$4.50 – $4.74/Can$6.30 – Can$6.64 = 5
US$4.25 – $4.49/Can$5.95 – Can$6.29 = 4
US$4.00 – $4.24/Can$5.60 – Can$5.94 = 3
US$3.75 – $3.99/Can$5.25 – Can$5.59 = 2
US$3.50 – $3.74/Can$4.90 – Can$5.24 = 1
States with minimums below the federal minimum and states with no minimum wage pro-
vision (AL, AZ, FL, LA, MS, SC, TN) were coded at the federal minimum on the assump-
tion that most firms in the states will affect interstate commerce and therefore be subject to
the filed minimum.
Subindex value = 10 if state has subminimum wage provision such that subminimum wage
> federal minimum wage.
Canadian data current as of 01/98, see <http://www.gov.ncs.ca/labr/wage_rt.htm>.
c Includes learners and apprentices.
d In the U.S., the Firm Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires the Secretary of Labor to
request a court injunction when compliance is not forthcoming.  See 39 U.S.C. 217.  For
Canada, see Canada Labour Code, Section 251(10).
e Not calculated at federal level since employment weights are determined for states or prov-
inces.
f State minimum wage subject to minimum employment site:
2 or more: IN, MI (2 or more at anytime during calendar year), VT
4 or more: AR, IL (exclulsive of employer’s parent, spouse, child, or immediate family
member), NE (not including seasonal workers of 20 or fewer weeks in calendar year), VA
(except parent, spouse, or child)
6 or more: WV (located in one location or establishment unless 80% covered by FLSA)
more than 6: GA
10 or fewer: in  OK, employees grossing <$100,000 per year with 10 or fewer employees
may pay a minimum of $2.00/hr.
g An employee earning a guaranteed monthly compensation of $1,250 or more is exempt for
minimum wage law.
h State minimum is replaced with federal if it is higher than the state minimum.
i State law does not curtain dollar minimums; instead state adopts federal minimum by ref-
erence.
j Minimum wage is $2.80/hr. for employees grossing <$150,000 in annual sales; $3.35/hr.
for employees not qualified under 1989 FLSA amendment.
k Based on average of Can$6.50 and Can$7.00 = Can$6.75.
l Ontario Ministry of Labour, “Employers Guide to Employment Standards Act,” at <http://
www.gov.on.ca/lab/es/chap6e.htm>.
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Table 5.8 Component Scoring for Overtime Index, United States and   









Federal 10 10 10 —c —c
AL 10 10 10 0.70 7.01
AK 10 10 10 0.94 9.36
AZ 10 10 10 0.70 6.99
AR 10 10 10 1.00 10.00
CA 10 10 10 0.94 9.41
CO 10 10 10 0.91 9.14
CT 10 10 10 0.93 9.34
DE 10 10 10 0.71 7.06
DC 10 10 10 0.95 9.46
FL 10 10 10 1.00 9.96
GA 10 10 10 0.94 9.40
HI 10 10 10 0.98 9.77
ID 10 10 10 0.84 8.36
IL 10 10 10 0.93 9.29
IN 10 10 10 0.72 7.17
IA 10 10 10 0.70 7.02
KS 10 10 10 0.97 9.75
KY 10 10 10 0.96 9.55
LA 10 10 10 0.71 7.14
ME 10 10 10 0.92 9.19
MD 10 10 10 0.89 8.91
MA 10 10 10 0.90 8.97
MI 10 10 10 1.00 9.96
MN 10 10 10 0.91 9.12
MS 10 10 10 0.72 7.22
MO 10 10 10 0.99 9.90
MT 10 10 10 0.97 9.71
NE 10 10 10 0.69 6.87
NV 10 10 10 0.91 9.09
NH 10 10 10 1.00 10.00
NJ 10 10 10 0.99 9.94









NY 10 10 10 1.00 9.96
NC 10 10 10 0.90 8.97
ND 10 10 10 0.92 9.16
OH 10 10 10 0.85 8.47
OK 10 10 10 0.70 7.02
OR 10 10 10 0.94 9.42
PA 10 10 10 0.95 9.48
RI 10 10 10 0.96 9.59
SC 10 10 10 0.73 7.31
SD 10 10 10 1.00 10.00
TN 10 10 10 0.72 7.16
TX 10 10 10 0.70 6.98
UT 10 10 10 0.70 7.02
VT 10 10 10 0.91 9.10
VA 10 10 10 0.69 6.89
WA 10 10 10 0.91 9.06
WV 10 10 10 0.98 9.76
WI 10 10 10 0.86 8.57
WY 10 10 10 0.69 6.91
CANADA
Federal 10.00 10 10.00 0.80 7.99
AB     7.28 10 7.42 0.80 5.86
BC        10.00 10 10.00 1.00 10.00
MB 10.00 10 10.00 0.80 8.00
NB 3.21 10 3.55 1.00 3.21
NF 4.57 10 4.84 0.92 4.21
NT 10.00 10 10.00 0.89 8.89
NS 1.85 10 2.26 0.80 1.48
ON 7.28 10 7.42 0.80 5.80
PE 5.92 10 6.13 0.96 5.67
QC 7.28 10 7.42 0.94 6.87
SK 10.00 10 10.00 0.86 8.64
YT 10.00 10 10.00 0.89 8.89
(continued)
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Table 5.8 (continued)
a Table entries are subindex values; index is calaculated as a weighted sum of subindex val-
ues using 0.95 for coding and 0.05 for limits on appeal rights.
b Subindex values coded as follows:
1.5 × reg. rate after 40 hrs. per week = 10
2 × reg. rate after 48 hrs. per week = 8.57
1.5 × reg. rate after 44 hrs. per week = 7.14
1.5 × reg. rate after 48 hrs. per week = 5.71
1.5 × min. wage after 40 hrs. per week = 4.18
1.5 × min. wage after 44 hrs. per week = 2.85
1.5 × min. wage after 48 hrs. per week = 1.42
c Not calculated at the federal level since employment weights are determined for states and
provinces only.
SOURCE: Canada federal: Canada Labour Code and Regulation.
Alberta: Employment Standards Code and Regulation.
British Columbia: Employment Standards Act.
Manitoba: Employment Standards Act.
New  Brunswick: Minimum Wage Legislation.
Newfoundland: Labour Standards Act and Regulation.
Northwest Territory: Employment Standards Act.
Nova Scotia: Labour Standards Code and Regulations and General Minimum Wage Order
(see for exclusions and provisions).
Ontario: Employment Standards Act and Regulation.
Prince Edward Island: Employment Standards Act.
Quebec: The Commission des Normes du Travail. Labor Standards in Quebec.
Saskatchewan: Labor Standards Act and Regulation.
Yukon Territory: Employment Standards Act Regulation.
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Table 5.9 Component Scoring for Paid Time Off Index, United States and Canada, December 31, 1998










 tenure Index Coverage
Coverage- 
deflated index
UNITED STATES 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
Federal
AL 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
AK 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
AZ 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
AR 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
CA 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
CO 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
CT 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
DE 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
DC 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
FL 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
GA 10.0 0 0 0 1.65 1.00 1.65
HI 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
ID 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
IL 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
IN 10.0 0 0 0 1.65 1.00 1.65
IA 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
KS 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
(continued)
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 tenure Index Coverage
Coverage- 
deflated index
KY 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
LA 10.0 0 0 0 1.65 1.00 1.65
ME 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
MD 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
MA 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
MI 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
MN 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
MS 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
MO 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
MT 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
NE 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
NV 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
NH 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
NJ 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
NM 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
NY 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
NC 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
ND 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
OH 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
OK 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
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OR 5.6 0 0 0 0.92 1.00 0.92
PA 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
RI 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
SC 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
SD 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
TN 10.0 0 0 0 1.65 1.00 1.65
TX 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
UT 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
VT 6.7 0 0 0 1.11 1.00 1.11
VA 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
WA 7.8 0 0 0 1.29 1.00 1.29
WV 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
WI 8.9 0 0 0 1.47 1.00 1.47
WY 5.6 0 0 0 0.92 1.00 0.92
CANADA
Federal 5.6 10 3.33 10 6.27 1.00 6.27
AB 5.6 10 6.67 6.67 7.61 1.00 7.61
BC 5.6 10 3.33 10 6.27 0.88 5.49
MB 3.3 10 3.33 10 5.89 1.00 5.89
NB 2.2 10 3.33 3.33 5.38 1.00 5.38
NF 1.1 10 3.33 10 5.53 1.00 5.53
NT 5.6 10 3.33 10 6.27 1.00 6.27
NS 2.2 10 3.33 10 5.71 1.00 5.71
ON 4.4 10 3.33 10 6.07 1.00 6.07
(continued)
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 tenure Index Coverage
Coverage- 
deflated index
PE 1.1 10 3.33 3.33 5.20 1.00 5.20
QC 3.3 10 6.67 6.67 7.23 1.00 7.23
SK 5.6 10 10 6.67 9.11 1.00 9.11
YT 5.6 10 3.33 10 6.27 1.00 6.27
a Table entries are subindex values; index is calculated as a weighted sum of subindex values using 0.165 for number of holidays; 0.335 for paid
time off or overtime for holidays; 0.45 for vacation length and pay; and 0.05 for required tenure.
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Table 5.10 Component Scoring for UI/EI Index, United States and 










 total benefitd Indexe
UNITED STATES
Federal 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
AL 1.7 10 2.0 5.0 5.12
AK 6.7 8.3 1.7 5.0 5.01
AZ 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
AR 1.7 10 6.7 5.0 6.77
CA 1.7 10 1.7 5.0 5.02
CO 3.3 10 5.0 5.0 6.33
CT 3.3 10 3.3 5.0 5.74
DE 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
DC 3.3 10 3.3 5.0 5.74
FL 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
GA 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
HI 8.3 10 10.0 5.0 8.58
ID 6.7 10 6.7 5.0 7.27
IL 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
IN 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
IA 5.0 10 6.7 5.0 7.10
KS 1.7 10 6.7 5.0 6.77
KY 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
LA 1.7 10 1.7 5.0 5.02
ME 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
MD 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
MA 3.3 10 6.7 7.5 7.55
MI 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
MN 5.0 10 6.7 5.0 7.10
MS 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
MO 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
MT 5.0 10 6.7 5.0 7.10
NE 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
NV 5.0 10 5.0 5.0 6.50
NH 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
NJ 5.0 10 5.0 5.0 6.50
(continued)











 total benefitd Indexe
NM 3.3 10 303 5.0 5.74
NY 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
NC 3.3 10 5.0 5.0 6.33
ND 3.3 10 6.7 5.0 6.93
OH 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
OK 3.3 10 6.7 5.0 6.93
OR 6.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.67
PA 1.6 10 6.7 5.0 6.76
RI 5.0 10 8.3 5.0 7.66
SC 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
SD 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
TN 1.7 10 3.3 5.0 5.58
TX 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
UT 5.0 10 6.7 5.0 7.10
VT 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
VA 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
WA 6.7 10 6.7 7.5 7.89
WV 1.7 10 5.0 5.0 6.17
WI 3.3 10 6.7 5.0 6.93
WY 3.3 10 6.7 5.0 6.93
CANADAf 10 1.7 10 10 7.51
a Table entries are subindex values; index is calculated as a weighted sum of subindex values
using 0.10 for taxable wage base; 0.30 for employee tax rate; 0.35 for average weekly ben-
efit; and 0.25 for minimum total benefit.
b Can$1 = US$0.71 (STAT-USA 1998).
c Defined as average weekly benefit as a percentage of average weekly wages.
d Includes provision for extended benefits.
e No coverage-deflated index is calculated because coverage is universal in both countries.
f The provisions in all jurisdictions in Canada are identical.
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AL 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
AK 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10
AZ 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10
AR 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
CA 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 0 10
CO 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10
CT 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
DE 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 10
DC 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
FL 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10
GA 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 10
HI 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10
ID 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10































































IN 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10
IA 10 0 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10
KS 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 10
KY 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
LA 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 10
ME 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
MD 10 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
MA 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 10
MI 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
MN 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
MS 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 10
MO 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
MT 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
NE 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 10
NV 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
NH 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10
NJ 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 10
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NM 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10
NY 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 10
NC 10 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10
ND 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
OH 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
OK 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
OR 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
PA 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10
RI 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
SC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10
SD 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
TN 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 0 10
TX 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 10
UT 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
VT 10 0 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
VA 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
WA 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 0 10 10
WV 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
WI 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
WY 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
CANADA
AB 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 0 10 10 0 10
BC 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10































































NB 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 10
NF 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
NT 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10
NS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
ON 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
PE 10 0 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
QC 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
SK 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
YT 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10
a Table entries are subindex values; index is weighted sum of subindex values.  Labels in parentheses are recommendations from National Com-
mission.  Weights, for recommendations 2.1a, 2.1b, and 3.25a are 0.024; for recommendation 2.11, weight = 0.00 due to lack of data for Canada;
for recommendations 3.25b, 3.25c, and 3.25d, weights are 0.008; and for all other recommendations, weights are 0.047.  Finally, weights are
0.05 for three appeals provisions.
b TTB = temporary total disability benefits; AWW = average weekly wage; SAWW = standard average weekly wage; PPT = permanent part-time;
and TTD = temporary total disability.
SOURCE: (U.S.) Burton, John F., and Timothy Schmidle.  1996.  1996  Workers’ Compensation Year Book.  Horsham, PA: LRP Publications;
(Canada) U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1996.  1996 Analysis of Workers’ Compensation  Laws. Washington, D.C.
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AL 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 0
AK 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 0
AZ 10 0 10 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 0
AR 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10
CA 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 10
CO 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
CT 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
DE 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0
DC 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
FL 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0
GA 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
HI 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10







































































IL 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
IN 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
IA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
KS 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 10
KY 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
LA 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 0
ME 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0
MD 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 0
MA 10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
MI 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
MN 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
MS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
MO 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10
MT 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 10
NE 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
NV 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
NH 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
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NJ 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 10 0
NM 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
NY 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
NC 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
ND 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 0
OH 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10
OK 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
OR 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
PA 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
RI 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
SC 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
SD 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
TN 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 10 0 0
TX 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
UT 10 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
VT 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 0
VA 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 0 10
WA 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10
WV 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
WI 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
WY 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 0
CANADA
AB 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10







































































MB 10 10 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
NB 10 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
NF 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
NT 10 0 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
NS 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10
ON 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
PE 10 0 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
QC 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 10
SK 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
YT 10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
a Table entries are subindex values; index is weighted sum of subindex values.  Labels in parentheses are recommendations from National Com-
mission.  Weights, for recommendations 2.1a, 2.1b, and 3.25a are 0.024; for recommendation 2.11, weight = 0.00 due to lack of data for Can-
ada; for recommendations 3.25b, 3.25c, and 3.25d, weights are 0.008; and for all other recommendations, weights are 0.047.  Finally, weights
are 0.05 for three appeals provisions.
b TTB = temporary total disability benefits; AWW = average weekly wage; SAWW = standard average weekly wage; PPT = permanent part-time;
and TTD = temporary total disability.
SOURCE: (U.S.) Burton, John F., and Timothy Schmidle.  1996.  1996  Workers’ Compensation Year Book.  Hursham, PA: LRP Publications;
(Canada) U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1996.  1996 Analysis of Workers’ Compensation  Laws. Washington, D.C.
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Table 5.11c Component Scoring for Workers’ Compensation, 
United States and Canada, December 31, 1998 
Provisiona Coverage-
deflated indexJurisdiction Level of appeal Index Coverage
UNITED STATES
AL 0 5.67 0.99 5.64
AK 0 6.64 0.99 6.54
AZ 0 6.02 0.98 5.92
AR 5 5.26 1.00 5.26
CA 5 6.92 0.99 6.86
CO 5 7.07 0.96 6.78
CT 5 7.94 1.00 7.94
DE 5 5.69 0.98 5.60
DC 0 8.65 0.98 8.46
FL 5 5.77 0.95 5.51
GA 0 5.34 0.94 5.04
HI 5 7.91 0.99 7.79
ID 7.5 5.13 0.97 4.97
IL 7.5 7.86 0.99 7.78
IN 5 6.13 0.96 5.90
IA 5 8.10 0.98 7.91
KS 5 6.52 0.91 5.94
KY 5 7.55 0.99 7.44
LA 5 5.38 0.98 5.26
ME 0 7.31 0.98 7.18
MD 2.5 7.27 0.98 7.11
MA 0 7.31 0.98 7.14
MI 5 5.81 0.99 5.75
MN 5 7.20 0.96 6.88
MS 7.5 4.76 0.96 4.55
MO 7.5 7.78 0.98 7.60
MT 5 7.83 0.98 7.67
NE 7.5 7.15 0.97 6.96
NV 5 6.37 0.99 6.32
NH 5 8.85 0.98 8.72
NJ 7.5 4.61 0.97 4.47
NM 5 4.70 0.98 4.60
NY 0 5.89 0.98 5.78
(continued)
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Table 5.11c (continued)
Provisiona Coverage-
deflated indexJurisdiction Level of appeal Index Coverage
NC 5 7.47 0.99 7.37
ND 5 6.95 0.96 6.70
OH 0 8.33 1.00 8.30
OK 5 5.89 0.98 5.75
OR 5 7.70 0.96 7.38
PA 5 7.31 0.99 7.27
RI 5 7.83 0.99 7.77
SC 7.5 6.13 0.96 5.88
SD 5 7.55 0.96 7.25
TN 5 3.51 0.99 3.46
TX 2.5 5.26 0.99 5.23
UT 5 7.86 0.98 7.72
VT 5 7.27 0.98 7.16
VA 0 6.26 0.97 6.05
WA 5 7.78 0.96 7.50
WV 5 8.38 0.99 8.30
WI 7.5 7.86 0.99 7.81
WY 5 4.83 0.96 4.64
CANADA
AB 10 6.69 0.99 6.62
BC 10 8.58 1.00 8.58
MB 10 6.54 0.99 6.50
NB 10 5.99 0.99 5.95
NF 10 7.25 0.99 7.14
NT 10 8.82 0.99 8.69
NS 10 7.32 0.94 6.86
ON 10 7.64 1.00 7.64
PE 10 7.72 0.98 7.56
QC 10 8.35 0.99 8.30
SK 10 8.66 0.98 8.53
YT 10 8.43 0.99 8.31
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a Table entries are subindex values; index is weighted sum of subindex values.  Labels in
parentheses are recommendations from National Commission.  Weights, for recommenda-
tions 2.1a, 2.1b, and 3.25a are 0.024; for recommendation 2.11, weight = 0.00 due to lack
of data for Canada; for recommendations 3.25b, 3.25c, and 3.25d, weights are 0.008; and
for all other recommendations, weights are 0.047.  Finally, weights are 0.05 for three
appeals provisions.
SOURCE: (U.S.) Burton, John F., and Timothy Schmidle.  1996.  1996  Workers’ Compen-
sation Year Book.  Hursham, PA: LRP Publications; (Canada) U.S. Chamber of Commerce
1996.  1996 Analysis of Workers’ Compensation  Laws. Washington, D.C.






























STATESb 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0.752 1.13
CANADA
FED JUR 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 6 —c —c
AB 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 6 0.712 4.27
BC 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0.706 7.06
MB 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 9 0.717 6.45
NB 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 8 0.713 5.70
NF 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 9 0.716 6.44
NS 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 6 0.716 4.30
NT 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 6 0.713 4.28
ON 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 9 0.730 6.57
PE 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 9 0.697 6.27
QC 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0.722 7.22
SK 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 9 0.705 6.35
YT 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 6 0.713 4.28
a Table entries are subindex values; index is calculated as a weighted sum of subindex values using 0.20 for “Election not required if evi-
dence that majority want union” and “Conciliation during negotiations compulsory”; 0.15 for “Statutory protection” and “Limits on
rights of loser for appeal”; and 0.10 for the other three provisions.
b States are not listed separately because U.S. federal standards are universal. 
c Not calculated at federal level since employment weights are determined for provinces.
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Table 5.13 Component Scoring for Equal Employment Opportunity and Employment Equity, United States and 
Canada, December 31, 1998





























Federal 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
AL 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
AK 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
AZ 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
AR 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
CA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 9.35
CO 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
CT 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 9.35
DE 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
DC 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
FL 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
GA 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
HA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 9.35
ID 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
(continued)
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IL 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
IN 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
IA 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
KS 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
KY 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
LA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
ME 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
MD 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 9.35
MA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
MI 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
MN 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
MS 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
MO 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
MT 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
NE 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
NV 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
NH 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
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NJ 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
NM 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
NY 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 9.35
NC 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
ND 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
OH 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
OK 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
OR 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
PA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
RI 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
SC 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
SD 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
TN 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
TX 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
UT 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
VT 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
VA 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
WA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
WV 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
WI 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.85
WY 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 5 10 0 8.35
CANADA
Federal 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 9.00
AB 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 8.10
(continued)
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BC 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 8.60
MB 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 9.10
NB 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 8.10
NF 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 8.60
NT 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 9.00
NS 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 9.10
ON 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 8.50
PE 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 8.60
QC 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 9.00
SK 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 8.60
YT 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 8.50
a Table entries are subindex values; index is calculated as a weighted sum of the subindices with 0.15 as the weight for race and gender protec-
tion; 0.10 for national origin, religion, age, and disability; 0.05 for sexual preference/orientation, political beliefs, family leave, and rights of
appeal; 0.04 for reasonable accommodation; and 0.03 for sexual harassment and equal pay provisions.
b Includes Aboriginal people and visible minorities.
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Table 5.14 Component Scoring for Unjust Discharge Index, United States 



















AL 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
AK 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
AZ 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
AR 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
CA 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
CO 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
CT 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
DE 10 0 0 10 0 1.50
DC 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
FL 10 0 0 5 0 1.00
GA 10 10 0 0 0 1.00
HI 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
ID 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
IL 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
IN 10 0 10 0 0 1.50
IA 10 5 10 10 0 2.75
KS 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
KY 10 5 10 5 0 2.25
LA 10 5 0 5 0 1.25
ME 10 10 5 0 0 1.50
MD 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
MA 10 5 10 10 0 2.75
MI 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
MN 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
MS 10 5 10 5 0 2.25
MO 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
MT 10 10 10 10 10 10.00
NE 10 5 10 5 0 2.25
NV 10 5 10 10 0 2.75
NH 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
(continued)


















NJ 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
NM 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
NY 10 10 0 0 0 1.00
NC 10 0 10 5 0 2.00
ND 10 5 10 0 0 1.75
OH 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
OK 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
OR 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
PA 10 5 10 0 0 1.75
RI 10 5 5 5 0 1.75
SC 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
SD 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
TN 10 0 10 5 0 2.00
TX 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
UT 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
VT 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
VA 10 5 10 5 0 2.25
WA 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
WV 10 10 10 5 0 2.50
WI 10 10 10 0 0 2.00
WY 10 10 10 10 0 3.00
CANADAc
Federal 0 0 0 0 10 7.00
a Table entries are subindex values; index is calculated as a weighted sum of the subindex
with 0.70 for limited to “good cause”; 0.10 for public policy and covenant of good faith
exceptions; and 0.05 for implicit contract and handbook exceptions.
b Limited, except for misconduct, incompetence, or negligence.
c The provisions in all jurisdictions in Canada are identical.
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Table 5.15a Component Scoring for Occupational Safety and Health, United States and Canada, 
December 31, 1998
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STATESb 10 0 1.7 1.7 6.7 10 0 3.33 6.7 10 10
CANADA
Federal 0 10 3.33 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0
AB 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 0
BC 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MA 0 10 1.7 0 3.33 0 0 0 3.3 0 0
NB 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NF 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0
NW 0 10 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NS 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0
ON 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PE 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0
QC 0 10 3.33 0 5e 0 0 0 0 0 0
(continued)
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SK 0 10 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 1.7 0 0
YT 0 10 1.7 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
a Table entries are subindex values for each provision; index is weighted sum of subindices with the five recordkeeping categories using weights
of 0.02; and the remaining 17 categories using 0.053, except for limits on appeal, which use 0.052.
b All U.S. states subject to federal statute.
c Coding: ≥ $100,000 = 10; $80,000–$99,999 = 8.33; $ 60,000–$79,999 = 6.7; $40,000–$59,999 = 5.0; $20,000–$39,999 = 3.33; $1,000–
$19,999 = 1.7; no penalty = 0 (all $ amounts are domestic).
d Coding: ≥ $10,000 = 10; $8,000–$9,999 = 8.3; $6,000–7,999 = 6.7; $4,000–$5,999 = 5.0; $2,000–$3,999 = 3.3; $1–$1,999 = 1.7; no time = 0
(all $ amounts are domestic).
e QC: Maximum subsequent fine is $50,000 for corporations and $2,000 for individuals.
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Table 5.15b Component Scoring for Occupational Safety and Health, United States and Canada, 
December 31, 1998

























































10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.13
CANADA
Federal 0 0 10 10 10 3.33 10 5 10 0 0 4.33
AB 0 0 10 0g 8 10.00 0 0 0 0 0 3.07
BC 0 0 10 10h 4 3.33 3.3 0 0 0 10 3.20
MA 0 0 10 10 6 0 0 0 0 5 10 3.13
NB 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 2.11
NF 0 0 10 0 6 1.70 0 0 0 0 10 2.08
NT 0 0 10 0 8 1.70i 0 0 0 0 10 2.18
NS 0 0 10 0 8 1.70 0 0 0 0 10 2.18
ON 0 0 10 10 8 3.33 0 0 0 0 10 3.24
PE 0 0 10 0 2 1.70 0 0 0 0 10 1.87
QC 0 0 10 0 8 1.70 1.7 0 0 0 10 2.63
SK 0 0 10 10j 10 1.70 0 0 0 1.7 10 3.00
YT 0 0 10 10 0 3.33 0 0 10k 0 10 3.17
(continued)
134a Table entries are subindex values for each provision; index is weighted sum of subindices with the five recordkeeping categories using weights
of 0.02; and the remaining 17 categories using 0.053, except for limits on appeal, which use 0.052.
b All U.S. states subject to federal statute.
c Coding: 24 months = 10; 12 months = 8; 6 months = 6; 3 months = 4; 1 month = 2; no imprisonment = 0.
d Coding: ≥$100,000 = 10; $80,000–$99,999 = 8.33; $ 60,000–$79,999 = 6.7; $40,000–$59,999 = 5.0; $20,000–$39,999 = 3.33; $1,000– $19,999
= 1.7; no penalty = 0 (all $ amounts are domestic).
e Coding: ≥ $10,000 = 10; $8,000–$9,999 = 8.3; $6,000–7,999 = 6.7; $4,000–$5,999 = 5.0; $2,000–$3,999 = 3.3; $1–$1,999 = 1.7; no time = 0
(all $ amounts are domestic).
f Minor offenses refer to acts such as: failure to post information, failure of keep records, not providing  sanitary or personal facilities, failure to
cooperate with safety/health persons, and failing to report  accident.  Source: A Guide to the Canada Labor Code, Occupational Safety and
Health Canada, L31-87, 1992. Coded as in note d.
g AB leaves committee up to discretion of the minister of labor.
h BC allows companies that have a low hazardous rating (“C”) to be exempt up to 50 employees.
i NT: Employees can be fined up to $1,000 and six months in prison.  If employer is guilty, every employee involved could be fined $500 and sen-
tenced to one month in jail.
j SK: Committees are mandatory in businesses with > ten workers.
k YT: Flat rate minimum for continuing offenses (not daily).  Each offense gets fined: Regulation violation: $1,500 for first, $2,500 for subse-
quent; for order violation: $1,750 first, $2,750 subsequent; and for work stop violation: $2,000 first, $3,000 subsequent. 
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Table 5.16 Component Scoring for Advance Notice of Plant Closings and Large Scale Layoffs, United States and 
Canada, December 31, 1998
























3.3 6.7 5 10 10 10 0 0 5.03
CANADA      
Federal 3.3 6.7 10 10 0 0 10 10 5.53
AB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
BC 3.3 3.3 7.5 10 10 10 10 10 7.89
MB 3.3 6.7 7.5 10 10 10 0 10 6.03
NB 6.7 6.7 2.5 10 10 10 0 10 5.71
NF 3.3 6.7 7.5 10 10 0 0 10 5.03
NT 6.7 6.7 5 10 0 0 0 10 3.21
NS 10 6.7 7.5 10 10 0 0 10 6.37
ON 3.3 6.7 7.5 10 10 0 10 10 7.03
PE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
QC 10 10 7.5 10 0 0 0 10 4.50
SK 10 6.7 5 10 10 10 0 10 6.87
YT 6.7 6.7 5 10 10 0 0 10 5.21
a Table entries are subindex values; index is weighted sum of subindices using 0.20 for number of employees, advanced notice required,
notice to affected employees, and severance pay; 0.10 for notice to union; 0.05 for limits on appeal; 0.04 for maximum time period; and
0.01 for notice to Labor Minister.
b All U.S. states subject to federal statute.
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Notes 
1. This chapter summarizes the results for the labor standards computations for the
United States and Canada as of December 31, 1998.  Readers interested in the raw
data on which the indices are based are encouraged to go to the following Web
site: <www.upjohninstitute.org/BlockRoberts>.
2. Employment data are for 1995, which was the last full year available for both
countries.  In addition, the employment-weighted average for Canada excludes
the federal jurisdiction.  To separate the federal jurisdiction would require us to
subtract from each province’s employment estimate the number of employed per-
sons in the province who are employed in an industry in the federal jurisdiction.
At this stage, our data will not permit us to make such a calculation.  It is neces-
sary to make such an adjustment for the United States because in the United
States, all employees in a state are covered by the labor standard in the state if that
labor standard is higher than the federal standard.  If it is lower, the federal stan-
dard prevails unless the employer is one of the very few that do not affect inter-
state commerce.
3. The above discussion presumes that each standard is equally important. It is pos-
sible, however, that the value of a standard might differ across different types of
users, such as firms, unions, policymakers, or researchers. See the appendix Table
5.11A, “Scenarios Using Alternative Weighting of Standards,” for examples of
scenarios that a policymaker concerned about attracting industry or a firm making
a location decision might examine in addition to the basic index.
4. The assumption in summing the indices of the standards is that each of the stan-
dards is equally important.  Other assumptions may also be reasonable.
5. Minimum wage levels, denominated in domestic dollars, are generally higher in
Canada as of December 31, 1998, than in the United States.  The federal minimum
wage in the United States was raised to US$5.15 as of September 1, 1997.  Eight
states and the District of Columbia have enacted minimum wage rates higher than
the federal rate, with the highest being $6.50 per hour in Oregon.  Canadian nom-
inal minimum wage rates range from Can$5.00 in Alberta to Can$7.15 in British
Columbia.
6. See web site <http://iaita.doc.gov/exchange> for underlying data.
7. For the purposes of this study, in computing coverage we did not consider the
number of employees in the two countries who might be exempt from coverage of
the overtime provision due to executive, professional, or managerial status.  See,
for example, U.S. Department of Labor (2001).  Whether such employees are
exempt from overtime is based on an individualized study of the nature of their
work, and such estimates are unavailable for the United States.  Therefore, not
considering these provisions maintains similarity in the criteria across the two
countries, but it should not affect the rankings if the percentage of executive, pro-
fessional, and managerial employees is comparable across jurisdictions.
8. It is possible, of course, that regardless of whether employers directly pay the
nominal cost of unemployment insurance, the burden is actually shifted to
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employees in the form of forgone earnings.  Then, weighting the index to account
for direct employee payments may underestimate the advantage for Canada rela-
tive to the United States because all costs are actually borne by employees.  Add-
ing a separate provision for employee payment is simply a decomposition of the
costs borne by all employees.  Nevertheless, given our method of limiting the
index to statutory provisions, consistency requires that we take separate account
of this provision.  
9. These values are not shown, although they can be computed from Table 5.16.  The
nondeflated, unweighted average is the average of all jurisdictions, including the
federal jurisdiction, except Alberta and PEI.  The coverage-deflated, employment-
weighted average is the average of all jurisdictions except Alberta, PEI, and the
federal jurisdiction.  The federal jurisdiction is excluded because coverage rates





One concern with the study is that the results reported in Chapter 5 might
be an artifact of the provision weights.  Although we chose the weighting
schemes as reported in the body of Chapter 4 to reflect our assessment of the
spirit of each standard, we acknowledge that other weighting schemes could be
equally plausible.  To test the robustness of the results, we simulated three cas-
es: a base case, an essential provisions case, and a smoothing case.  The base
case is the set of weights described in Chapter 4, based on our best judgment
of the importance of the various provisions to the purpose of the standard.
The essential provisions case reweights the provisions so that only the pro-
visions that are essential to the purpose of each labor standard are positively
weighted.  For seven of the standards (advance notice, collective bargaining,
minimum wage, overtime, paid time off, UI/EI, and unjust discharge), we re-
duced the number of provisions considered in each standard to 2 or fewer.  We
reduced the labor standard for EEO/EE to 8 provisions; that for occupational
safety and health to 5; and that for workers’ compensation to 10.
The smoothing case smooths the weights across provisions by reweighting
the most important provisions by 80 percent of their former value and spread-
ing the remainder (1 minus the sum of the new weights for the important pro-
visions) equally across the remaining provisions.
Tables 5.1A through 5.10A show the weights for all three cases.




Minimum wage levela 0.92 1.0 0.736
Subminimum wage 0.04 0.088
Fines, imprisonment 0.02 0.088
Right of appeal of agency decision 0.02 0.088
a As of April 1, 1997.
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Table 5.2A Overtime: Alternative Weights
Table 5.3A Paid-Time Off: Alternative Weights   





Overtime 0.95 1.0 0.76





Pay or overtimea 0.335 0.5 0.268
Vacation length and pay coding 0.45 0.5 0.36
Eligibility 0.05 0.24
a Pay for holidays taken or overtime for holidays worked.
Provision Base Essential purpose Smoothed
Taxable wage base 0.1 0.1
Employee tax rate 0.3 0.3
Average weekly 
benefita 0.35 0.5 0.35
Maximum total benefit 0.25 0.5 0.25
a As a percentage of average weekly wages.
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Compulsory coverage for private employment 0.024 0.1 0.039
No waivers permitted 0.024 0.1 0.039
No exemption based on firm size 0.047 0.038
Farmworkers covered 0.047 0.038
Casual and household workers covered 0.047 0.038
Mandatory government worker coverage 0.047 0.038
No exemptions based on employee class 0.047 0.038
Employee choice over where to file 0.000 0.039
Coverage for all work-related diseases 0.047 0.038
Temporary total disabiliy (TTD) benefits 
≥ 66 2/3% wages (subject to maximum)
0.047 0.1 0.038
Maximum TTD benefit at least 100% standard 
averge weekly wages (SAWW)
0.047 0.1 0.038
Retain prevailing PT definition 0.047 0.038
PT benefits ≥ 66 2/3% wages (s.t. maximum) 0.047 0.1 0.038
Maximum part-time benefit at least 100% 
SAWW
0.047 0.1 0.038
Benefit duration = disability duration 0.047 0.1 0.038
Death benefits ≥ 66 2/3% wages 0.047 0.1 0.038
Maximum death benefit at least 100% SAWW 0.047 0.1 0.038
Benefits to widow(er) 0.024 0.039
Lump sum to widow(er) on remarriage 0.008 0.039
Benefits to dependent child until 18 0.008 0.039
Benefits to dependent child until 25 if student 0.008 0.039
No statutory $ limit on medical or rehab. 
services 0.047 0.1 0.038
No time limit on right to medical or rehab. 
services 0.047 0.038
Right of appeal
Internal first level agency 0.05 0.04
Internal appeal process 0.05 0.04
Levels of appeal beyond first 0.05 0.04
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Table 5.6A Collective Bargaining: Alternative Weights





Statutory protection for collective bargaining 0.15 0.5 0.15
Election requirementsa 0.2 0.5 0.20
Unlimited subjects of bargaining 0.1 0.10
Conciliation rightsb 0.2 0.20
Striker permanent replacements prohibited 0.1 0.10
First-agreement arbitration available 0.1 0.10
Limits on rights of loser to appeal 0.15 0.15
a The jurisdiction’s subindex value is coded as 10 if the provision is in effect; 0 other-
wise.




Race, visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples 0.15 0.125 0.12
Gender 0.15 0.125 0.12
National origin or ancestry 0.10 0.125 0.069
Religion 0.10 0.125 0.069
Age 0.10 0.125 0.069
Sexual preference or orientation 0.05 0.125 0.069
Disability 0.10 0.125 0.069
Political beliefs, organization memberships 0.05 0.125 0.069
Family leave 0.05 0.069
Sexual harassment 0.03 0.069
Equal pay 0.03 0.069
Reasonable accommodation for disabled 
employees
0.04 0.069
Limits on rights of appeal 0.05 0.069
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Table 5.8A Unjust Discharge: Alternative Weights




Discharge prohibited if implicit contract 0.05 0.11
Handbook exception 0.05 0.11
Public policy exception 0.10 0.11
Covenant-of-good-faith exception 0.10 0.11
Limiteda 0.70 1.0 0.56




Subject to general duty clause 0.02 0.056
Inspection warrant required 0.053 0.17 0.042
Maximum penalty for a willful violation 0.053 0.17 0.042
Maximum penalty for a serious violation 0.053 0.16 0.042
Maximum penalty for a willful repeat 
violation 0.053 0.16 0.042
Repeat violation penalties 0.053 0.042
Willful violation causing death
Penalty for 1st offense 0.053 0.17 0.042
Penalty for 2nd offense 0.053 0.042
Penalty for failing to abate a hazard 0.053 0.17 0.042
Reduction in penalties for firms
With less than 250 employees 0.02 0.056
With written health and safety program 0.02 0.056
With no violations during a specified time 0.02 0.056
Record keeping exemptions for small firms or 
specified industries
0.02 0.056
Stricter standards than federal 0.053 0.042
Occupational safety committee or 
represenative required
0.053 0.042
Maximum imprisonment possible 0.053 0.042
Maximum penalty for contravening direction of 
safety officer or inspector
0.53 0.042
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Table 5.10A Advance Notice of Plant Closings or Large-Scale
 Layoffs: Alternative Weights
The discussion in Chapter 5 presumes that each standard is equally impor-
tant.  It is possible, however, that the value of a standard might differ across
different types of users, such as firms, unions, policymakers, or researchers.
Table 5.11A gives two examples of scenarios that a policymaker concerned
about attracting industry, or a firm making a location decision, might examine
in addition to the basic index.  Consider, for example, the interests of two types
of firms: a software development firm and a small-niche steel manufacturing
plant.  We constructed a scenario for each of these firms by simply changing
the standards such that they continue to sum to 10, but are no longer weighted
equally.  In the software case, we assume that the industry hires contract work-
ers on a project basis, that the workforce is not unionized, and that workers are
paid well above the minimum wage.  Thus minimum wage, paid time off, col-
lective bargaining, overtime, and advance notice are excluded from the analy-
sis.  We weight the remaining five standards equally.
In the case of the small steel-manufacturing plant, the plant expects to pay
all its employees a wage rate above the minimum so that standard does not ap-





Maximum penalty for minor offenses 0.053 0.042
Additional fines possible 0.053 0.042
Penalty for failing to abate a second hazard 0.053 0.042




Number of employees 0.20 0.16
Maximum time in which layoffs must occur 0.04 0.09
Advanced notice required 0.20 1.0 0.16
Notice to minister of labor or government 0.01 0.09
Notice to affected employee 0.20 0.16
Notice to union 0.10 0.09
Severance pay 0.20 0.16
Limits on appeal of agency decisions 0.05 0.09
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concerns: specifically, it is concerned about safety, because it uses a dangerous
production process, and collective bargaining, because most plants in this in-
dustry are organized.  Therefore, in this case, workers’ compensation, occupa-
tional safety and health, and collective bargaining are given twice the weights
of the remaining six standards.
The unweighted and weighted averages in the table show that the U.S. av-
erage index improves slightly relative to Canada for the software producers,
but declines considerably for the small manufacturer for both the values of the
index and the rankings.  Not shown in the table, but available from the authors
upon request, are the relative rankings of the states/provinces in the two scenar-
ious, which change somewhat.


























64.10 60.55 64.71 60.55 65.28 55.93
U.S. weighted 
average









This study takes the first step toward evaluating the differences in
labor standards between Canada and the United States by creating a
means to measure the strength of 10 labor standards in the two coun-
tries. Specifically, each standard is evaluated using an ordinal scale.
Absent provisions are assigned a score of 0 and the strongest provision
a score of 10.  Provisions of intermediate strength are assigned inter-
mediate values in accordance with the number of possible categories in
the provision.
Taking the 10 standards as a group, assuming that all standards are
equally important and that the internal scalings of the standards are
identical, the results indicate that Canadian labor standards are higher
than U.S. labor standards.  The sum of the basic unweighted Canadian
indices is 64.30, while the sum of the basic U.S. unweighted indices is
52.24.  The sum of the basic employment-weighted Canadian indices is
65.27, while the sum of the basic employment-weighted U.S. indices is
51.91. 
The superiority of the overall level of Canadian labor standards
vis-à-vis U.S. labor standards is confirmed by the ranking analysis. Of
the 12 Canadian provinces and territories, 6 are among the 10 highest
ranked in the study.  Similarly, the average Canadian ranking is 14.92,
while the average U.S. ranking is 36.02.  This difference is significant
at the 0.001 level. Thus, a broad-based overview of the labor standards
in the two countries suggests that the conventional wisdom is correct—
Canadian labor standards are indeed higher than U.S. labor standards.
An examination of the rankings on individual labor standards gen-
erally confirms the conclusions from the two broad-based analyses.
Nevertheless, in some standards  the United States is superior to Can-
ada.  The ranks on the minimum wage, overtime, and occupational
safety and health standards in the United States are higher than those in
the Canadian jurisdictions.  Moreover, the differences in the ranks
between the two countries in the equal employment opportunity and
employment equity standard is insignificant, supporting the view that
the two countries are equal with respect to this standard. Significant
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differences in favor of Canada appear in standards involving paid time
off, unemployment or employment insurance, workers’ compensation,
collective bargaining, unjust discharge, and advance notice.
Canadian jurisdictions also demonstrate greater variation than do
the jurisdictions in the United States. This is because the Canadian con-
stitutional system gives the provinces far more authority to legislate
than the U.S. constitution does to individual states in areas in which the
U.S. federal government chooses to regulate.  Thus in the United
States, if the federal government chooses to regulate in an area, federal
law creates a floor for all states, resulting in uniformity.
CAVEATS
Four important caveats should be noted when analyzing this work.  
First, the creation of the indices depends largely on the selection of
provisions within each labor standard, and on the weights given to the
various provisions.  Excluded provisions or different weights would
result in different indices.  We believe our weights are reasonable, but
other weighting schemes may also be reasonable.   By making the data
publicly available, this study allows other researchers to revise the
weighting scheme using different assumptions. We address this in
Chapter 4 by using multiple scenarios. But also, because the data are
available, other researchers can address this caveat by using the same
method but applying different weights.
Second, we define labor standards quite narrowly, limiting our def-
inition to those standards that appear in both countries and that directly
affect the employer-employee relationship in both countries.  We
exclude such issues as social security, child labor, and health insurance
even though, to some extent, these have implications for employment
relations. 
Third, our summing of the indices and the rankings assumes that
each of the standards is equally important.  It is quite likely, however,
that not all standards will be equally important to all firms and all
employees.  If a firm produces a labor-intensive product, and that firm
pays relatively low wages, the employees and management of that firm
may be most concerned about such standards as the minimum wage,
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overtime, and paid time off.  High-wage, capital-intensive employers
may be most concerned about standards that may be perceived as con-
straining hiring, such as equal employment opportunity and employ-
ment equity.  High-wage, unionized employees  may be unconcerned
about minimum wage and overtime standards. Researchers can address
such concerns by using the publicly available data to link specific stan-
dards to specific industries.  In the appendix to Chapter 5, for example,
we relax the equality assumption.  Moreover, as they can with the inter-
nal weights, researchers using the publicly available data can alter the
importance given to each standard.
Fourth, before we look beyond the United States and Canada, we
must keep in mind that in comparing the United States and Canada we
are comparing two countries that have many similarities. Any attempt
to extend this work as a template for studying other countries must take
into account any differences in such measures as the size of the infor-
mal economy in developing countries (ILO 1995), the importance of
collective bargaining as a standard-setting mechanism in European
countries, and the fact that not all countries have the same labor market
problems, suggesting that the baseline standards are not the same in all
countries.1
Nevertheless this U.S.-Canada comparison is a complex study
because of the large number of  jurisdictions in the two countries that
could promulgate labor standards. In other words, while this  study
compares only two countries, at the same time it compares 63 political
jurisdictions.  In that sense, it simulates a multicountry comparison if
the countries generally promulgate standards at the national level.
IMPLICATIONS
Despite these caveats, the results presented in this study are gener-
ally consistent with the conventional wisdom: the overall level of labor
standards in Canada is higher than the overall level of labor standards
in the United States.  These results, then, provide some validation of
the method.  The method generates the expected results.
We hope that this database will be used to answer questions that, to
a large extent, have not been researched.  Do labor standards affect
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trade flows between the United States and Canada? Are there differ-
ences in economic growth, investment, and  employment that can be
linked to the level of labor standards?  Put simply, do labor standards
matter, and, if so, how much?  More than anything else, our goal with
this study is to move the debate about international labor standards
from a reliance on assertion, theory, and morality to a reliance on anal-
ysis and results.
Note
1. For example, while guest workers represent an important labor market issue in the
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